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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this thesis is to develop a generic approach for solving reliability design 
optimisation problems which could be applicable to a diverse range of real engineering 
systems. The basic problem in optimal reliability design of a system is to explore the means 
of improving the system reliability within the bounds of available resources. Improving the 
reliability reduces the likelihood of system failure. The consequences of system failure can 
vary from minor inconvenience and cost to significant economic loss and personal injury. 
However any improvements made to the system are subject to the availability of resources, 
which are very often limited. 
The objective of the design optimisation problem analysed in this thesis is to minimise system 
unavailability (or unreliability if an unrepairable system is analysed) through the manipulation 
and assessment of all possible design alterations available, which are subject to constraints on 
resources and/or system performance requirements. This thesis describes a genetic algorithm-
based technique developed to solve the optimisation problem. Since an explicit mathematical 
form can not be formulated to evaluate the objective function, the system unavailability 
(unreliability) is assessed using the fault tree method. Central to the optimisation algorithm 
are newly developed fault tree modification patterns (FTMPs). They are employed here to 
construct one fault tree representing all possible designs investigated, from the initial system 
design specified along with the design choices. This is then altered to represent the individual 
designs in question during the optimisation process. Failure probabilities for specified design 
cases are quantified by employing Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). 
A computer programme has been developed to automate the application of the optimisation 
approach to standard engineering safety systems. Its practicality is demonstrated through the 
consideration of two systems of increasing complexity; first a High Integrity Protection 
System (HIPS) followed by a Fire Water Deluge System (FWDS). The technique is then 
further-developed and applied to solve problems of multi-phased mission systems. Two 
systems are considered; first an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and secondly a military 
vessel. The final part of this thesis focuses on continuing the development process by 
adapting the method to solve design optimisation problems for multiple multi-phased mission 
systems. Its application is demonstrated by considering an advanced UAV system involving 
multiple multi-phased flight missions. 
Abstract ii 
The applications discussed prove that the technique progressively developed in this thesis 
enables design optimisation problems to be solved for systems with different levels of 
complexity. A key contribution of this thesis is the development of a novel generic 
optimisation technique, embedding newly developed FTMPs, which is capable of optimising 
the reliability design for potentially any engineering system. Another key and novel 
contribution of this work is the capability to analyse and provide optimal design solutions for 
multiple multi-phase mission systems.  
Keywords: optimisation, system design, multi-phased mission system, reliability, genetic 
algorithm, fault tree, binary decision diagram 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
AFFF Aqueous Film-Forming Foam 
AR2TS Advances in Risk and Reliability Technology Symposium 
BDD Binary Decision Diagram 
CPU  Central processing Unit 
CW Circulating Water 
ESD Emergency Shutdown 
ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve 
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FWDS Firewater Deluge System 
FTMP Fault Tree Modification Pattern 
GA Genetic Algorithms 
GSDOA General System Design Optimisation Algorithm  
GSDOP General System Design Optimisation Programme 
HIPS High Integrity Protection System 
IP integer programming 
ite If-Then-Else 
LP Linear Programming 
MDT Maintence Down Time  
MFGP Main Fire and Gas Panel 
MG Motor Generator 
MILP Mixed Integer Linear Programming  
MINLP Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming 
MOGA Multi Objective Genetic Algorithm 
MPMSDOA Multiple Phased Missions System Design Optimisation Algorithm 
MPMSDOP Multiple Phased Missions System Design Optimisation Programme 
NLP Nonlinear Programming 
NPGA Niched Pareto Genetic Algorithm 
NSGA Non-Dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm 
PAES Pareto-Archieved Evolution Strategy 
PMSDOA Phased Mission System Design Optimisation Algorithm  
PMPSDOP Phased Mission System Design Optimisation Programme  
PSO Particle Swarm Optimisation 
PT Pressure Transmitter 
RAM  Random Accessible Memmory  
RDGA Rank-Density Based Genetic Algorithm  
RS Random Search 
RWGA Random Weighted Genetic algorithm 
SA Simulated Annealing 
SOGA Single Objective Genetic Algorithm 
SPEA Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm 
TS Tabu Search 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
VEGA Vector Evaluated Genetic Algorithm  
VFR Voltage Frequency Regulator 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
A(t) availability 
C(i) offspring population in generation i 
CI initial design cost 
CS storage cost 
CostD total system design cost 
CostM  cost assigned for system maintenance 
CostSys total system cost 
c_pi cost of a single preventive maintence activity for component i 
c_ri cost of a single repair for component i 
c_ti cost of a single maintenance test for component i 
idcost _   design cost of a component i 
itcost _  cost of maintenance testing for component i. 
ipcost _  preventive maintenance cost of the component i. 
iccost _  corrective maintenance cost of the component i. 




 *
,
*
21 PPC  
function (measure) C 
id   minimum value of the sum of the absolute differences in the values of 
objective functions between the i-th solution and any other solution in 
the P* 
( )Bdi ,x  magnitude of violation of a given constraint i for solution x  
d   mean value of the distances id  
[ ]ixE  probability that event i has occurred 
iF ,  Fi, objective function value of the individual i 
allF  the best unpenalised value of the objective function yet found 
feasF  the best feasible value of the objective function yet found 
i
fitnessF  
fitness value of the individual i 
Fj  the logical expression for the top event of the fault tree to occur in phase 
j 
i
pF   
penalty value for an infeasible individual i 
F(x) objective function 
F(t) unreliability function 
fi  objective function value of the individual i 
f1, f2 Boolean functions 
f(x) function of a variable x, structure function 
Gi gate number 
GD General Distance metric 
g(x) function of a variable x (inequality constraint)  
HT number of hours of manual work required to test the component 
h(x) function of a variable x (equality constraint)  
ICH(i)  value of the ith digit in a binary string 
m total number of components representing the system design case 
mk  maximum number of redundant components required for successful 
operation, i.e. mk≤mn 
Nomenclature v 
mn maximum possible number of redundant components 
mt  tmaximum number of possible different component types 
nb number of bits in a binary string 
nc  total number of constraints set for the problem 
N number of chromosomes in a population 
NC total number of minimal cuts set 
NS Total number of spare stored 
θ
N  number of different maintenance test intervals 
ic
N  number of system components which are tested at the same time interval  
iNFT   near-feasibility threshold that corresponds to a given constraint i 
PT  true Pareto optimal set of the problem. 
Phj  mission failure in phase j 
P(Ci)  probability that a minimal cut set i exists 
P(i)  parent populations in the generation i 
P(PFCi)  probability of phase failure combinations for phase i 
P*  non-dominated set of solutions, Pareto-optimal set of solutions 
ip   cost of a single preventive maintenance for the component i 
sysQ  system unavailability 
Q(t) unavailability function 
AVQ (t) average unavailability 
iq  unavailability value of component i. 
R(t) Reliability function 
rj  a non-negative random number 
S Spacing metric 
jT   test time for each system component. 
t time 
TU  total number of time units per examined time period,  
vi  volume parameter calculated for component i 
iW , number of expected failures of component i. 
wi  weight of component i 
wi  a constant weight for  function ( )xif  
X vector of the decision variables ( )jik ttx ,  variable indicating component k failure in time interval ( )ji tt ,  
  
iβ   Weibull distribution parameter 
iη  Weibull distribution parameter 
θ  time between inspections/maintenance activities 
iκ   user-specified severity parameter 
λ  constant conditional failure rate 
τ  mean time to repair 
ν  repair rate 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION TO RELIABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS 
Risk and reliability analysis of systems and their components is an integral part of modern 
equipment design. Furthermore every engineering project, contract and piece of equipment 
requires this discipline by law. Reliability and risk analysis has a potentially wide range of 
application areas. The developed methods have been adopted for safety cases in the nuclear, 
chemical and offshore industries. They are applied to assess the safety and reduce the hazards 
of systems in defence, marine and automotive industry areas. Risk and reliability techniques 
also find applications in production and maintenance studies during the design phase of new 
plants to improve their availability and profitability.  
Risk and reliability is a relatively new field. Its conception has been developed primarily due 
to the complexity, sophistication, and automation inherent in modern technology. Reliability 
engineering emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s when the problems of maintenance, 
repair, and field failures became severe for military equipment used. Much of the early work 
was confined to the analysis of performance aspects of systems in transportation and 
communication. In the early 1970s methods were developed for identifying hazards and for 
quantifying the consequences of failures. Over recent years major accidents such as 
Flixborough, Seveso, Piper Alpha and the Clapham rail incident increased the concern about 
risk associated with operating large plants. It prompted the focus in the use of the risk and 
reliability methods in the field of hazard assessment. Thus, engineers are working to 
maximise the benefits of modern processing technology ensuring its availability while 
reducing the safety risks to acceptable levels.  
Reliability has two connotations. One is probabilistic in nature; the other is deterministic. The 
most widely accepted definition of reliability is the ability of an item to operate under 
specified operating conditions for an assigned period of time. Considering the probabilistic 
approach the ability of an item can be designated through a probability. Thus, reliability 
theory is concerned with predicting the probability of survival of a component or system 
performing its prescribed function during a given lifetime. 
Risk can be formally defined as the potential of loss or injury resulting from exposure to a 
hazard. Quantitative risk analysis involves estimation of the degree of loss or the probability 
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that a component or system will fail to perform its function which results in a hazard 
occurring. Thus, reliability and risk are related to one another. 
1.2. SYSTEM RELIABILITY MODELING 
The main concern in reliability engineering is to identify potential failures of systems and 
prevent these failures from occurring. A system comprises a number of subsystems and 
components which are interconnected. It is important to model the reliability of individual 
items as well as the relationship between various items to determine the reliability of the 
system. One of the most important aspects of reliability analysis is the assessment of system 
reliability through the analysis of its constituent elements. 
Various probabilistic methods are employed in system reliability modelling. Available 
methods can be broadly classified into inductive and deductive techniques. Using inductive 
techniques failure modes are identified at the component level first. Next, the effect of each 
component on the overall system is established. In the deductive techniques, the analysis 
starts with the identification of the potential system failure mode and works down through the 
system to identify possible causes of the hazard. In this research project two methodologies 
have been used for system reliability analysis: fault tree analysis (FTA) and binary decision 
diagram (BDD) method. 
The FTA is a deductive technique. An undesirable event, called the top event, is postulated 
and the possible means for this event to occur are systematically deduced using a logic 
diagram, a fault tree. The deduction process is performed so that the fault tree embodies all 
component failures that contribute to the occurrence of the top event. It is also possible to 
include environmental conditions, human errors as well as specific component failures during 
the system operation. 
A FTA may be qualitative, quantitative, or both. The analysis may provide a listing of the 
possible combinations of environmental factors, human errors and component failures that 
may result in the critical system condition. The probability that the critical event will occur 
during a specified time interval can also be determined. 
Over recent years attention has been given to the development and use of the BDD method in 
system reliability analysis. A BDD is a directed acyclic graph, where all path through the 
BDD start at the root vertex and terminate in one of two states – a 1-state (system failure), or 
a 0-state (system success). BDDs provide an alternative approach to fault trees to represent 
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the failure logic of a system. The main benefit is that the method improves the efficiency and 
accuracy of the fault tree analysis procedure. 
1.3. SYSTEM DESIGN AND RELIABILITY 
During the design phase reliability engineering can have the greatest effect for enhancing the 
system’s safety and reliability. The typical design is an iterative process and several trial 
systems are analysed in sequence before an acceptable design is obtained. The process begins 
with the identification of a need and the definition of a specification for the system. The 
conceptual design stage is the best time to incorporate reliability and also maintainability 
considerations. The second step of the process is to define a preliminary design of the system. 
The third step is to carry out a detailed design and analysis for all subsystems. System testing 
and evaluation follows next. However, it may not be the last step in the design process, 
because during testing and evaluation it may be revealed that the system performance criteria 
has not been met, or the reliability level may not be satisfactory, or that constraints are not 
satisfied. In fact, re-examination may be necessary at any step of the design process.  
One of the goals of reliability engineering is to build high reliability into the system through 
careful design and analysis within the limits of constraints imposed on resources, which can 
be economic and physical. Some of the means through which system reliability can be 
enhanced are: 
• reducing the system complexity; 
• increasing the reliability of constituent components in the system; 
• use of structural redundancy; 
• putting in practice repair/preventive maintenance; 
• decreasing the downtime of the system; 
Implementation of the listed means requires resource consumption. Therefore during the 
design process the balance between reliability and resource consumption is essential. As 
modern systems are becoming more and more complicated it is highly unlikely that the trade-
offs within the available resources, such that the optimal system reliability is achieved, can be 
made manually. For this reason an optimisation algorithm integrated within the design 
process is greatly needed. 
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1.4. THE OPTIMAL RELIABILITY DESIGN PROBLEM 
System reliability is important in any system design. An optimal reliability design is such 
where the reliability of the system has been enhanced through all possible means available 
with minimum cost and under other constraints imposed on the development of a system.  
A reliability design problem can be formulated as an optimisation problem where the 
objective may be the maximisation of system reliability/availability, minimisation of system 
unreliability/unavailability, minimisation of downtime or the number of failures, or 
minimisation of the overall cost associated with the system. In the literature, reliability 
optimisation problems are classified according to the types of their decision variables as 
redundancy allocation problems, reliability allocation problems, reliability-redundancy 
allocation problems and component assignment problems. The type of reliability optimisation 
problem determines the nature of decision variables, objective function and constraints 
considered. Thus design parameters, i.e. decision variables, may include the number of 
redundancies, component reliability value or arrangement of unknown components. The 
constraints may include budget restrictions, reliability requirements or design considerations 
such as volume and weight. One more of these criteria may be included in the objective 
function, while the others may be treated as constraints. Optimal system reliability design 
involves identifying objective functions as well as decision variables and constraints. 
A wide range of mathematical optimisation methods exist, such as linear programming, 
nonlinear programming and evolutionary algorithms. However, the features offered by some 
of the methods make them inappropriate for real world system design optimisation problems. 
The majority of engineering system optimisation problems involve objective functions and 
constraints that are too complicated to manipulate with standard approaches (for example, 
linear programming optimization techniques). A genetic algorithm (GA), one of the most 
popular evolutionary algorithms, has been chosen for finding the optimal solutions for the 
reliability design optimisation problems considered in this research. The algorithm has the 
capability to solve complex and large scale optimisation problems with any kind of non-linear 
objective functions and constraints defined in discrete, continuous or mixed search spaces. 
1.5. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
One part of the reliability design optimisation process is the evaluation of design proposals, 
i.e. the objective function. The second part is the generation of new, and hopefully, better 
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designs. One of the challenges when solving an optimal reliability design problem is 
computing the objective function. Obtaining a closed-form mathematical expression for the 
objective function may be particularly difficult. In such cases the optimisation methods 
employed should not depend on the form of the objective function, which limits the number 
of optimisation techniques capable to solve reliability design optimisation problems. 
The majority of the methods used for reliability design optimisation problems consider simple 
or well-structured systems. However, real world systems are usually very complex and 
analysing its simplified structure in order to apply such methods may compromise the 
accuracy of the results. Other techniques combine additional means for performance 
evaluation of design proposals, such as fault tree analysis, with an optimisation technique. 
However these techniques were developed for specific examples and have not been applied 
for a general case system. 
This thesis is concerned with the development of a generic optimisation approach that can 
solve complex engineering system design optimisation problems and can be applicable to a 
diverse range of systems. The new approach developed will combine system reliability 
modelling techniques for the introduction and evaluation of design proposals and the 
optimisation technique for analysis and generation of solutions.  
The first type of systems to be considered is general engineering systems. The second type of 
systems analysed is phased mission systems. A large number of systems which can employ 
different technologies such as electronic, nuclear and chemical can be analysed as phased 
mission systems. However, there is no demonstrated evidence in the literature for research 
that focuses on such phased mission system design optimisation problems. The third group of 
systems considered are systems designed for multiple phased missions. For these systems 
equipment can be designed for varying conditions (military tanks) or for varying operations 
(warfare).  
The objectives of the research are to: 
1. Review existing risk and reliability assessment methods, which can be used to asses the 
performance of different system designs. Identify optimisation techniques used to solve 
reliability design optimisation problems and provide an appropriate critical review with 
regards to their application to solve such problems. Following the review the main risk and 
reliability assessment methods and the optimisation technique which would be employed 
in the developed approach will be identified. 
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2. Develop a problem-independent genetic algorithm based optimisation technique and its 
computer code. The technique will be used to construct an optimal system design case with 
the aim of minimising its unavailability and at the same time ensuring optimal usage of 
available resources. The developed code will automate the optimisation process. 
3. Demonstrate a systematic approach to system design by applying the technique developed 
in (2) to a number of safety systems. The application examples will demonstrate scalability 
and the potential of the technique to be applicable to a range of different systems. Critical 
appraisal of the application results will highlight the algorithm deficiencies that may result 
in modifications of the initial approach. 
4. Develop a general genetic algorithm based optimisation technique and its computer code 
for multi-phased missions analysis. The optimisation technique will define the optimal 
phased mission system design with the aim to minimise the overall mission failure 
probability and to spend available resources for the best use. 
5. Utilise the technique derived in (4) to demonstrate its potential applicability to different 
systems and scalability to problems with a diverse degree of complexity. 
6. Develop and apply the general genetic algorithm based optimisation approach and its code 
to solve the design optimisation problems of phased mission systems involved in multiple 
missions. The approach will be used to construct an optimal design for the phased mission 
systems considering their performance and optimal usage of available resources throughout 
multiple missions. 
2. FAULT TREE AND BINARY DECISION 
DIAGRAM ANALYSIS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
FTA is one of the engineering approaches used for systems safety and operational analysis 
[1]. It is a deductive methodology that specifies a system failure mode through logic 
statements of possible causes of system failure. FTA provides a schematic description of the 
possible combinations of system conditions that could lead to its failure. It can be both a 
design tool that identifies probable accidents in a system design and a diagnostic tool for 
prediction of hazardous causes of system failure. FTA involves two major steps: construction 
of the fault tree and its evaluation [2]. In the current research project FTA is used to represent 
system designs through the analysis of its causes of failure. 
Fault trees are not, however, an ideal form for mathematical analysis. Quantitative fault tree 
analysis for complex systems can be computationally very extensive. As an alternative, 
BDDs, which represent the logic of system failure, are easier to manipulate than the fault tree 
for an exact quantitative assessment. BDDs were first introduced by Lee [3] for the 
representation of switching circuits. Later Akers [4] derived the basic BDD methodology 
aiming to define a diagram for a digital function which determines the output values of the 
function by examining the values of the inputs. Bryant [5] extended the BDD application to 
Boolean functions with further restrictions on the ordering of variables in the diagrams. The 
method for reliability analysis based on the BDD was introduced by Rauzy [6]. The proposed 
method improved the efficiency of analysis for the introduced industrial systems. In the 
current research project the BDD technique is used for the quantitative analysis of fault trees 
representing system designs. 
In this chapter FTA is discussed in Section 2.2. Fault tree construction is described in Section 
2.2.1. Qualitative and quantitative FTA is detailed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 respectively. 
Section 2.3 discusses the BDD methodology. First, the BDD architecture is described in 
Section 2.3.1. BDD construction and reduction procedures are detailed in Sections 2.3.2 and 
2.3.3 respectively. Finally, qualitative and quantitative BDD analysis is discussed in Sections 
2.3.4 and 2.3.5 respectively. 
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2.2. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
2.2.1. Fault Tree Construction 
Construction of a system fault tree is based on the knowledge of its design and operation [2]. 
It is a process of developing a tree of logical relationships among possible events that result in 
a specific system failure that is called a top event. The term event defines a dynamic change of 
state of a system element. In addition such factors as human actions or environmental 
characteristics can also be identified as events. Logical relationships among events are defined 
using gates. 
Thus a fault tree is a hierarchical diagram consisting of events and gates. The symbols 
representing different types of fault tree events are shown in Table 2.1. The rectangle defines 
the top event or an intermediate event that is the output of a logic gate. The circle represents a 
basic failure of a system element and is an input to a logic gate. The house event is an event 
that is expected either to occur or does not occur, i.e. it can be in a TRUE or FALSE state. 
Table 2.1. Event Symbols 
Event  
Symbol Meaning of Symbol 
 
Top event/ 
intermediate event 
 
Basic event 
 
House event 
The fundamental logic gates used in fault tree construction include the AND and the OR gate. 
An output event of the AND gate occurs if and only if all input events are present 
simultaneously. The OR gate describes the existence of an output event when at least one of 
input events exist. Other frequently used gates are the NOT gate and the k/n vote. The NOT 
gate describes the logic of occurrence of an output event when none of the input events occur. 
Finally, the k/n vote gate provides an output event if at least k out of n inputs occur. The k/n 
vote gate can be transformed to a branch of a fault tree using OR and AND gates. The symbols 
for the gates are presented in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2. Gate Symbols 
Gate Symbol Gate Name Causal Relation 
 
AND Output event results if all input 
event occur simultaneously 
 
OR Output event results if one or 
more input events occur 
 
NOT Output event result if the input 
event does not occur 
n inputs
k
 
k/n vote Output event results if at least k 
out of n input event occur. 
A house event is a special type of event employed for specific use within a fault tree analysis. 
It can be turned on or off to specify the conditions present under a specific scenario. When a 
house event is turned on (TRUE state) the event is presumed to have occurred and the 
probability of that event is set to 1. When a house event is turned off (FALSE state) it is 
presumed that the event has not occurred, and the probability is set to 0. If a house event is 
turned on the gate that the house event inputs to is calculated normally. By turning a house 
event off, the gate that the house event inputs to can be removed from the tree. 
In current research house events are utilised to make parts of a fault tree functional or non-
functional when considering different system design options. For example, consider a water 
deluge system that can fail if either its pump fails or the nozzle is blocked. The system can 
have a pump fitted that can be chosen out of two samples – type 1 or type 2. Both scenarios 
can be represented in one fault tree using two house events as shown in Figure 2.1a. By 
turning one house event off the resulting fault tree will represent the failure causes of the 
deluge system with the specified pump sample. Figure 2.1 b) shows the case when house 
event PT1 has been turned off (a Type 1 pump has not been fitted) and house event PT2 set to 
TRUE (Type 2 is fitted). 
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Water Deluge 
System Fails
Nozzle is 
Blocked
Pump 
Fails
NB
Type 1 Pump 
is Fitted
PT1
Type 1 Pump is 
Fitted & Fails
Type 1 
Pump Fails
PF
Type 2 Pump is 
Fitted & Fails
Type 2 Pump 
is Fitted
PT2
Type 2 
Pump Fails
PFT2
Water Deluge 
System Fails
Nozzle is 
Blocked
Pump 
Fails
NBType 2 Pump is Fitted & Fails
Type 2 Pump 
is Fitted
PT2
Type 2 
Pump Fails
PFT2
a) b)
 
Figure 2.1. Fault Trees with House Event(s) 
A constructed fault tree provides a convenient format of the possible causes of a specific 
system failure. Evaluation of the fault tree can be performed qualitatively and quantitatively 
[2]. 
2.2.2. Qualitative Analysis 
Qualitative fault tree analysis involves the identification of the causes of a specific system 
failure which can occur due to failure of an individual system element or a combination of 
failures of system elements. A set of basic events whose existence cause the top event to 
occur is called a cut set. For example, a fault tree contains four basic events A, B, C and D. 
Failure of components A and B or C and D can lead to the top event as shown in Figure 2.2. 
As a result seven cut sets can be identified for this case: {A, B}, {C, D}, {A, B, C}, {A, B, 
D}, {A, C, D}, {B, C, D}{A, B, C, D}. 
A B D
TOP
G1
C
G2
 
Figure 2.2. Example Fault Tree 
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For larger systems the number of cut sets can dramatically increase. Therefore in order to 
simplify the analysis consideration is usually given only to those cut sets that include the 
smallest combination of basic events. From the given example it would be cut sets {A, B} and 
{C, D}. The cut set {A, B, C} would not be considered. The cut set includes event C and its 
state is irrelevant to system failure since the system fails due to the occurrence of A and B. A 
cut set that can not be reduced and still ensures the existence of the top event is called a 
minimal cut set.  
The aim of qualitative analysis is to produce a list of minimal cut sets for a given top event. 
Since each minimal cut set consists of a combination of component failures relevant to the 
given top event, the list of minimal cut sets is unique to this top event. A number of basic 
events in a minimal cut set defines its order. A one-component minimal cut set is called a 
first-order minimal cut set, a two-component set defines second-order minimal cut set and etc. 
In general, lower order minimal cut sets identify major contributors to system failure. 
The top event can be represented in terms of a Boolean equation where fault tree events are 
logic variables and the final result is a sum of products (s-o-p). This transformation provides 
the list of all minimal cut sets relevant to the top event. One way of obtaining the s-o-p is 
using the top-down approach. However in some cases the resulting s-o-p may not be minimal 
and so the minimal cut sets cannot be obtained directly. Boolean reduction rules [7] need to 
be applied to allow the extraction of the minimal cut sets.  
2.2.3. Minimal Cut Set Algorithms 
The top-down approach mentioned earlier for obtaining minimal cut sets is based on logic 
Boolean operations together with substitution, expansion and reduction methods. Here each 
AND gate implements the logical AND function or intersection and is represented by the 
product (.). The OR gate is the logical OR function or union and is denoted by a sum sign (+). 
Correspondingly the NOT gate is the logical NOT function or inverter which is denoted by a 
horizontal bar over the variable to be inverted. Input events of each gate are variables of the 
corresponding logic function. 
The top-down approach is started by deriving a logic expression for the top event. The listed 
Boolean events in the expression are then expanded by substituting in the logic expressions 
appearing one level lower in the tree. To simplify the expansion process Boolean reduction 
rules can be applied where necessary. The process is continued until the expression remaining 
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has only basic events. If the resulting s-o-p expression is not minimal then Boolean Laws of 
Algebra are applied. The obtained products are the minimal cut sets for the fault tree.  
As an example consider the fault tree in Figure 2.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Example Fault Tree 
The logical function for the top event TOP comprises of two Boolean events: 
TOP = G1.G2 
As G1 and G2 are gates they can be expanded into the following logic expressions: 
G1 = G3 +G4, G2 = G5.A 
Similarly expressions are substituted for G3 and G4 that results in the full expansion of gate 
G1: 
G1 = A.B + B +C. 
The obtained expression is simplified and the number of terms in the equation is reduced. The 
Absorption Law is used: 
G1 = B + C 
After the second Boolean event of the top logic function (G2) is fully expanded and Boolean 
reductions rules are applied the TOP equation is reduced:  
TOP = A.B.D + A.C 
TOP
A B C
G1
G3 G4
G2
G5
B C D
A
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This is the minimal form of the s-o-p. Each term is a minimal cut set. Thus for the given 
example fault tree two minimal cut sets exist. One cut set is of order two, i.e. contains two 
elements, {A, C} and the other one is of order three {A, B, D}. 
Although the presented algorithm is not complex, the task to obtain the minimal cut sets for 
larger systems can become computationally intensive. There are a number of alternative 
techniques introduced to obtain minimal cut sets in a more efficient manner. For example, 
computation time and the memory required for minimal cut set generation can be reduced by 
employing BDDs [6], [8] since they provide a faster means of analysing fault trees. The 
BDDs will be discussed in detail in Section 2.3. 
2.2.4. Quantitative Analysis 
The aim of the quantitative analysis of the fault tree is to quantify a number of parameters in 
order to assess the system performance. It is used to calculate the probability and frequency of 
occurrence for the top event. It may also provide importance measures which indicate the 
contribution of specific basic events and their groups to the top event. 
To quantify performance measures for a system, it is necessary to have the corresponding 
information for its components. The means for quantification of component performance are 
discussed in the following Sub-section 2.2.4.1 
2.2.4.1. Parameters of Component Performance 
A number of characteristics can be employed to describe component and system performance. 
The most useful ones include a measure of time to first failure, i.e. reliability, and a measure 
of expected up-time, i.e. availability. 
For components that can be repaired, and so for which failure can be tolerated, a relevant 
measure of performance is availability. Availability, A(t), is defined as the probability that a 
component is functioning at a given point in time. It is the fraction of the total time that a 
component is able to perform the required function. The complement of availability is 
unavailability, Q(t) (Equation 2.1). It is the probability that a component is failed at time t. 
( ) ( )tAtQ −= 1  (2.1) 
Reliability, R(t), is a relevant measure for components where failure cannot be tolerated, and 
so the successful operation of the component over a stated period of time is an important 
performance measure. It is the probability that a component will operate without failure for a 
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stated period of time under specified conditions. The probability that a component fails to 
work continuously over a stated time interval under specified conditions is known as its 
unreliability, F(t), where: 
( ) ( )tRtF −= 1  (2.2) 
2.2.4.2. Maintenance Policies 
Unavailability of a component is also influenced by the way it is maintained. There are three 
basic types of maintenance repair policies [7]: 
 1. No repair. 
 2. Unscheduled maintenance; repair is initiated when failure is revealed. 
 3. Scheduled maintenance; repair is initiated when failure is discovered. 
If a component is unrepairable, for example an aircraft part whilst in flight, then its 
unavailability is equal to its unreliability. If it is considered that a components failure rate is 
constant then the unavailability is: 
( ) ( ) tetFtQ λ−−== 1 ,  (2.3) 
where λ is a constant conditional failure rate, a measure of the rate at which failures occur. 
If a component undergoes unscheduled maintenance its repair is carried out when a failure is 
revealed. Since the failure is immediately known the time to fix the failure includes repair 
time only and no detection time is included. For constant failure and repair rates it can be 
shown that the unavailability of the component is given by: 
( ) ( )( )tetQ νλ
νλ
λ +−
−
+
= 1   (2.4) 
Here ν is a repair rate which is assumed to be constant. 
The third type, i.e. scheduled maintenance is common for systems which are not continuously 
operating, for example, protection systems. In this case a component failure will be revealed 
if a system is maintained or it is in operation. The time that a component is in the failed state 
will include the time it takes to identify the occurrence of a failure and the time needed to 
repair the component. If again it is considered that the failure rate is constant, θ is the time 
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between inspections and it is assumed that between inspections the component is effectively 
non-repairable then the average component unavailability is: 
( )λθθλθ λ λθλθθ −
−
−
−−=








+=−= ∫ e
e
tdteQ
t
t
AV 1
11111
00
   (2.5) 
The average unavailability for components that undergo scheduled maintenance can be 
approximated as follows: 






+= τ
θλ
2AV
Q , (2.6) 
where τ is the mean time to repair. 
2.2.5. Assessment of System Performance 
The fault tree is drawn for a particular failure mode of the system. Therefore the probability of 
occurrence of the top event is the probability of that failure. The general method which gives 
the exact probability of the top event existence is based on minimal cut sets and the Inclusion-
exclusion principle. Thus the top event probability (system failure probability) is given by: 








=
=
U
c
N
i
isys CPtQ
1
)(  (2.7) 
where P(Ci) is the probability that a minimal cut set i exists, NC is the total number of minimal 
cuts set in the fault tree that can not be smaller than one, i.e. at least one minimal cut set has to 
exist. 
Expanding Equation 2.7 gives the Inclusion-exclusion formula: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
cN
cN
cN
i
i
j
ji
cN
i
isys CCCPCCPCPtQ ∩∩−++∩−= −
=
−
==
∑∑∑ ...1...)( 211
2
1
11
I   (2.8) 
For example, consider the example fault tree presented in Figure 2.3. The fault tree has two 
minimal cut set C1 = {A, C} and C2 = {A, B, D}. The expression for the calculation of the top 
event probability when using the inclusion-exclusion principle is obtained as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )DPBPCPAPDPBPAPCPAP
DBACAPDBAPCAPCPCPCPCPtQsys
⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅+⋅=
=−+=⋅−+= .......2121
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The increasing fault tree complexity results in more and more intensive computation in order 
to evaluate the top event probability when using the inclusion-exclusion principle. For 
exceedingly large problems a solution for the intensive computation problem could be the use 
of approximations. Upper and Lower Bounds for system unavailability and the Minimal Cut 
Set Upper Bound are the most commonly used approximation methods.  
2.3. BINARY DECISION DIAGRAMS 
2.3.1. BDD Architecture 
With the BDD method the fault tree is first transformed into a BDD which encodes Shannon’s 
decomposition [9] and represents the Boolean equation for the top event. It allows the 
minimal cut sets to be obtained directly and the exact failure probability to be determined in 
an efficient way. 
A BDD is composed of a root vertex, non-terminal (internal) vertices and terminal vertices 
which are connected by branches. Sometimes vertices are also called nodes and branches are 
named edges. Terminal vertices end with the value 1 or 0 that corresponds to the system state, 
while non-terminal vertices represent the corresponding basic events of the fault tree. Every 
vertex has two branches with the assigned value 1 or 0. The branch with value 1 represents 
failure of a basic event or vertex occurrence and the 0 branch indicates functioning of the 
basic event or vertex non-occurrence. All the left branches leaving a vertex are the 1 branches, 
where the right branches are assigned the value 0. Figure 2.4 represents an example of a 
BDD. 
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B
A
C
D1         0         
1         0         
0         
Root Vertex
Non-terminal 
Vertex
1 0
1 1
1
0 0
0
Terminal 
0 Vertex
Terminal 
1 Vertex
0 Branch1 Branch
 
Figure 2.4. BDD Example 
Fault tree cut sets can be directly found from its BDD. Every path through the diagram starts 
at the root vertex and proceeds to a terminal vertex. All the paths terminating in a 1 state 
yields the cut sets of the fault tree. A minimal cut set is formed by the vertices that lie on 1 
branches on the way to a terminal 1 vertex. For example, there are 2 paths that terminate in a 
1 state in the BDD presented in Figure 2.4: { BA, } and { DCA ,, }. Since vertex A lies on the 
0 branch in the second path it is not included in the minimal cut set. Thus the given BDD has 
two minimal cut sets: { BA, } and { DC, }. 
2.3.2. BDD Construction 
Two methods are commonly used to convert a fault tree to the appropriate BDD. The first 
method is based on the top event logic function, while the second is derived using 
If-Then-Else (ite) technique. The logic function method requires a considerable amount of 
simplification by applying Boolean reduction laws after each function evaluation. These 
problems can be alleviated when using the second method. 
The ite structure for the BDD construction was first introduced by Rauzy [6]. The method 
derives from Shannon’s formula which is applied at each gate of the fault tree. To illustrate 
the formula consider a Boolean structure function for the top event f(X). Pivoting about any 
variable xi, the Shannon formula can be written as 
( ) 21 fxfxf ii +=X  (2.9) 
where f1 and f2 are Boolean functions with xi = 1 and 0 respectively. The ite structure that 
corresponds to Equation 2.9 is ite(xi, f1, f2). It means if the Boolean variable xi fails then 
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consider logic function f1 else consider logic function f2. Since the 1 branch in the BDD 
represents failure, f1 lies on the 1 branch and f2 appears on the 0 branch. The diagrammatic 
representation of the ite structure is in Figure 2.5. 
 
xi
f1         f2        
1 0
 
Figure 2.5. Representation of ite(xi, f1, f2) 
Consider 
( )2,1, ffxJ ite=  and ( )2,1, ggyH ite=   
The following operation procedures can be defined for the ite structures: 
( )
( ) y x if2op2,1op1,op
y  x ifop2,op1,op
==
<=
gfgfxHJ
HfHfxHJ
ite
ite
    (2.10) 
Here op  represents the Boolean operations such as AND (·) and OR (+). The introduced 
procedures can be simplified using the following identities: 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ).2,1,2,1,0
,12,1,1
,02,1,0
,2,1,2,1,1
ffxffx
ffx
ffx
ffxffx
iteite
ite
ite
iteite
=+
=+
=⋅
=⋅
  (2.11) 
Construction of the BDD from a fault tree is implemented according to the following 
conversion procedure: 
Basic events are given an ordering, such as x < y or A < B (example from Figure 2.4). 
Usually a top-down ordering procedure is employed. According to the scheme the basic 
events placed higher up the tree are listed first and are “less than” those basic events 
appearing further down the tree. There are other ordering schemes such as top-down left-right, 
top-down left-right repeated, depth-first or priority depth first. The chosen ordering scheme 
may influence the size of the resulting BDD. 
Assign each basic event xi in the fault tree the ite structure ite(xi, f1, f2). 
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Consider each gate in the fault tree in a bottom-up approach. 
Derive the ite structure for the top event and simplify the expression. 
To draw the BDD successively break down each ite structure in the top event into its 1 and 0 
branches. 
As an example of the BDD construction method the fault tree in Figure 2.6 is considered. 
 
TOP
B C D
G1
G2 G3
B
A
 
Figure 2.6. Example Fault Tree 
To order the basic events a top-down, left-right ordering is used resulting in A < B < C < D. 
Each event is assigned an ite structure. Working from the bottom of the tree to the top 
operation procedures (2.10 and 2.11) are applied: 
( ) ( )
( )( )0,0,1,,
0,1,0,1,2
CB
CBG
iteite
iteite
=
⋅=
 
( ) ( )
( )( )0,0,1,,
0,1,0,1,3
DB
BBG
iteite
iteite
=
⋅=
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( )0,0,1,,1,,
0,0,1,0,1,,
0,0,1,,0,0,1,,
321
DCB
DCB
DBCB
GGG
iteiteite
iteiteite
iteiteiteite
=
+=
+=
+=
 
Finally the top event is expressed: 
( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( )( )0,0,0,1,,1,,,
0,0,1,,1,,0,1,
1.TOP
DCBA
DCBA
GA
iteiteiteite
iteiteiteite
=
⋅=
=
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Once the ite structure for the top event is given the BDD is constructed by successively 
dividing each ite structure into the corresponding 1 and 0 branches. According to the given 
ordering event A is considered first and it becomes the root vertex. The structure 
( )( )( )0,0,1,,1,, DCB iteiteite  lies below its left branch and its right branch is the terminal 0 
vertex. According to the ordering next variable B follows, which is encoded in the vertex 
beneath the 1 branch of the A vertex. Thus the structure ( )( )( )0,0,1,,1,, DCB iteiteite  is 
analysed. Then ( )( )0,1,,1, DC iteite  will lie below the left branch of B and the right branch will 
terminate in the terminal 0 vertex. Following event C is considered and its branches are 
determined by breaking down the structure ( )( )0,1,,1, DC iteite . Its left branch terminates in the 
terminal vertex 1 and the right branch terminates in the last non-terminal vertex representing 
event D. The D vertex is finally broken down into terminal vertices 1 and 0. When all basic 
events have been considered and all branches end with terminal vertices the construction 
process is terminated. The resulting BDD is presented in Figure 2.7. 
B
A
C
D1         
0         
1         0         
1 0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0         
 
Figure 2.7. BDD for the Fault Tree in Figure 2.6 
2.3.3. Reduction 
The size of the fault tree influences the size of the BDD. However different basic event 
orderings applied to the same fault tree will result in different sized BDDs. Therefore a poor 
ordering can result in an inefficient BDD. One way of producing a more efficient diagram can 
be the application of reduction procedures for repeated nodes. 
Two reduction operations can be performed in order to remove the irrelevant repeated events. 
For example, if a node X has two equivalent nodes lying below its left and right branches, 
then node X can be deleted and all of its incoming edges need to be directed to a node 
attached to its left branch. Figure 2.8 illustrates the procedure. Another reduction operation is 
Chapter 2. Fault Tree and Binary Decision Diagram Analysis 
 
21 
applicable when two nodes are equivalent and their incoming edges are directed to different 
nodes where one of them lies beneath another as it is shown in Figure 2.9 a). In this case one 
of the repeated nodes is deleted and its incoming edge is directed to the remaining node. The 
diagram resulting from this reduction is shown in Figure 2.9 b). 
W
V
X
1         
1 0
1
1
0
0
0         
X
1         0         
1 0
0         
V
X
1         
1
1
0
0
0         
0         
a) b)
 
Figure 2.8. BDD Reduction Operation 1 
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1
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X
1 0
0         1         
V
X
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1
1
0
0
0         
W
1 0
0         
a) b)
 
Figure 2.9. BDD Reduction Operation 2 
2.3.4. Quantitative BDD Analysis 
On the contrary to the fault tree approach, the BDD method used for the exact solution of the 
top event avoids the need to use approximations. The probability of the top event is obtained 
directly from the diagram which makes this method computationally efficient. If employing 
the BDD method system performance measures, such as the earlier mentioned system failure 
probability (the top event probability), unconditional system failure intensity or importance 
measures, can be found [10]. In this section the BDD methodology to evaluate the system 
failure probability is discussed. 
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As discussed, the BDD is constructed employing the ite structure which is derived from 
Shannon’s formula. Given a structure function f(X) for the top event, the probability is 
obtained by taking the expectation of each term of Equation 2.9: 
( )[ ] [ ] ( ) [ ]211 fEqfEqXfE ii ⋅−+⋅=   (2.12) 
where [ ]ii xEq =  is the probability that event i has occurred. 
Iteratively expanding the terms in Equation 2.12, i.e. calculating expectations for each node, 
results in a sum of disjoint products. In the resulting expression each product corresponds to a 
particular path through the BDD to a terminal 1 vertex. Therefore the probability of 
occurrence of the top event, sysQ , is obtained by calculating the sum of the probabilities of the 
disjoint paths through the BDD. The disjoint paths are found by traversing all paths from the 
root vertex to terminal 1 vertices and including all events which lie on the 1 and 0 branches 
for each of the basic events.  
Consider the BDD presented in Figure 2.10. In order to find the top probability, Equation 
2.12 is applied to each node in the BDD in a bottom-up approach. Thus the nodes which have 
both terminal vertices are considered first: 
( ) [ ] ( ) DDD qqqFEDF =⋅−+⋅=⇒= 01160,1,6 ite , 
( ) [ ] ( ) EEE qqqFEEF =⋅−+⋅=⇒= 01130,1,3 ite , 
Then node F5 is considered. Its ite structure is: 
( )0,6,5 FCF ite= . 
Applying Equation 2.12 and substituting in the probability of node F6, the probability of node 
F5 is found: 
[ ] [ ] ( ) DCCC qqqFEqFE ⋅=⋅−+⋅= 0165 . 
In the same manner the probabilities for nodes F4 and F2 are evaluated: 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) DCEEDCEE qqqqqqqqFEFEF ⋅⋅−+=⋅⋅−+⋅=⇒= 11145,1,4 ite . 
( ) [ ] ( )( ) ( )
( ) .1
1123,4,2
EDCEB
EBDCEEB
qqqqq
qqqqqqqFEFFBF
+⋅⋅−⋅=
⋅−+⋅⋅−+⋅=⇒= ite
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Finally the probability of occurrence of the top event, i.e. the sum of the probabilities of the 
disjoint paths through the BDD is found: 
( ) [ ] ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) .111
1111;2,4,1
EDCEBADCEA
EDCEBADCEEA
qqqqqqqqqq
qqqqqqqqqqqFEFFBF
+⋅⋅−⋅⋅−+⋅⋅−⋅=
+⋅⋅−⋅⋅−+⋅⋅−+⋅== ite
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Figure 2.10. Example BDD 
2.4. SUMMARY 
The operation of a system can be considered from two standpoints: enumeration of various 
ways for system success, or enumeration of various ways leading to system failure. A primary 
goal of system reliability and safety analysis is to identify the causal relationships between 
events resulting in system failure and to find ways to reduce their numbers and impact by 
system redesigns and upgrades. In this chapter two methods have been introduced which are 
widely used in the field of reliability engineering. 
The fault tree provides the diagrammatic failure logic of the system. Hence it can be used to 
identify problematic areas in the system design. Fault trees can be used for both qualitative 
analysis (to find system minimal cut sets) and quantitative system analysis (to evaluate system 
performance parameters), for example, system unavailability. However fault tree analysis for 
complex systems can be computationally very intensive. In order to reduce calculations 
approximations may be introduced, which however leads to the loss of accuracy. BDDs were 
introduced as a more efficient method for quantitative fault tree analysis. 
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The BDD method converts a fault tree to the BDD which encodes a Boolean equation for the 
top event. By using the BDD both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis can be 
achieved. The BDD method enables the exact system unavailability to be determined without 
explicitly using minimal cut sets which makes the method computationally very efficient. 
However the size of the BDD depends on the given ordering of the basic events used to built 
the BDD. Badly chosen ordering may result in a computationally-intensive BDD structure 
which reduces the efficiency of the analysis. 
Both the fault tree analysis and the BDD technique are employed in this research. Since a 
fault tree provides a diagrammatic description of the failure logic it is used as a design tool for 
system design representation. BDD methods are computationally efficient mechanisms for 
quantitative fault tree analysis, therefore the analysed system unavailability value for an 
individual design is found using the BDD methodology. The application of these techniques is 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 7. 
3. TECHNIQUES FOR DESIGN 
OPTIMISATION IN RELIABILITY 
ENGINEERING 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Optimisation Theory is widely used to solve engineering problems where the emphasis is on 
the maximisation or minimisation of a certain goal. From an engineering point of view one 
part of optimisation is the evaluation of design proposals. The second part is the generation of 
new improved designs. The goal of optimisation is to find the optimal solution given the 
properties of the system being designed and the behaviour of the system model [11]. 
A general mathematical form of the optimisation problem can be written as follows: 
( )Xfmax(min) , (3.1) 
subject to inequality and equality constraints: 
( ) ;,...,1,0 Iigi =≥X  (3.2) 
( ) .,...,1,0 Jjh j ==X  (3.3) 
The vector X ( ),...,,( 21 nxxx=X ) is referred to as vector of design variables. The objective 
function, ( )Xf , given by Equation 3.1 measures the quality of the solution. The objective 
function as well as the constraint functions defined by Equations 3.2 and 3.3 may be linear or 
nonlinear functions of the design variables X. These functions may be explicit or implicit in X 
and may be evaluated using analytical or numerical techniques [12]. 
The optimisation of a system design is a classical optimisation problem in the area of system 
reliability engineering [13]. In general, the objective of such problems is to optimise a 
function-of-merit of the system design (reliability, cost, mean time to failure, etc) subject to 
known constraints on resources (cost, weight, volume, etc) and/or system performance 
requirements (reliability, availability, mean time to failure, etc.) [14]. A design is considered 
to be optimal if all the possible means available have been explored to enhance the reliability 
of the system under certain objectives, operational requirements and allocated resources. 
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The diversity of system structures, resource constraints and options for reliability 
improvement lead to the construction and application of several optimisation techniques [13]. 
The most common optimisation techniques which have been applied in the optimisation of 
system reliability, and have had some success in solving particular optimisation problems, are 
these: linear programming, nonlinear programming, discrete optimisation, dynamic 
programming, modern heuristsics (metaheuristics) and multi-objective optimisation 
techniques. In some cases to find an optimal solution a group of optimisation techniques can 
be employed. Conversely, it is almost unrealistic to solve all reliability optimisation problems 
using one method. 
In this chapter the basic concepts behind the listed optimisation techniques are considered. 
Examples of the applications of the techniques in reliability optimisation are also provided. 
Moreover, where appropriate a critical review, with regards to their application to reliability 
optimisation problems, is expressed. Section 3.2 covers linear programming. Nonlinear 
programming methods are discussed in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 concepts and application 
examples of discrete optimisation methods are provided. Section 3.5 discussed meta-
heuristics. The genetic algorithm method, an optimisation technique employed in this 
research, is discussed in more detail in Section 3.5.4. 
3.2. LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
Linear programming (LP) is the fundamental mathematical optimisation method. A number of 
optimisation problems can be expressed as linear programming problems. For example, 
nonlinear problems can be solved through a series of linear programming problems. 
LP deals with problems where f(X) is a linear function of n variables and the constraints are 
also linear. There are two main classes of algorithms to solve LP problems. The first class 
contains simplex-type algorithms, the second is the class of interior-point methods [15]. The 
simplex methods move from one extreme point on the boundary (vertex) of the feasible 
region to another along the edges of the boundary iteratively. This involves identifying the 
constraints (lines) on which the solution will lie [16]. An interior-point algorithm, in contrast 
to the classical Simplex algorithm, searches for a feasible solution point through the interior 
of the feasible region [17]. 
LP in reliability optimization is used for solving an optimisation problem with a linear form 
of non-negative variables subject to a system of linear inequalities or a nonlinear optimisation 
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problem having been transformed into a linear form. Kolesar [18] considered an optimal 
assignment of redundant components in systems which are subject to random failure. In 
general, the objective of the problems solved was to maximise the system reliability through 
assignment of redundant components subject to constraints on the total weight, cost, and so 
forth of the system. The constraint functions were of the linear form. The problems analysed 
included systems subject to a single type of failure and systems subject to both the possibility 
of premature operation and the possibility of failure to operate on command. In each case the 
problem was expressed as a linear programme. 
Hsieh in [19] investigated reliability problems subject to multiple separable linear constraints 
of series–parallel redundant systems, where each subsystem had multiple component choices. 
A simple linear programming approach was proposed that approximates the integer nonlinear 
programming problem. The numerical results presented demonstrated the efficiency of the 
proposed approach, however it could not be guaranteed that the approach derived the global 
optimums. The main limitation of the approach was with regards to the requirements defined 
for constraints; they had to be linear and separable. 
Most of the reliability optimisation problems have a nonlinear objective function and/or 
nonlinear constraints. Therefore the greatest disadvantage of the LP technique with regards to 
its application in reliability optimisation problems is the supposed linearity of the objective 
and constraint functions. Another disadvantage of LP techniques is that they are very time-
consuming when solving large scale optimisation problems. 
3.3. NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING 
Nonlinear programming (NLP) involves problems where either the objective function, the 
constraints, or both are nonlinear. There are three main approaches for solving a NLP 
problem. The first approach involves methods with an iterative feasible direction search. This 
approach is useful for problems involving linear constraints. Methods from the second 
approach are based on Lagrange multipliers and can be easily implemented when the system 
involves single equality constraints. Using the third approach the solution of a constraint 
optimisation problem is obtained by solving a sequence of unconstrained optimisation 
problems, whose objective functions are penalised for violating the constraints. In this case 
solutions to the unconstrained problems approach an optimal solution of the original 
constrained problem [13]. 
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Most of the reliability optimisation problems are discrete, mixed integer and nonlinear 
optimisation problems. Such problems can be solved by using NLP methods if appropriate 
rounding off procedures for integer variables are utilised. Everett III in [20] used the Lagrange 
multiplier method to optimise the redundancy of an m-stage system, each stage of which 
consisted of a number ni of parallel (redundant) components. The formulated objective was to 
choose the stage redundancies (ni 's) in such a manner as to minimise the cost of achieving 
some stated system reliability (or alternately, to maximise the system reliability subject to 
constrained total cost). Hwang et al. [21] proposed an augmented Lagrangian method and a 
reduced gradient method for system reliability optimisation. Li and Haimes in [22] proposed a 
3-level decomposition approach for the optimal allocation of available resources to 
subsystems in order to maximise the reliability of a large system with a general network 
structure. The developed methodology greatly reduces the complexity of the large problem by 
solving several smaller-dimensional sub-problems iteratively. The sub-problems can be 
solved by any existing nonlinear programming method.  
Both the generalised reduced gradient and Lagrangian methods are promising in solving 
reliability optimisation problems [23]. The Lagrangian method is not limited to differentiable 
functions and can be applied in situations involving the maximisation of any type of function 
over any set of strategies, discrete or continuous, numerical or non-numerical, with 
constraints that can be represented as bounds on real valued functions over the same strategy 
set [20]. However most of these techniques are problem-orientated. Therefore since they are 
designed for solving certain problems, it is difficult to adopt them for solving other problems 
[24]. Moreover, it is not always possible to solve larger scale problems using these 
approaches. 
3.4. DISCRETE OPTIMISATION 
Discrete optimisation problems involve discrete (integer) decision variables. It includes 
integer programming (IP), mixed integer linear programming (MILP) and mixed integer 
nonlinear programming (MINLP) problems [25]. In IP problems decision variables are scalar 
and integer. In MILP optimisation problems the linear objective function and linear 
constraints are analysed, and integer as well as continuous decision variables are involved. 
MINLP optimisation problems are similar to NP problems, however MINLP involves integer 
and continuous decision variables.  
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The majority of reliability optimisation problems are nonlinear integer programming 
problems. Since their solutions need to be integer they are more difficult to solve than general 
nonlinear programming problems. Discrete optimization approaches, such as dynamic 
programming, branch-and-bound techniques and integer programming methods are the most 
widely used exact optimisation approaches for solving such problems.  
Yalaoui et al. [26] proposed a new dynamic programming method for the reliability 
redundancy allocation problem for series-parallel systems, where components and their 
reliability belong to a finite set. The solved problem is decomposed into as many sub-
problems as subsystems. The global problem consists of determining the reliability target of 
the subsystems. In the obtained method sub-problems and the global problem are solved by a 
dynamic programming technique and result in convergence towards an optimal solution. Ng 
and Sancho used a hybrid ‘dynamic programming/depth-first search’ algorithm to solve 
redundancy allocation problems for series-parallel systems [27]. It computes a global optimal 
solution to the optimisation problem and provides an alternative to the traditional lagrangian 
approaches which often fail to identify an optimal solution of integer optimisation problems. 
The most efficient branch-and-bound method for redundancy allocation problems at present is 
the method developed by Nakagawa et al. [28]. Sung and Cho in their paper [29] considered a 
reliability optimization problem for a series system with multiple-choice constraints 
incorporated for each subsystem to maximize the system reliability subject to the system 
budget. In the approach some solution properties were characterized, such as lower and upper 
bounds of the system reliability, to reduce the solution space in advance. A branch-and-bound 
solution algorithm was then derived based on the reduced solution space to search for the 
optimal solution. The authors stated that the proposed algorithm can be applied to various 
practical-size field systems. Ha and Kuo in [30] presented an efficient branch-and-bound 
approach to solve the redundancy allocation problem with the objective of system reliability 
optimisation. The main advantage of the proposed method is flexibility. It does not rely on 
any assumptions of linearity, a single constraint or separability, which make the method 
adaptable to various applications. Here a problem is considered to be separable if the system 
reliability is equal to the sum of reliability of the subsystems and the total amount of resources 
is equal to the sum of the consumption of resources at each subsystem. The authors 
demonstrated that the method is superior to the existing exact algorithms for redundancy 
allocation problems in terms of computation time. 
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Misra introduced an efficient technique for a variety of reliability optimization problems, 
which involve integer programming formulation [31]. The algorithm is based on functional 
evaluations and a limited search close to the boundary of resources. This procedure has the 
following advantages over the other existing techniques: it requires only functional 
evaluations and it does not require the conversion of the original decision variables into 
binary variables, there are no assumptions on the separability, differentiability and 
convexity/concavity of the objective functions and/or constraints. 
The advantage of the discrete methods is that they give an exact optimal solution. Integer 
programming methods also yield integer solutions. However the transformation of nonlinear 
objective functions and constraints into linear forms so that integer programming can be 
employed can be a difficult task. Moreover the various integer programming techniques do 
not guarantee to find optimal solutions in a reasonable time [13]. In general, computational 
complexity of the discrete methods is very high. Branch-and-bound methods do not exploit 
separability to reduce the computation. Moreover the effectiveness of the methodology 
depends on the problem specifics. Most branch-and-bound algorithms are confined to linear 
constraints with an objective function that need not be linear. The implementation of DP is 
limited by the number of constraints and the system structures it can be applied to. It is not 
applicable to non-separable objective or constraint functions which arise in reliability 
optimization problems where complex structures are considered. It also has dimensional 
difficulties. For a system which has more than two constraints, the computational complexity 
of dynamic programming increases exponentially. Thus development of a good discrete 
method for reliability optimisation problems remains a challenge. 
3.5. META-HEURISTIC METHODS 
The major focus of recent work in reliability optimisation is in the development of modern 
heuristic algorithms [32]. Often these algorithm are referred to as metaheuristics or general 
heuristics [33]. As described in [34] “a heuristic is a technique which seeks good (i.e. near-
optimal) solutions at a reasonable computational cost without being able to guarantee either 
feasibility or optimality, or even in many cases to state how close to optimality a particular 
solution is”. These methods facilitated solution of optimisation problems that were previously 
difficult or impossible to solve. The most popular of these tools are genetic algorithms (GA), 
random search (RS), simulated annealing (SA), tabu search (TS) and particle swarm 
optimisation (PSO). They consist of general search principles organized in a general search 
strategy. 
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Heuristics compute approximate or locally optimal solutions of an optimisation problem. 
Despite this fact they have some advantages over exact methods. They are more flexible than 
exact algorithms and are usually used to solve more complicated and larger sized problems.  
3.5.1. Simulated Annealing 
The idea of the SA originates from thermodynamics and metallurgy which was originally 
proposed as a simulation of the cooling of materials in a heat bath, the process known as 
annealing. It is an approach to search for the global optimal solution that attempts to avoid 
entrapment in poor local optima by allowing an occasional uphill move to inferior solutions. 
The method involves probabilistic transitions among the solutions of the problem. During the 
iteration process a random solution x is drawn in the neighbourhood of the current solution xn. 
If the objective function value of the solution is not worse than the one of the current solution 
(f(x)≤ f(xn) in the minimisation case), x becomes the next current solution. Otherwise, either x 
becomes the current solution with probability p(n) or xn remains the current solution with the 
complementary probability 1-p(n). Typically, p(n) decreases with time and with the size of 
deterioration of the objective function [33]. 
To obtain the optimal schedule of testing and maintenance of safety equipment in nuclear 
power plants Cepin proposed an optimisation method based on the SA algorithm [35]. The 
algorithm for minimisation of risk by finding the optimal test placement times was used to 
evaluate several examples. One of them was the high – pressure injection system that consists 
of seven valves and three pumps, which provides water to two injection paths [36]. The 
results have shown that it is possible to reduce risk by employing the developed algorithm. 
The most important result of the method possibly is the prevention of schedules of equipment 
outages, which result in high risk. 
Recently, Kim et al. in [37] applied the SA to search for the optimal solution of reliability-
redundancy allocation problems. The objective of the problem solved was to maximize the 
system reliability subject to three nonlinear resource constraints. Three types of systems were 
analysed: the series system, the series-parallel system and the complex (bridge) system. It was 
assumed that the system had identical components in the subsystem and one failure mode. 
The results of the conducted numerical experiments suggest that the best solution for the SA 
algorithm are better then most of the solutions considered in the comparative analyses. 
SA is effective when a problem is highly complex without having any special structure. 
Although the SA gives satisfactory solutions for complicated combinatorial optimisation 
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problems, it has a major disadvantage. The SA involves a lot of computation effort with a 
large number of function evaluations and tests for solution feasibility. 
3.5.2. Tabu Search 
Tabu search (TS) can be described as an alternative to SA and a form of neighbourhood 
search. However the neighbourhoods in TS are assumed to be symmetric, i.e. 1x  is a 
neighbour of 0x  if and only if 0x  is a neighbour of 1x  [34]. The main idea of this method is to 
explore and analyse various regions of the search space. Using this method in the searching 
process at any stage memory (information about solutions visited up to that stage) rather than 
probability plays the important role [15]. The main parameters of the TS algorithm are the 
history record H (definition and usage), determination of the candidate neighbourhood set and 
the evaluation function f(H, x). These parameters are usually changed and fitted to the 
problem that is to be solved. As with SA techniques the TS technique can be improved by 
combining it with other methods. Reference [38] details such combined algorithms. 
Kulturel-Konak et al. in [39] have used the TS to solve redundancy optimisation problems. 
The series system of s independent k-out-of-n:G subsystems have been analysed. The 
algorithm was applied for two types of problems. The first problem maximised the system 
reliability given overall restrictions on the system cost and weight. Problem two minimised 
the system cost given overall restrictions on the maximum system weight and the minimum 
system reliability. It was also assumed that system weight and cost were linear combinations 
of component weight and cost. Moreover the TS was designed with the use of a penalty 
function which allowed search in the infeasible region. The application of the algorithm 
demonstrated encouraging results. When compared to GAs, the algorithm resulted in a 
superior performance in terms of best solutions found and reduced variability and greater 
efficiency. 
Ouzineb et al. in [40] also developed an efficient TS based algorithm to solve redundancy 
allocation problems. The algorithm was applied to determine the minimal system cost 
configuration under availability constraints for multi-state series–parallel systems. The system 
analysed could have a range of performance levels from perfect functioning to complete 
failure. The elements of the system were characterized by their cost, performance and 
availability which belonged to a finite set. The algorithm proceeded by dividing the search 
space into a set of disjoint subsets, and then by applying TS to each subset. Comparison of 
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numerical results for the test problems from previous research showed that the proposed TS 
out-performed GA solutions, in terms of both the solution quality and the execution time. 
TS is very useful for solving large complex optimisation problems that are very difficult to 
solve by exact methods. However it is rather difficult to define effective memory structures 
and memory-based strategies which are problem dependant. Thus development of an effective 
TS method requires thorough understanding of the problem and some numerical 
experimentation. 
3.5.3. Particle Swarm Optimisation 
Particle swarm optimisation (PSO) is a stochastic global optimization technique inspired by 
social behaviour of bird flocking or fish schooling. It was first introduced by Kennedy and 
Eberhart in [41]. PSO is initialised with a population of random solutions within a feasible 
range, called particles or individuals. In the algorithm during the learning procedure each 
individual particle keeps track of its coordinates in the search hyperspace which are associated 
with two factors: the best solution ever found (personal best) and the overall best fitness value 
and its location (global best). During the optimisation process at each time step, the velocity 
each particle moves toward its personal best and global best is changed. The velocity is 
dynamically adjusted by a random term, with separate random numbers being generated for 
acceleration toward personal best and global best. 
Coelho [42] presented an efficient PSO algorithm to solve the reliability–redundancy 
optimisation problem. Two examples of reliability–redundancy design problems were 
considered: a complex bridge system and a specific system, and an overspeed protection 
system for a gas turbine. The latter was formulated as a mixed-integer nonlinear programming 
problem. Simulation results demonstrated that the proposed PSO performed well for the two 
examples of mixed-integer programming in reliability–redundancy applications. The solutions 
obtained by the PSO were better than the previously best-known solutions available in the 
literature. 
The algorithm has very few parameters. It is very simple and easy to implement. Moreover it 
has a very efficient global search procedure. However, the main disadvantage of the algorithm 
is its poor local search ability. It has slow convergence in the refined search stage and 
prematurity. The PSO may fail to find the required optima in cases when the problem to be 
solved is too complicated and complex [43]. 
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3.5.4. Genetic Algorithms 
The GA was developed by J. Holland and his associates at the University of Michigan in the 
1960s and 1970s. In 1975 Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems - the primary 
monograph about GAs by J. Holland was published [44]. GAs belong to the group of 
evolutionary algorithms simulating the natural evolutionary process of living beings and they 
are perhaps the most widely known type of these algorithms. GAs differ from conventional 
optimisation techniques in a number of fundamental ways. They work with a coding of the 
solution set, not solutions themselves. They also deal with populations of solutions rather than 
with single solutions. GAs use fitness function and probabilistic transition rules in the search 
process. 
GAs are stochastic global search methods based on the mechanics of natural genetic variation 
and natural selection. Thus terminology used in GAs is analogous to biological systems. For 
example, strings that are used in the optimisation algorithm are analogues to chromosomes in 
biological systems. Genes form chromosomes and are located at particular locus (positions) 
on the chromosome. Analogically in a GA variables correspond to genes and a total package 
of strings forms a structure. Describing biological genetics the term alleles is used, which 
means that genes can have some values, thus in a GA alleles are the possible values of 
variables. To describe the collection of chromosomes that form the structure of the organism 
biologists use the term genotype and phenotype as a physical expression of the structure. In 
terms of the GA a genotype is a coded string and phenotype represents the decoded set of 
parameters [25], [45]. The GA and corresponding optimisation terms are summarised in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Explanation of GA Terms 
Genetic Algorithm Term Optimisation Term 
Chromosome Solution (string, individual) 
Genes (bits) Part of solution, a member of solution vector 
Locus Position of gene 
Alleles Values of gene 
Phenotype Decoded solution 
Genotype Encoded solution 
The GA is a meta-heuristic method and it does not guarantee to find the global solution, but it 
has been theoretically and empirically proven that the method provides accurate and reliable 
optimisation results. Recently, GAs have received considerable attention and have been 
proven to be a powerful tool for solving a large number of complex optimisation problems. 
The algorithms are applied in such areas of reliability engineering as 1) redundancy allocation 
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and structure optimisation, 2) optimal network design, 3) maintenance and surveillance 
optimisation [24].  
Coit D.W. and Smith A.E. used a GA to optimise series-parallel system design configurations 
when there are multiple component choices available for each of several k-out-of-n:G 
subsystems [46]. The problem considered was to select the optimal combination of parts and 
levels of redundancy to minimise system cost subject to reliability and weight constraints, or 
alternatively, to maximise reliability subject to cost and weight constraints. Tavakkoli-
Moghaddam et al. [47] also solved the series-parallel systems reliability optimisation problem 
using a GA. The objective was to select the best redundancy strategy, component, and 
redundancy level for each subsystem in order to maximise the system reliability under 
system-level constraints. 
Yun and Kim in [48] considered redundancy allocation problems in series systems. The 
authors adopted a GA approach to solve a problem in which redundancy can be available at 
all levels in the system. The objective of the problem presented was to maximise system 
reliability given the constraints of available resources such as cost, weight and volume. The 
results obtained from the illustrative example showed that considering modular redundancy 
could be better than using only component redundancy. 
Hsieh et al. presented GAs for reliability design problems where both the component 
reliabilities and redundancy allocations were considered. The systems analysed included 
series, series-parallel and complex (bridge) systems [49]. The objective of the problems 
solved was to maximise the system reliability, while maintaining feasibility with respect to 
nonlinear constraints. The constraints considered included cost, weight and constraints on the 
products of volume and weight. The authors reported that the solutions of the numerical 
examples performed were better than previously best-known solutions.  
Some other authors employed GAs to analyse redundancy optimisation problems for multi-
state systems [50], [51]. Levitin et al. in [50] considered multi-state systems that have a range 
of performance levels and represented a general redundancy optimisation problem for such 
systems. In solving the optimisation problem three system component characteristics were 
used: nominal performance level, cost and availability. The objective of the optimisation was 
to minimise total cost subject to the required reliability or availability. Levitin [52] also 
discussed a redundancy optimisation problem for a multi-state system of 2 subsystems. The 
objective of the work was to choose elements from a list of available equipment in order to 
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optimise system design subject to availability constraints. The optimisation problem was 
formulated as an investment cost minimisation problem which was solved using a GA. 
A GA based optimisation approach has also been applied to optimise surveillance and 
maintenance of components in order to improve system reliability [53], [54], [55], [56]. 
Munõz et al. in [53] presented a new approach aimed at the global and constrained 
optimisation of surveillance and maintenance of components based on risk and cost criteria. 
Lapa et al. in [54, 55] proposed a method for preventive maintenance scheduling optimisation 
of standby systems where a GA was employed as an optimisation technique. The goal of the 
approach was to improve the average availability of the system when optimising the 
preventive maintenance strategy. The proposed method was applied to a nuclear system. 
Marseguerra and Zio in [57] examined the approach of the optimal maintenance and repair 
strategies of an industrial plant considering some reliability and economic constraints. The 
GA was employed to search for an optimum combination of plant safety and economic 
performance that was evaluated for each possible maintenance and repair strategy. 
There are many other GA applications in engineering reliability optimisation problems. For 
instance, Monga and Zuo in [58] introduced a reliability based design model for a series-
parallel system with deteriorating components in order to optimise the life cycle cost of the 
system. To model the economic effects of the system life cycle acquisition costs, preventive 
maintenance costs, minimal repair costs and system’s salvage value at the time of disposal 
were incorporated into the model. The objective of the problem was formulated as the 
minimisation of system cost subject to both active and non-active constraints. Dengiz et al. 
[59] developed a GA approach with specialised encoding, initialisation and local search 
operators to optimise the design of communication network topologies. The objective of the 
analysed problem was to minimise network cost given a minimal reliability requirement. 
Ren and Dugan in [60] adopted a GA in a fault tree method to determine the optimal design 
configuration of a reliable system. The presented methodology could be employed to analyse 
optimal system design from two different design-viewpoints: to maximise system reliability 
given cost, weight and/or physical size constraints and to minimise system cost subject to 
reliability constraints. Andrews and Bartlett [61] also combined GA and fault tree approaches 
to optimise the design of a Firewater Deluge System. The objective of the problem was to 
minimise the system unavailability subject to cost and spurious system shutdown constraints. 
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3.5.4.1. Advantages and Disadvantages of a GA 
GAs are one of the most widely used metaheuristics. They have become popular techniques to 
solve various optimisation problems. GAs can be used to solve complex discrete optimisation 
problems with any kind of non-linear objective functions and constraints defined in discrete, 
continues or mixed search spaces. They do not require much mathematical information about 
the optimization problem [62]. Only a few assumptions on the objective as well as the 
constraint functions are involved. GAs use only the objective function itself to measure the 
fitness score of each solution. Therefore they can be very effective when the objective 
function is not available in a closed mathematical form.  
In order to find a global optimum trade-off between the exploration and exploitation needs to 
be found. GAs combine elements of direct and stochastic search which can make a 
remarkable balance between exploration and exploitation of the search space [45], [63]. 
Therefore they can be are very effective at performing global search and obtaining global 
optima [53], [62]. GA parameters, such as population size, maximum generation, crossover 
and mutation rates affect a balance between exploitation and exploration in the search space. 
However it takes much time to tune the unknown parameters [64]. 
GAs produce a variety of good quality solutions simultaneously, which is important in the 
decision-making process. They are also successful in locating potentially optimal regions. 
However they provide heuristic solutions since they are not designed for precisely locating 
the optimal solution. Moreover, they involve a lot of computational effort [13]. In order to 
reduce the effects of GAs drawbacks, algorithms can be hybridized with other domain-
dependent heuristics when solving specific optimisation problems. 
3.5.4.2. Fundamentals of the GA 
A GA has been chosen as an optimisation technique for this research project. The choice of 
the GA can be attributed to a number of factors. GAs use a fitness function itself and do not 
require derivative or other auxiliary quantities. They can be very effective when the objective 
function is not available in a closed form. This factor is very important since the objective 
function represents the probability of system failure and is evaluated using FTA in the 
optimisation algorithm proposed in this research. Moreover, GAs are not problem orientated 
and can be easy implemented and adapted to solve different reliability optimisation problems 
for a range of systems considering both constrained and unconstrained optimisation cases. 
This trait allows GAs to be applied to a range of safety systems. 
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General Structure of a Genetic Algorithm 
GA - differently from conventional search techniques - starts with an initial set of random 
solutions, i.e. chromosomes, called the population. The chromosomes evolve through 
iterations, called generations. At each iteration, the chromosomes are evaluated using some 
measure of fitness. New chromosomes of an auxiliary population, i.e. offspring chromosomes, 
are formed by merging two chromosomes from the current generation using a crossover 
operator and/or modifying a chromosome using a mutation operator. A new generation of 
chromosomes is formed by selecting some of the parents and offspring on the basis of their 
fitness values and rejecting others so as to keep the population size constant. After several 
generations, the algorithm converges to the best chromosome, which represents the optimum 
or suboptimal solution of the problem. 
Let P(i) and C(i) be parent and offspring populations in the current generation i. The general 
form of a GA can be described through the following steps [62]: 
Step 1: Make initial population P(i), i = 0; 
Step 2: Evaluate each chromosome in population P(i), i = 0; 
Step 3: Choose parents from population P(i) to yield C(i); 
Step 4: Evaluate each chromosome in population C(i); 
Step 5: Select P(i +1) from P(i) and C(i) 
Step 6: If the maximum number of generations is reached, stop and return the best 
chromosome; if not, go to Step 3. 
Initialisation 
A GA starts with an initial population of say N encoded representations of solutions, i.e. 
chromosomes. Decision variables of each solution are coded using a coding technique; 
Holland suggested using binary (0 and 1) coding, but other coding techniques can be 
implemented, for example, integer or real-valued coding [34], [65]. The binary coding of 
decision variables has been used in the GA for this research. Using this technique every 
variable is converted into a binary string of corresponding length (number of digits). The 
number of bits (denoted with nb) required to code each variable is calculated using the 
following formula: 
12)(2 1 −≤−<− nbnb ab ,   (3.4) 
where [a, b] is the range of the decision variable. 
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A nb-digit binary string has nb2  possible 0-1 combinations, i.e. it can represent nb2  different 
discrete values. There are some rules that give equivalence between integer and binary 
numbers, for example, a discrete variable having V allowable discrete values can be 
transformed to a binary string using the formula: 
∑
=
− +=
n
i
iiICHj
1
1 12)( .  (3.5) 
Here ICH(i) is the value of the ith digit in the binary string, and n is the smallest integer 
satisfying Vn >2  [66]. 
These binary strings, one for each decision variable, are concatenated to form one 
chromosome that represents one solution. As an example, suppose variables ]15,1[1 ∈x  and 
]18,1[2 ∈x  are used in the problem. To calculate the number of bits in a chromosome 
Formula (3.4) is used where: 
 (15 - 1) = 14 
 22 < 14 < 24 – 1 → n1 = 4 
 
 (18 - 1) = 17 
 24 < 17 < 25 – 1 → n2 = 5 
 
 n = n1 + n2 = 9  
The length of the chromosome is calculated as 9 bits which can be represented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
The corresponding values of variables 1x  and 2x  are calculated using Formula (3.5): 
Binary Number     Decimal number 
    00011 =x  9 
   010102 =x  11 
 
N chromosomes form the population of solutions with which the GA operates. The values of 
the initial solutions are usually generated randomly but several other methods can be used 
9 bits 
  0 0 0 1    0 1 0 1 0 
4 bits 5 bits 
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[66]. For example, only solutions satisfying constraints can enter the initial population. The 
number of solutions in the initial population may vary. There are no strict rules as to the 
required population size for a problem, but it is known that this influences the algorithm 
performance. Some theoretical work has been done on this. Goldberg [45] showed that the 
optimal size for the population of binary strings depends on the length of the strings and the 
dependence is exponential, i.e. the optimal size of the population grows exponentially with 
the length of the string [34]. 
Reproduction 
Once the initial population is determined reproduction is performed. Sometimes this process 
is also called selection. Both these terms can be used as it is the process which determines the 
number of times a particular individual is chosen for reproduction and, therefore, the number 
of offspring that an individual will produce. During this process selection and reproduction 
are performed. Selection is made according to the fitness values of each string (or individual). 
The fitness function is used to evaluate the fitness values of the strings. This function 
transforms the objective function value into a measure of relative fitness. A general form of 
the fitness function is  
))(()( xfgxF = , (3.6) 
where f is the objective function, g is the transformation function that changes the value of the 
objective function f to a non-negative number and F is the resulting relative fitness. In 
applications of the GA several forms of transformation can be used, such as linear 
transformation or power law scaling [67]. A commonly used transformation is that of 
proportional fitness assignment, which is sometimes interpreted as a probability of the string 
to be selected for the next generation. The transformation can be written as 
∑
=
= N
i
i
i
i
f
f
F
1
, (3.7) 
where N is the population size, fi is the objective function value of the individual i and Fi is 
the fitness value. 
The rules that determine how individuals are selected for reproduction depend on the 
selection method. The most popular and easiest are roulette wheel selection methods. The 
methods are based on the link between the fitness value of each string in the population and 
the size of the particular segment of the determined interval which is usually interpreted as a 
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roulette wheel slot. The interval is determined as the sum of the individuals’ (strings’) 
selection probabilities or the sum of fitness values over all the individuals in the population. 
The current range [0, sum] is divided into segments and the size of each segment corresponds 
to the fitness value of the associated individual. To select a string, a random number is 
generated from the interval [0, sum] and an individual, that is associated with the segment 
spanning the random number, is selected.  
There are two types of roulette wheel selection method. Both are described as stochastic 
sampling, but one type of method uses simple replacement of individuals and the other partial 
replacement. Employing stochastic sampling with replacement uses the same segment size 
and selection probability throughout the selection phase. Any individual string from the 
population is selected as described in the procedure previously outlined. In stochastic 
sampling with partial replacement each time an individual is selected for reproduction the 
segment associated with it is resized, i.e. the size of the segment is reduced by 1. This resizing 
process is continued until the segment size becomes equal to zero. 
Crossover 
Crossover is the main genetic operator, sometimes called recombination. The operator enables 
the creation of new strings at each generation. The strings that are created by crossover differ 
from that which are generated during initialisation. During initialisation new strings are 
generated randomly and new ones that are obtained during crossover have some identical 
parts of strings from which they are created. Thus, the crossover operates on two strings at a 
time, selected during the reproduction stage, ( wv ss , ). The next step that follows depends on 
the form of crossover that is used. For example, using a single-point recombination operator 
an integer position, k, is selected uniformly at random from the range [1, l-1]. Here l is the 
length of the strings in the population. Strings xs  and ys  are crossed over at that kth position 
and the resulting two offspring are created. If genes of the string vs  are ),...,,( 21 lvvv and 
),...,,( 21 lwww  are genes of the string ws  ( }1  ,0{  , ∈ji wv ) then the new offspring are: 
),..,,,..,( 11 lii wwvv +  and ),..,,,..,( 11 lii vvww +  [69]. For example, consider two parent binary 
strings: 
.01001011
11101100
2
1
=
=
P
P
 
Let the randomly elected crossover point be i = 2 and the two offspring would be: 
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11101111
.01001000
2
1
=
=
O
O
 
It is the simplest form of recombination. There are a number of more complicated variations 
of this GA operator, such as multipoint crossover or uniform crossover. For multipoint 
crossover, n non duplicate crossover positions are chosen, i.e. crossover points are chosen 
randomly and sorted into ascending order. Then, parts of the strings between successive 
crossover points are swapped between the two parents and two new strings are produced. 
Between parents the sections of the strings between the first and the second, the third and the 
forth, i.e. between j and j+1 crossover points, are changed. Here j is an odd number of a sorted 
sequence of crossover points and it is less than the length of the string, i.e. j < l . For instance, 
let the crossover points be 2, 4 and 6. Then multipoint crossover produces two new offspring: 
P1=00¦11¦10¦11 
P2=11¦01¦00¦10, 
 
O1=00¦01¦10¦10 
O2=11¦11¦00¦11. 
The crossover rate, pc, used in the GAs controls the expected number of chromosomes that 
undergo the crossover operation. pc is equal to the ratio between the number of offspring 
produced in each generation and the total number of chromosomes N in the population. Thus 
in total pc × N chromosomes will undergo the crossover at each generation. If a crossover rate 
is high more of the solution space can be explored and settling for a false optimum can be 
avoided. However if the rate is too high computation time might be wasted in exploring 
unpromising regions of the solution space [62]. 
Mutation 
Mutation is one more genetic operator used in the process of creating offspring chromosomes. 
It is utilised to recover good genetic material which can be lost during selection or crossover 
operations [67] and therefore prevents convergence to local optima. For mutation operation, a 
single chromosome is selected and at some mutation point chosen (at random) the element of 
the chromosome is modified. If the string is coded in binary then at mutation point the bit 
changes its state: 0→1 or 1→0. For example, mutating the third bit in string P1=00111011 
leads to the new offspring O1=00011011.  
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The mutation operator when one element of the chromosome is changed at a time is called 
uniform mutation. More variations of the mutation operator are used in the GA. Multiple 
uniform mutation is described as uniform mutation of n randomly selected elements of the 
string. This number n is also selected at random and is from interval [1, 2, …, l], where l is 
the length of the string. Employing Gaussian mutation all elements of the chromosome are 
changed. The rule that is used to change them can be written as: 
k
P
k
O
k fss += , (3.8) 
where Oks  is the kth element of the mutated offspring, Pks  is the kth element of the parent 
chromosome and kf  is a random number drawn from a Gaussian distribution [68]. 
In general, mutation in the algorithm is randomly applied with a probability, i.e. mutation 
rate, pm, to the population of new offspring that were created during the crossover operation. 
Colin in [34] surveyed some different opinions regarding the application of mutation operator 
in GAs. For example, it was suggested that either crossover or mutation should be applied at 
each iteration. Another suggestion was to use crossover at the beginning iterations and as 
chromosomes begin to converge to start using just mutation. Mutation rate usually varies from 
0.001 to 0.01 [67]. 
Replacement 
Replacement operator, sometimes called reinsertion, is employed to form a population which 
becomes a parent population for the next generation of offspring chromosomes. Once the 
population is formed the sequence of genetic operators is repeated resulting in the new set of 
offspring solutions. Usually, the number of chromosomes in a parent population is kept fixed 
throughout the generation process.  
A number of strategies exist on how to form a new generation of parent solutions. The basic 
approach as given in [45] is to utilise the nth generation of offspring solutions as a parent 
population for the (n+1)th generation of solutions. In this case all chromosomes in the current 
parent population are replaced with the current offspring chromosomes.  
Another replacement strategy is to substitute only certain chromosomes of the current parent 
population with the offspring solutions. For example, the least fit members of the parent 
population can be replaced with their offspring [67]. Similarly, the fittest two out of four 
parents involved in the crossover operation and the fittest two offspring individuals are 
selected for the new population. The replacement of the parent solutions can also be random. 
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In this case two children replace two individuals randomly chosen from the entire population 
[69]. 
In the steady-state GA [70] individuals from both current parent and offspring populations are 
first combined into one population. Consider N is the defined size of a population and No is 
the size of an offspring population. Then each individual in the combined population is 
ranked based on the fitness value. The No worst individuals in the ranking are removed and 
the best N individuals remain in the new parent population for the next generation. 
3.6. SUMMARY 
The primary goal of the optimisation of a system design in reliability engineering is to find 
the best way to increase system reliability. A number of accepted principles can be 
implemented to improve system reliability. However, at the same time, the steps taken will 
normally consume resources. Thus it is essential to find a balance between system reliability 
and resources consumption. 
Numerical methods for optimisation have been developed extensively having a range of 
applications in diverse fields. In this chapter the approaches most commonly used in 
reliability engineering were introduced followed by examples of application. The review 
suggests that the use of each method has its practical advantages and disadvantages. Some 
methods are more efficient and accurate than the others. However, none of the methods have 
proven to be sufficiently superior to the others and the choice of the algorithm needs to be 
made according to the problem solved.  
Most of the reliability optimisation problems are discrete, mixed integer and nonlinear 
optimisation problems. Due to their complexity, practical application of various approaches 
can be limited. To summarise: 
Application of the linear programming techniques requires the objective and constraint 
functions to be linear. A problem formulated as nonlinear programming problem can be 
transformed into a linear problem. However, such transformation results in an increased 
number of variables and constraints to be treated therefore becomes more difficult in the sense 
of the computation time and memory space needed. 
Most of the nonlinear and discrete techniques are problem orientated. Therefore, since they 
are designed for solving specific problems, it is difficult to adopt them for solving a wide 
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range of problems. Moreover, only a few nonlinear algorithms have proven effective when 
applied to large-scale problems. 
The discrete methods require much computational effort to determine an exact optimal 
solution. Computational complexity of the methods is very high. In addition, the various 
integer programming techniques do not guarantee that optimal solutions can be obtained in a 
reasonable time. 
Meta-heuristics, which can be used to solve complex discrete optimisation problems, also 
exhibit some drawbacks. SA involves a lot of computation effort with a large number of 
function evaluations and tests for solution feasibility. In TB memory structures and memory-
based strategies are problem dependant. PSO may fail to find an optimum if the problem to be 
solved is too complicated and complex. Using GA requires tuning the unknown parameters. 
Owing to numerous reports of its successful application, GAs have attracted more attention  
recently than other heuristic methods in reliability optimization problems. GA has also been 
chosen as an optimisation technique for this research. The choice was made considering 
development of the algorithm with its application to solve design optimisation problems for a 
range of systems, including safety and phased mission systems. GAs are not problem 
orientated and can be easily adopted to solve different reliability optimisation problems for a 
range of systems. Furthermore, the objective function of the optimisation problems solved 
cannot be defined in a closed mathematical form. GAs use an objective function itself and do 
not require its derivative or other auxiliary quantities. Only values of an objective function are 
required to represent the search space, which means that the algorithms can incorporate other 
methods for the evolution of objective function values. The objective of the problem solved 
was to define the system design that contributes to the minimisation of system failure within 
the context of pre-defined design constraints and resources. GAs can solve complex and large 
scale optimisation problems with any kind of non-linear objective functions and constraints 
defined in discrete, continues or mixed search spaces. The GAs are capable to perform global 
search and determine global optima. These properties suggest the GAs have a strong potential 
to determine solutions required in engineering system reliability problems for the work 
presented here. 
4. GENERAL SYSTEM DESIGN OPTIMISATION 
ALGORITHM 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Safety systems usually installed in safety–critical control systems, such as nuclear power 
plants, oil platforms or chemical processes, prevent the occurrence of catastrophic 
consequences caused by a system failure. They have a specific functioning principle, i.e. such 
systems work on demand. A high likelihood of functioning on demand for a safety system can 
be ensured by altering its design. For this purpose redundancy techniques can be introduced 
or certain components may be replaced with ones with better reliability characteristics [71]. 
However, design alterations and therefore the level of system reliability improvement are 
usually subject to a number of limiting factors, such as cost or weight. Thus, the problem is to 
construct a system design that would improve its availability within the constraints imposed 
on its design.  
In this chapter a General System Design Optimisation Algorithm (GSDOA) is introduced that 
determines an optimal design configuration for a safety system. The objective of the approach 
is to identify an optimal system design that contributes to the improvement of system 
availability within the context of pre-defined design constraints and resources. The introduced 
GSDOA is designed to be applicable to a range of safety systems. The approach combines an 
optimisation technique with both qualitative and quantitative system analysis methods, such 
as fault tree analysis (FTA) and binary decision diagrams (BDDs).  
Fault trees provide a schematic description of the possible combinations of system conditions 
involving system components that could lead to system failure [72]. Therefore FTA has been 
employed as a means to represent system design cases and evaluate their failure probabilities 
by analysing the failure logic of the system. Fault tree modification patterns (FTMPs) have 
been developed to provide standardised elements to build a single fault tree representing all 
possible design cases under consideration which is then modified to identify specific design 
configurations. A BDD is a directed acyclic graph representing a Boolean Function. The 
quantitative analysis of fault trees can be performed by transformation into BDDs [6]. The 
BDD based approach is considered to be a computationally more efficient method. Thus in 
the design optimisation algorithm the BDD method has been implemented to quantify system 
failure.  
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The objective function of the problem solved cannot be defined in the closed mathematical 
form (see Section 4.3.1) and therefore the Genetic Algorithm (GA), a meta-heuristic 
optimisation technique, has been chosen as the optimisation technique to perform the 
optimisation part of the approach. GAs are stochastic global search methods which are based 
on the mechanics of natural genetic variation and natural selection [45]. The principles of the 
GA allow easy implementation and adaptation of the algorithm according to a solved 
problem. GAs use a fitness function itself and do not require derivative or other auxiliary 
quantities. Moreover, only values of an objective function are required to represent the search 
space which means that the algorithms can incorporate other methods for evolution of 
objective function values. Finally, GAs easily handle constrained optimisation problems [24]. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 details rules on how to transform the fault 
tree and incorporate causes of failure for all given design alternatives of the analysed system 
in a single fault tree. The quantification process of the resulting fault tree is also discussed. In 
Section 4.3. the developed algorithm and the programme code are detailed. At the end of the 
chapter a summary of the developments is provided. 
4.2. FAULT TREE MODIFICATION METHODOLOGY 
A fault tree provides a schematic description of the possible causes of a specific system 
failure mode. Each event of the fault tree defines a dynamic change of state of a system 
element. Thus, if a system design is altered and new components are introduced the resulting 
fault tree for the new design system will also include new events representing failures of the 
new system components. 
When considering a number of different design cases it is time-consuming to construct and 
then analyse a fault tree for each individual design. The problem can be resolved by using a 
fault tree representing all possible design alterations. This idea was first suggested by 
Andrews and Pattison [73]. A fault tree representing all possible design variations includes 
house events. The house events are employed to switch on or off different branches of the 
fault tree to model the causes of system failure for each design alternative. Thus the use of the 
house events overcomes the need to construct an individual fault tree for every possible 
design alternative. 
In this research the problem of constructing a fault tree comprising all possible designs is 
extended. General rules which define changes in a fault tree according to the design options 
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specified for the optimisation problem have been developed. These rules are not adapted to 
one particular system and they have the potential to be employed to represent all considered 
possible design variations in one fault tree for any analysed system. 
4.2.1. Design Alteration Options 
A number of alterations regarding the structure and operation of a safety system influence its 
performance capabilities. System operation can be influenced by the time taken to maintain 
the system and how often maintenance actions are taken. Design alterations that can affect 
system availability are redundancies introduced at component or subsystem levels and also 
different component-type selections. 
By introducing parallel redundancy, system components are duplicated. As a result, the 
failure of the system occurs if and only if all redundant components fail. It is also possible to 
introduce so called k-out-of-n redundancy. Here n defines the number of redundant 
components and k is the number of working components that are needed for successful system 
operation. In this case a system will be subject to failure if n-k+1 ≤ n components fail. If k is 
equal to 1 then it is equivalent to the simple redundancy case. Both redundancy types can be 
implemented at component or sub-system level. Considering system design optimisation the 
problem is to determine the redundancy level necessary subject to the available resources. 
It is also possible to improve system availability by replacing a component with another 
component selected from a group of possible alternatives. Each possible candidate can have 
different characteristics such as failure rate, cost, weight or time taken for maintenance. The 
problem in making a decision about candidate suitability appears when the choice between 
different characteristics of the components needs to be made. For example, a choice needs to 
be made between a more reliable component which is expensive and a less reliable 
component which is considerably cheaper. 
When considering a system design, an initial design will be specified. Along with this will be 
the options for alterations. These options are defined as structural design variables for 
quantification purposes since they define changes being introduced to the initial system 
design. In this research three parameters associated with structural design changes are utilised, 
defined as n, k and t and referred to as design variables. 
n corresponds to redundancy allocation. For example, consider the possibility to install up to 4 
pumps instead of one. The maximum value of n for the structural design variable associated 
Chapter 4. General System Design Optimisation Algorithm 49 
with the replacement of the pump would be equal to 4. Hence the design consideration is the 
number of redundant components, n, which can vary from 1 to 4. 
As it was mentioned earlier, another option to change the system is to use k-out-of-n 
redundancy. If k as a design variable parameter is not defined its default value is equal to 1. 
Otherwise, it is assumed that it can be equal to any whole number in the interval (1, n). It 
provides the choices of different k-out-of-n redundancy requirements. 
The final design change considered in this study is where a different component type selection 
is implemented. The parameter t is used to identify a possible component type from a number 
of possible options. It is also possible to introduce a selection option of a component type for 
new redundant components. 
4.2.2. Fault Tree Modification Patterns 
4.2.2.1. Overview 
The fault tree comprising all design alternatives is constructed using modification rules which 
are implemented in the fault tree of the initial system design. The initial system design fault 
tree, as well as the resulting one comprising all design alternatives, are considered to be 
coherent fault trees and to have two types of gates, AND and OR. 
The rules for building a fault tree with all design alternatives implemented are defined as 
FTMPs. A FTMP defines a fault tree part representing all possible design variations 
introduced for the replacement of one chosen component. When solving a system design 
optimisation problem, a number of system components can be chosen to be replaced and 
therefore several FTMPs will be applied.  
The fault tree part introduced with the FTMP incorporates groups of new basic events linked 
together by house event(s). Groups of house events corresponding to different FTMPs are 
independent from each other. Having general numbering rules for gates, basic events and 
house events introduced in the resulting fault tree structures enables the implementation of 
FTMPs in the fault tree of any system. Specific numbering rules exist for each FTMP. 
During the analysis phase the fault tree that has been built using FTMPs is modified to 
represent particular designs. Values of house events introduced with the FTMP are set to alter 
the corresponding fault tree part by switching certain branches on and off so that only one 
possible design alternative is modelled. This is repeated for each FTMP implemented.  
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Each modification pattern can represent either one or two or three structural design variables 
and is defined by the following three parameters. mn is the maximum possible number of 
redundant components, i.e. the largest value of a design variable n (n=1,2,…,mn). mt is the 
maximum number of possible different component types or the largest value of a structural 
design variable t. Parameter mk defines a redundancy type and corresponds to design variable 
k. There are five FTMPs defining all possible component replacement cases. Each 
replacement is possible at both component and subsystem level. A FTMP is identified 
according to the values of three parameters mn, mt and mk: 
Pattern 1:mn > 1, mt = 1, mk = 1; (parallel redundancy); 
Pattern 2: mn > 1, mt = 1, mk = mn; (k-out-of-n redundancy); 
Pattern 3: mn = 1, mt > 1, mk = 1; (type change); 
Pattern 4: mn > 1, mt > 1, mk = 1; (parallel redundancy and type change); 
Pattern 5: mn > 1, mt > 1, mk = mn; (k-out-of-n redundancy and type change); 
Here the value of the parameter mk is either equal to mn, representing a k-out-of-n redundancy 
of components where k ≤ n, or it is equal to 1 and represents a parallel redundancy. 
Application of each pattern is discussed in more detail in the following sections (Sections 
4.2.2.1 –4.2.2.5). The fault tree for the simplified fire protection system (Figure 4.1) is used 
as an example. The pump has been chosen as a replaceable component. Therefore, the 
corresponding basic event ‘Pump Fails’ is replaced with a new fault tree structure for every 
pattern introduced. When making fault tree alterations at event level one common rule applies 
to all patterns, that is an OR gate replaces the chosen basic event. The gate is numbered as 
Gmax+1, where Gmax defines the maximum gate number in the initial fault tree. Note that in 
all discussions the numbers in the gate symbols in the fault trees are used as gate reference 
numbers. 
Fire Protection 
System Fails
Fire Detector 
Fails
Water Deluge 
System Fails
Nozzles 
Blocked
Pump 
Fails
NBPF
FD
1
2
 
Figure 4.1. Fire Protection System Fault Tree 
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4.2.2.2. Parallel Redundant Elements (Pattern 1)  
Pattern 1 defines the fault tree structure comprising possible design alternatives representing 
different numbers of redundant elements. For example, a chosen component can be replaced 
with up to mn redundant elements. In the resulting new part of the fault tree mn house events 
will be incorporated. Every house event is coupled with the corresponding fault tree structure 
providing the possible combinations of the causes of failure for i redundant components 
leading to the system failure. In other words, each house event indicates a design case where i 
(i=1, 2, …, mn) redundant elements are fitted in the system. It is also acceptable that the basic 
event chosen to be replaced remains incorporated in the new fault tree structure. It specifies 
failure of the component which can be referred to as component number 1 in the group of 
redundant components. The flowchart of the algorithm for implementation of Pattern 1 is 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Flowchart for the algorithm of Pattern 1 
The links between the house events introduced in the resulting new structure of the fault tree 
are explained through the analysis of the application of Pattern1 for the simplified fire 
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protection system. In this illustration it is considered that the existing pump can be replaced 
with either 2 or 3 redundant pumps. The option to keep only one pump is also possible. Thus 
in order to construct the fault tree for the system with 3 design alternatives Pattern 1 is 
employed where mn = 3. The obtained fault tree is shown in Figure 4.3. 
As seen in Figure 4.3, a new OR gate replaces the chosen basic event. The original basic 
event remains in the fault tree. Thus, employing Pattern1 mn-1 new basic events are 
introduced. ‘Pump 2 fails’ and ‘Pump 3 fails’ are the two new events for the case analysed. 
Correspondingly three house events are also introduced. The state of each house event is to be 
defined so that only one possible design alternative is represented. The following rule is used 
for the Pattern1: 
if iHE = TRUE; (i = 1,2,…,mn) 
then jHE = FALSE; (j = 1,2,…i-1,i+1,…,mn). 
Here iHE and jHE defines the ith and jth house events respectively. For instance, if in the 
given example the house event 2PF is set to TRUE then the house events 1PF and 3PF are in 
the FALSE state, which means the resulting fault tree defines the causes of failure for a fire 
protection system which has two redundant pumps fitted. 
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System Fails
Fire Detector 
Fails
Water Deluge 
System Fails
Nozzles 
Blocked
Pump(s) 
Fail(s)
NB
FD
1
2
3
6
3 Pumps are 
Fitted & Fail
3 Pumps are 
Fitted
3PF
1 Pump is 
Fitted
1PF
4
1 Pump is 
Fitted & Fails
Pump 1    
Fails
PF
Pump 1   
Fails
PF
8
3 Pumps  
Fail
Pump 2    
Fails
PF2
Pump 3    
Fails
PF3
5
2 Pumps are 
Fitted & Fail
2 Pumps are 
Fitted
2PF
Pump 1   
Fails
PF
7
2 Pumps  
Fail
Pump 2    
Fails
PF2
Altered Fault Tree Structure
1HE 2HE 3HE
 
Figure 4.3. Pattern 1 Application Example for Fire Protection System 
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4.2.2.3. k-out-of-n Redundancy (Pattern 2)  
Pattern 2 is similar to Pattern 1 in the way that it is employed to alter the initial fault tree in 
replacing one system element with a number of redundant elements. However, in this case k-
out-of-n redundancy is used where k and n are both design variables, i.e. not defined a priori. 
It means the resulting fault tree represents all design alternatives for all possible combinations 
of n and k values. The flowchart of the algorithm for Pattern 2 is shown in Figure 4.4. 
In this case two groups of linked house events are introduced. Assuming that up to mn 
redundant components are introduced, each house event from the first group indicates a 
design case where i (i = 1,2, …, mn) elements are fitted in the system. The second group of 
house events is used to define the minimum number of possible failures of the redundant 
elements causing the system failure (j), i.e. j= mn –mk+1, mk = 1,2,…, mn. The new fault tree 
structure also has mn -1 new basic events plus the initial replaceable basic event.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Flowchart for the algorithm of Pattern 2 
To illustrate the case, the Fire Protection System example is considered where up to two 
redundant pumps can be introduced and k-out-of-2 redundancy can be implemented. The fault 
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tree representing the causes of failure for all possible design alternatives is given in Figure 
4.5. The house event 1PF (1HE) set to TRUE defines the case when only one pump is used. 
Accordingly the house event 2PF (2HE) in a state TRUE is associated with branches of the 
fault tree modelling the causes of the system failure when two pumps are fitted. The house 
event PR (2_1HE) from the second group is introduced to represent the case when j = 2, i.e. 
when 1-out-of-2 or parallel redundancy is used. Accordingly, the house event k2R (2_2HE) 
identifies the design case where 2 pumps are required to function for successful operation of 
the system, i.e. where j = 1 and failure of either pump causes the Fire Protection System 
failure. 
 
Fire Protection 
System Fails
Fire Detector 
Fails
Water Deluge 
System Fails
Nozzles 
Blocked
Pump(s) 
Fail(s)
NB
FD
1
2
3
1 Pump is 
Fitted
1PF
4
1 Pump is 
Fitted & Fails
Pump 1    
Fails
PF
5
2 Pumps are 
Fitted & Fail
2 Pumps are 
Fitted
2PF
Altered Fault Tree Structure
Failure when 2 
Pumps Fitted
6
Parallel Redundant 
Pumps are fitted
PR
7
Parallel Redundant 
Pumps are Fitted & Fails
8
k-out-of-2 Redundant 
Pumps are Fitted & Fails
k-out-of-2 Redundant 
Pumps are Fitted
k2R
2 Pumps      
Fail
9
2 Pumps      
Fail
Pump 1  
Fails
PF
Pump 2  
Fails
PF2
10
Pump 1  
Fails
PF
Pump 2  
Fails
PF2
1HE 2HE
2_1HE 2_2HE
 
Figure 4.5. Pattern 2 Application Example for Fire Protection System 
The rule defining links between house events in the first group is the same as the one used for 
the Pattern1. The rule defining the states of the house events in the second group is as 
follows: 
 if i_kHE = TRUE, (i_k = 1,2,…,i) 
 then  i_lHE = FALSE, (i_l = 1,2,….,i_k–1, i_k+1,…i) and 
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   j_lHE = FALSE, (j_l = 1,2,…,j; j = 1,2,…i-1,i+1,…, mn) 
Here i_kHE and i_lHE define the corresponding kth and lth house events from the second 
group which are linked with the ith house event from the first group. Similarly, j_lHE is the 
lth house event from the second group which is linked with the jth house event (set to state 
FALSE) from the first group of house events. According to these rules only two house events 
can be in a TRUE state while the rest of them are set to FALSE. 
4.2.2.4. A Different Component Type Selection (Pattern 3)  
Pattern3 is used to construct a fault tree structure where a different component type selection 
is implemented. A variable mt associated with this pattern identifies the number of possible 
component types. Each of the mt incorporated house events is coupled with a basic event. The 
basic event indicates failure of the component with specific characteristics indicating the type 
of the component. There are also mt-1 new basic events in the fault tree, since the basic event 
chosen to be replaced is incorporated in the new fault tree structure and defines failure for the 
component of type 1. The flowchart of the algorithm for implementing the choice for a 
different type component is shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
Do i = 1 to 
mt
Terminate
type: AND gate
number of input gates: 0
number of input events: 2
Input Event No. 1
Input Event No. 2 
Gate TG + i:
name: RE_1_i
type: basic event
name: MH + i
type: house event
state: FALSE
Do i = 1 
to mt
name: TG + i
Input Gate No. i
type: OR gate
number of input gates: mt
number of input events: 0
Top Gate TG:
names of input gates
 
Figure 4.6. Flowchart for the algorithm of Pattern 3 
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The pattern with mt=3 applied for the replacement of the pump in the example Fire Protection 
System introduces the fault tree where failure causes for three design cases are incorporated 
(Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.7. Pattern3 Application Example for Fire Protection System 
The rule for defining the links between the introduced house events is identical to the one 
used for Pattern1. If one of mt house events is set to TRUE the rest of them have a state 
FALSE. For example, if the house event PT3 is set to TRUE then the rest of the two house 
events PT1 and PT2 are defined as FALSE. For this case the resulting fault tree represents the 
Fire Protection System where a type 3 pump is installed. 
4.2.2.5. Selection Option of a Component Type for New Redundant Components 
(Pattern4 and Pattern5) 
When considering design changes it is possible to introduce redundant components where a 
selection option for a component type also exists. Since there are two redundancy types two 
possible FTMPs exist that can be used for the fault tree structure alterations regarding both 
redundancies and component type selections. Pattern4 is employed when parallel redundant 
components and choices for each component type are considered. Pattern5 is used to alter the 
fault tree in the matter of k-out-of-n component redundancy added together with the 
possibility to choose each component type. 
Pattern4 combines two FTMPs, Pattern1 and Pattern3, where mn represents the maximum 
possible number of parallel redundant components introduced and mt identifies the maximum 
number of possible different component types for each redundant component. There are two 
groups of house events introduced. The first group comprises mn and the second group has mt 
house events. The ith (i=1,2,…, mn) house event from the first group is associated with the 
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possible failure causes for the system design case when i redundant components are used. The 
failure event of each introduced component is then associated with the second group of house 
events resulting in t sets comprising one basic event coupled with one house event. Here each 
basic event indicates the failure of a specific type of component. The latter linking of house 
events with basic events is analogous to the replacement of each earlier introduced basic event 
when using Pattern3. The resulting fault tree structure also comprises (mt×mn) - 1 new 
components. As in the previous cases the basic event chosen to be replaced represents the 
failure for component number 1 with type 1. The example of the application of Pattern4 is 
shown in Figure 4.8.  
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Figure 4.8. Pattern4 Application Example for Fire Protection System 
For the case analysed up to two redundant pumps can be installed and the possibility to 
choose one of two pump types is implemented. Thus there are two house events associated 
with the possible number of pumps to be installed, 1PF (1HEn) and 2PF (2HEn). Four house 
events PT11 (1HEt), PT12 (2HEt), PT21 (3HEt) and PT22 (4HEt) are also introduced which 
are associated with the choice of a type for any pump installed. Three new basic events are 
incorporated in the fault tree, which are ‘Type 2 Pump1 Fails’, ‘Type 1 Pump 2 Fails’ and 
‘Type 2 Pump 2 Fails’. 
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The two groups of house events are independent. It means rules for assigning either TRUE or 
FALSE values for house events within the group apply for each group individually. For the 
general case a particular design is defined by assigning values for the house events as follows: 
if iHEn = TRUE; (i = 1,2,…, mn) 
then jHEn = FALSE; (j = 1,2,…i-1,i+1,…, mn). 
if iHEt = TRUE; (i = 1,2,…, mt) 
then (i+mt*k)HEt = TRUE, (k = 1,2,…, mn-1) 
and jHEt = FALSE; (j = 1,2,…, mt*mn, j ≠ i+mt*k, k = 1,2,…, mn-1). 
Here iHEn and jHEn define the ith and jth house events from the first group of house events. 
Accordingly iHEt and jHEt are used to define the ith and jth house events associated with the 
choice of component type.  
Note that once one of the sets of the house events implementing the choice of component type  
are assigned their values the house events in the remaining sets will have the same values 
assigned. It means the redundant components will be of the same type for any level of 
redundancy. For example, for the Fire Protection system the house events are assigned values 
as follows; 2PF=TRUE (2HEn) and PT11=TRUE (1HEt) therefore 1PF=FALSE (1HEn) and 
PT21=TRUE (3HEt), PT12 = FALSE (2HEt), PT22 = FALSE (4HEt). As seen in Figure 4.8, 
the resulting fault tree represents a system where two redundant pumps of type 1 are installed. 
Pattern5 as well as Pattern4 is also equivalent to a combination of two FTMPs. The resulting 
fault tree structure determined by Pattern5 could be defined by firstly applying Pattern2 and 
then again altering the obtained fault tree a number of times using Pattern3. However the use 
of only Pattern5 is simpler and straightforward. 
The implementation of Pattern5 is very similar to the one of Pattern4. Indeed, the only 
existing difference between the two is that the fault tree structure defined by Pattern5 
corresponds to a system with k-out-of-n redundancy. Thus the new structure defined by the 
pattern also has two groups of house events. The first group comprises events to model k-out-
of-n redundancy cases and the second corresponds to the choice of a type for a redundant 
component. These two groups of house events are implemented as being independent. 
Therefore the rules used for assigning values for house events from the first group are 
identical to the ones used for Pattern2 and the rules employed for Pattern3 are used for house 
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events from the second group. An example of the application of the pattern is given in Figure 
4.9 where up to two pumps can be installed into the Fire Protection System and each of them 
can be either type1 or type 2. 
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Figure 4.9. Pattern5 Application Example for Fire Protection System 
4.2.2.6. Fault Tree Alteration at Gate Level 
The question is posed: when can it be useful to apply FTMPs at gate level? Assume a 
situation when a pumping device is considered to be replaced with n redundant pumping 
devices where each of them is comprised of a pump and a switch. The pumping device fails if 
either the pump or the switch fails. It means the failure of the pumping device is described 
with an OR gate and two input basic events. Application of FTMPs for the pump and switch 
replacements individually would be complicated. However, if the failure of a pumping device 
is considered as a simple event then the fault tree comprising all design alternatives with 
different numbers of redundant pumping devices can be built directly applying Pattern1 at the 
OR gate level. 
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As an example, the Fire Protection system is shown in Figure 4.10. In this case a redundant 
Water Deluge subsystem is introduced. Pattern1 is applied for AND gate 2. The initial 
subsystem comprises of one pump and a nozzle. Thus after introducing a redundant Water 
Deluge subsystem two new basic events appear in the fault tree. They are input events of the 
output event ‘Water Deluge subsystem 2 fails’ and this fault tree part is considered as a new 
intermediate event. The structure of the new part is a reproduction of the initial fault tree 
structure for failure of the Water Deluge subsystem. Considering the replaceable fault tree 
structure as a simple event, only two house events are needed to be incorporated in the new 
fault tree. When one of them is set to TRUE and another one is set to FALSE the resulting 
fault tree represents either the system with one Water Deluge subsystem or the system with 
two parallel redundant Water Deluge subsystems. 
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Figure 4.10. Example of Pattern 1 Application at Gate Level for Fire Protection 
System 
The remaining four FTMPs can be employed at gate level in the same manner as the 
discussed Pattern1 when a changeable part of a fault tree is treated as a simple event. In this 
case the number of introduced house events will be equal to the number of house events when 
FTMPs are applied at an event level. The same rules defining links between house events will 
be valid. The number of new simple events, i.e. fault tree parts having an identical structure, 
will be the same as the number of new basic events when applying FTMPs at event level. 
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4.3. QUANTITATIVE FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
When performing the quantitative system analysis for different design cases each design 
needs to be analysed individually. For this purpose the fault tree representing causes of failure 
for all possible design cases is utilised. House events in the fault tree are assigned the 
appropriate Boolean states to specify the fault tree structure for a particular design case. Since 
the value of the house event is specific to the design in question it must be specified prior to 
each individual design quantification. 
To set values for house events each fault tree part constructed according to a specific FTMP is 
analysed individually. The house events are assigned either TRUE of FALSE values 
according to the rules specific to the FTMP. As a result the fault tree structure represents 
causes of failure of one design alternative defined by the FTMP. 
The fault tree with house events assigned with specific values undergoes a trimming operation 
before its quantification process. Branches with house events set to a FALSE state are cut off 
resulting in a fault tree of an individual design case for the analysed system. Trimming allows 
the size of the fault tree to be greatly reduced which results in much faster calculations. It is 
especially useful when a large number of design variables is used and / or their range of 
possible values is large or when alterations are made at sub-system level. 
After the trimming operation has been performed the resulting fault tree is converted to its 
BDD. Since the obtained fault tree has a simple structure a standard BDD approach is 
employed to calculate the top event probability, i.e. the probability of the failure of the 
specific system design. As it is known, conversion of the fault tree to the BDD format enables 
the exact system unavailability to be found in a computationally more efficient way.. The 
BDD methodology for quantitative fault tree analysis was discussed in detail in Chapter2 
4.4. OPTIMISATION ALGORITHM 
4.4.1. Mathematical Problem Concept 
The objective of the process of safety system design construction and / or design alteration is 
to determine an acceptable system design. The criteria for evaluation of the designs 
acceptability can consist of system requirements based on its reliability, cost, weight, physical 
size, etc. The most important feature of a safety system is that it works when the demand 
arises. Therefore, in the developed approach system unavailability, i.e. the probability of 
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system failure on demand, has been chosen to provide a measure of system performance for 
different design alternatives. A small value of the probability of system failure identifies a 
highly reliable system design.  Other design requirements are considered within the context of 
pre-defined constraints. 
The system design optimisation problem is analysed as a general single objective constrained 
optimisation problem. The merit function of the problem is the probability of system failure 
that is to be minimised:  
( )sysQ Xmin    (4.1) 
Here ( )XQ  is a function defining system failure probability and X is a m–dimensional vector 
X = {x1, x2, …, xm} where its element xi is the failure probability value of a basic event i, i.e. 
system component i. The vector dimension m is equal to the number of basic events, i.e. 
system components subject to failure, in the fault tree for a specific design case. Thus if the 
number of system components varies for different design cases the content of X is adjusted to 
the changes. It follows that the optimisation objective to minimise system unavailability is 
equivalent to the objective to find the vector X that corresponds to the minimum system 
unavailability. The given objective function does not have an explicit form. As such, the Fault 
Tree Modification Methodology and FTA discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are used to 
quantify the system unavailability of each potential design. 
When developing a system design, considerations could also be given to other factors that 
influence the design criteria, additional to the used failure probability. Typically considered 
design requirements include system cost, physical size, power consumption, etc. In the 
approach developed for a general application it was decided to implement the possibility to 
set limitations to system cost, weight and volume (physical size). To use the resources 
efficiently it may be useful to have minimum and maximum limitation values. If only 
maximum limit values are needed then the minimum values become equal to zero. Thus the 
general system design optimisation problem is subject to the following constraints: 
,
,
,
maxmin
maxmin
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VolumeVolumeVolume
WeightWeightWeight
CostCostCost
sys
sys
sys
<<
<<
<<
    (4.2) 
where Costmin predefines a minimum possible cost for a system design, accordingly Costmax is 
the maximum possible cost for the design being constructed and Costsys is the actual cost for 
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the system design in question. Variables for weight and volume constraints have respective 
definitions. 
Since a safety system works on demand, the time taken to maintain the system influences its 
availability. Therefore the possibility to define limits for minimum (MDTmin) and / or 
maximum (MDTmax) maintenance down time is also implemented in the algorithm: 
maxmin MDTMDTMDT sys <<   (4.3) 
 
4.4.2. Evaluation of Design Requirements 
The total cost of a system differs for each individual system design. Every time a possible 
system design is chosen its cost needs to be recalculated. In the proposed approach two main 
types of system cost are considered: design cost and maintenance cost. Design cost can 
include all costs associated with a system design, i.e. cost of a component, storage cost etc. 
The maintenance cost of the system can be divided into three categories: maintenance test 
cost, corrective cost and maintenance preventive cost. The generalised formula for system 
cost evaluation introduced in the optimisation approach is as follows: 
MDsys CostCostCost += ,    (4.4) 
where CostD defines the total system design cost and CostM is associated with the cost 
assigned for system maintenance.  
The total system design cost for a specific design case is found by summing the design cost of 
each component as follows: 
∑
=
=
m
i
iD dcostCost
1
_ .   (4.5) 
Here idcost _  is the design cost of a component i, m is the total number of components 
representing the system design case analysed. 
The total system maintenance cost per examined time period for a specific design alternative 
is evaluated as the sum of the system test cost, preventive maintenance cost and corrective 
maintence cost: 
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Here itcost _  is the cost of maintenance testing for component i, ipcost _  is the preventive 
maintenance cost of the component and iccost _  is the corrective maintenance cost. 
The cost of either testing or maintenance for each component per examined time period is 
determined by multiplying the number of tests and/or amount of maintenance carried out 
during the examined period by the cost of a single testing or maintenance. Both maintenance 
testing and preventive maintenance are performed at regular defined intervals. Corrective 
maintenance is performed when demand arises, i.e. when system failure occurs. Thus to find 
the cost of maintenance testing for a component i the following formula is employed:  
i
Ti
T
i tc
U
tcost __
θ
= .  (4.7) 
Here TU  is the total number of time units per examined time period, Tiθ  corresponds to the 
interval between two tests for component i and itc _  is the cost of a single maintenance test. 
The time units defining TU , and Tiθ  are the same.  
Analogically, the preventive maintenance cost for component i can be evaluated: 
i
Pi
T
i pc
U
pcost __
θ
= ,  (4.8) 
where Piθ  is the time interval between two preventive maintenance activities and ipc _  
represents the cost of a single preventive maintenance for the component. Piθ  has the same 
time units as Tiθ . 
To find the cost of corrective maintenance for component i an expected number of failures 
occurring during the examined period needs to be identified. If the number of expected 
failures, iW , is known the following formula can be used: 
iii rcWccost __ =   (4.9) 
Here irc _  represents the cost of a single repairs for component i. 
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If the number of expected failures is not given it can be evaluated using an appropriate 
formula. For component i which has constant conditional failure intensity iλ  the number of 
expected failures over the analysed period can be found using the following formula: 
( ) TiiTi UqUW −= 1),0( λ .  (4.10) 
Here iq  is a failure probability of the component and TU  is the total number of time units in 
the examined time period. 
If the component failure rate is defined by the Weibull distribution the expected number of 
failures per examined time period is: 
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where Piθ  is the preventive maintenance interval of the component i presented using the time 
units as for TU . iβ  and iη  are Weibull distribution parameters, t denotes time and iq  is the 
failure probability of component i. 
System weight and volume for different design cases may also differ. New components 
introduced to the system will alter the overall system characteristics values. Thus if each 
component weight is given the total system weight can be evaluated as their sum: 
∑
=
=
m
i
isys wWeight
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,  (4.12) 
where wi denotes the weight of component i and m is the total number of components fitted 
for the design case analysed. 
The equivalent formula is used to evaluate the overall system volume where vi is the volume 
parameter calculated for component i: 
∑
=
=
m
i
isys vVolume
1
  (4.13) 
The second type of limitation that can be introduced is system maintenance down time. The 
following formula (Formula 4.14) is employed to find the total system maintenance down 
time: 
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where 
θ
N is the number of different maintenance test intervals, iθ  corresponds to the test 
interval, TU  is the total number of time units per examined time period, icN  defines the 
number of system components which are tested at the same time interval and jT  is the test 
time for each system component. 
4.4.3. Genetic Algorithm Characterisation 
A single objective GA has been chosen as the optimisation technique to solve the system 
unavailability minimisation problem. The implemented GA is summarised by the flowchart in 
Figure 4.11. Each stage of the algorithm is discussed in detail in the following sub-sections. 
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Figure 4.11. Structure of the Implemented SOGA 
 
4.4.3.1. Chromosome Encoding  
If applying a GA, a problem specific representation is needed to describe each chromosome of 
the population. In a general case, a chromosome encodes decision variables of the 
optimisation problem. In the proposed case, in Equation 4.1, failure probability values of 
system components compose the vector of the decision variables X. When using a fault tree 
representing all possible system design alternatives and FTA to evaluate the objective 
function of the problem, the dimension of vector X varies for different system design cases. If 
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coding these variables as genes the resulting chromosome structure will vary throughout the 
optimisation process. It will result in a rather complicated implementation of the GA, which 
would not necessary guarantee an efficient optimisation process.  
The problem of the variable length chromosomes has been avoided by using chromosomes 
encoding parameters of FTMPs instead. As mentioned earlier, during the optimisation process 
structural design variables are assigned various specific values resulting in the variable 
dimension of vector X. Since the set of components which are not considered to be replaced is 
the same for every design case, only sets of components introduced after the implementation 
of structural design changes are needed for identification of a specific design configuration 
case. Therefore the search for the optimal design which minimises system failure probability 
can be governed by manipulating only the values of structural design variables. Since the 
design variables are represented by FTMPs which define their maximum values, the structure 
of a chromosome is defined based on parameters of FTMPs. The number of FTMPs remains 
the same throughout the whole optimisation process which means that a fixed length 
chromosome is utilised for the problem analysed.  
Binary numbers are used for the encoding of each variable. In defining the structure of a 
chromosome, first parameters of FTMPs (mn, mt and mk) are allocated a particular number of 
bits required to code their values. The bits associated with one parameter represent a gene. To 
evaluate the size of the gene Formula 3.4 is used. Since the introduced values for parameters 
of FTMPs define the maximum range limit of an associated design variable(s), a parameter 
with the introduced value equal to 1 is omitted and no bits are allocated to it in the 
chromosome. Next, a required number of bits are allocated to code the maximum possible 
values of parameters which are not associated with the fault tree modifications, such as 
maintenance test intervals. The number of genes in the chromosome is increased by the 
amount which is equal to the number of different maintenance intervals. Such allocation of 
bits ensures that the size of a chromosome is sufficient to store any values of design variables 
and its size remains constant throughout the optimisation process. Thus the algorithm creates 
an individual fixed size chromosome for a specific problem analysed. 
As an example, three FTMPs are considered. Patterns are given in the following order: 
Pattern1 (mn = 2, mt = 1, mk = 1), Pattern3 (mn = 1, mt = 3, mk = 1) and Pattern5 (mn = 4, 
mt = 3, mk = 4). In order to encode the possible levels of parallel redundancy introduced with 
Pattern1 in a binary format two bits are required. Thus the first two bits are allocated in the 
chromosome for the parameter of Pattern1. In this case mt = 1 which means that no changes 
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are made regarding the choice of a different type for the component. As such, no bits are 
allocated in the chromosome. Next, two bits in the chromosome are allocated to code the 
parameter mt = 3 for Pattern3. Finally, a number of bits required to code parameters of 
Pattern5 are allocated. To code number 4 in binary digits three bits are required. Therefore 
the first three digits are allocated for parameter mn. A two bit length gene is allocated to code 
the value of the variable mt and the next three digits are assigned to parameter mk. The final 
structure of the chromosome is shown in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12. The Chromosome Structure 
 
4.4.3.2. Population Manipulation 
In the proposed algorithm an initial population is generated as follows: 
Step 1: Each gene in a chromosome is assigned a random binary number. 
Step 2: The chromosome is decoded, i.e. a binary number assigned to each gene is converted 
into a decimal number, to assign values of parameters for the design variables. At the same 
time it is checked to see if the obtained phenotype of each gene, i.e. the decoded value of each 
gene, does not exceed the predefined maximum value. If the generated value is bigger than 
the maximum possible value of the particular parameter then the gene is assigned a new 
binary number and its validation is checked again. The process is repeated until all the 
generated parameter values are valid. 
Step 3: A system design fault tree is reconfigured according to the obtained parameter values 
of the design variables. 
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Step 4: System resources and system failure probability are evaluated for the design 
generated.  
Step 6: The generated chromosome enters the initial population. 
Step7: If the number of chromosomes in the population is equal to the predefined value N the 
process is terminated. Otherwise the process is repeated from Step 1. 
The initial population is considered as the first generation parent population and is used to 
generate a new generation offspring population. Each generation offspring population is 
created using three main GA operators. The reproduction operator is implemented employing 
a biased roulette wheel. The operator is used to select N/2 couples of parent strings entering 
into a mating pool. Strings of each couple are crossed over employing a one-point crossover 
operator. During the crossover process, a bit-by-bit mutation is also carried out. All the 
mentioned GA operators were discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Each time a pair of parent chromosomes are crossed over and mutation is implemented two 
new strings are created. Before adding the new chromosomes into an offspring population 
each gene is decoded to check the generated values for the corresponding design parameters. 
In some cases the same number of bits allocated for one parameter value can represent a 
larger decimal number than the given parameter value. For example, in order to code Pattern1 
parameter mn=4 three bits need to be allocated in the chromosome. However decimal 
numbers 5, 6 and 7 can also be coded using three bits. To avoid situations when a 
chromosome with unfeasible genes enters into a population, a chromosome repair is carried 
out. If a gene value is outside of the range a new binary number is generated for the 
corresponding gene and its validation is checked again.  
4.4.3.3. Replacement 
The replacement procedure is implemented to preserve both elite and feasible chromosomes. 
After an offspring population is generated each pair of offspring chromosomes is compared 
with their parent chromosomes and a new parent population for the next generation is formed. 
The following outcomes of the comparison are possible: 
1. If both offspring are infeasible parent chromosomes enter in the new parent population.  
2. If one of the offspring chromosomes is feasible the fitness value that it yields, i.e. the 
measure of its fitness based on the objective function value, is compared with the fitness value 
of each parent chromosome. In this case two out of three chromosomes which have the 
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smallest fitness values are stored in the new parent population. Both the chromosome with the 
largest fitness values and the infeasible offspring chromosome are discarded.  
3. If offspring chromosomes are feasible then both of them enter the new parent population. 
4.4.4. Optimisation Algorithm Structure 
This section provides an overview of the GSDOA. This algorithm has two major parts. The 
first part is considered as a preparative part for the optimisation process. At this stage all 
proposed design alternatives are introduced for the alteration of the initial system design using 
appropriate FTMPs. The second part of the algorithm, i.e. optimisation part, comprises the 
optimisation technique and the quantitative system failure analysis. The SOGA, chosen as the 
optimisation technique, governs the generation of system design alternatives converging to an 
optimal design case. FTA and BDD analysis are employed to quantify failure probabilities of 
the generated design cases and the obtained results are passed back to the generation process 
of new design alternatives. The final result of the optimisation process is a system design case 
with the minimal failure probability. The detailed structure of the GSDOA is shown in Figure 
4.13 and is further discussed in this section. 
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Figure 4.13. Structure of GSDOA 
 
4.4.4.1. Preparative Part 
To perform the design optimisation analysis for a chosen system the following data is 
required: a fault tree structure for the initial system design, a list of chosen design variables 
represented as FTMPs and parameters for the GA. Parameters used for the GA performance 
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and defined by the user are population size N, which should be an even number (the 
requirement of the population to have even number of chromosomes is discussed in Section 
4.3.5.3), crossover rate, mutation rate and maximum number of generations performed before 
the optimisation process is terminated. 
The fault tree for the initial system design and the list of the appropriate FTMPs with the 
associated replaceable fault tree events are employed to construct a fault tree incorporating all 
possible design alternatives. The construction of the fault tree occurs automatically within the 
derived computer program. Structural fault tree changes defined by a particular FTMP are 
completed for one chosen fault tree event at a time. The order in which FTMPs are 
implemented corresponds to the sequence they are provided in the initial data. The sequence 
of FTMPs is important and it is discussed in Section 5.4.2 considering a specific optimisation 
example. The constructed fault tree representing causes of failure for all design alternatives is 
then used in the following optimisation part of the algorithm. 
4.4.4.2. Optimisation Part 
The data required for this stage includes the fault tree representing all possible design 
alternatives created in the first part of the algorithm and the same list of FTMPs implemented. 
Moreover, for the quantitative analysis of system designs, a number of characteristics of 
system components are required, such as design and failure-related data.  
Design characteristics include components volume, weight and cost. This set of data is 
arbitrary and varies from case to case. Three types of components can be introduced for the 
analysis according to their failure characteristics. If a component is repairable then its failure 
rate, mean time to repair and scheduled time interval for performing maintenance activities 
have to be provided. If component failure times are distributed under the Weibull distribution 
the distribution parameters β and η and also a value of scheduled maintenance interval need to 
be given. Since a time interval between scheduled maintenance activities can be considered as 
a design variable it can be omitted but it then needs to be defined in the provided list of design 
variables. Finally, if introducing unrepairable components their failure probability values 
should be provided. 
Having the required data the optimisation process can be started. It starts with the generation 
of the initial feasible population of N chromosomes which was discussed in detail in Section 
4.3.3.2. In the population each chromosome represents a specific design configuration and has 
a failure probability value of the design in question assigned to it. In order to find the failure 
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probability of a specific system design the fault tree representing all possible design 
alternatives is utilised. The chosen chromosome is decoded and the design variables are 
assigned specific values. Each house event representing the assigned value of the associated 
design variable is set to TRUE. The rest of the house events are set to either TRUE or FALSE 
according to the existing rules specific to each FTMP. Next, trimming of the fault tree follows 
where fault tree branches with the house events set to FALSE are eliminated. At this stage the 
fault tree structure is considered to be defined representing a particular design choice. The 
fault tree is converted to its BDD which is then used to evaluate the failure probability of the 
system design in question. The chromosome is assigned its fitness value. 
Each chromosome also has assigned associated system characteristics for the system design it 
represents. To evaluate the characteristics Equations 4.4 -4.14 are employed. 
The initial population of chromosomes with their fitness values becomes a parent population 
and three genetic operators are used to generate a new offspring population. The offspring 
chromosomes provide a new set of system design cases. The fault tree for each of them is 
constructed as explained earlier and resulting system design characteristics and failure 
probability values are assigned to the corresponding chromosomes. At this stage the 
replacement procedure takes place and a new population comprising a number of 
chromosomes from either population is formed. The latter population is now considered a 
parent population for the next generation of offspring chromosomes. The optimisation process 
is terminated after a pre-set number of generations. The steps of the procedure are presented 
in Figure 4.14. 
The algorithm provides a set of results. After a defined maximum number of generations, the 
feasible chromosome with minimal fitness value is presented. The genes of the chromosome 
are decoded to get values for the design variables representing the optimal system design 
case, while the chromosome fitness value gives the failure probability of the system. For the 
purposes of analysis the algorithm also produces a set of the minimum feasible and average 
fitness values for each generation. 
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Figure 4.14. Optimisation Process Flow Chart 
4.4.5. Computer Implementation of the GSDOA - GSDOP 
The software built for a general system design optimisation algorithm is called GSDOP 
(General System Design Optimisation Programme). The code for the developed GSDOP was 
written using Microsoft Visual C++ 2003. It includes the code for the fault tree modification 
methodology and the code for optimisation process. The developed code for the GA 
implemented is based on the original Pascal Simple Genetic Algorithm code presented by 
Goldberg [45] which was translated and altered to adapt it to the problem analysed. The code 
for the computation method to convert a fault tree to a BDD structure and perform its 
quantitative analysis was previously developed at Loughborough University [74]. The source 
code was incorporated in the code for GSDOP. The routines constituting the developed 
programme and the subroutines they contain are discussed in detail. 
4.4.5.1. Initialisation Stage 
The routine Initial_Data is the initialisation routine called to read initial data stored in data 
files created by the user. The data is entered into the files manually. The files are named to 
define what set of data the file provides. Each name is composed of two parts. The first part 
can consist of any combination of letters and the second part is to be chosen from the given 
list in order to represent the content of the file. The list of possible file names, i.e. their default 
parts, is given in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Data Files 
Default Name Information File Contains 
_fts.txt A fault tree structure in a text format 
_var.txt Data of FTMPs employed  
_bse.aqd Data of basic events 
_cost_cst.txt Data of system cost constraints* 
_mdt_cst.txt Data of system maintenance down time constraints* 
_volume_cst.txt Data of system volume constraints* 
_weight_cst.txt Data of system weight constraints* 
_theta.txt Parameters of inspection intervals* 
_gav.txt Genetic algorithm variables 
The sign “*” identifies optional data files. The optional files store data for evaluation of 
constraints. If any type of constraint is not considered for the analysed system the user does 
not create the corresponding file(s). For instance, if there are no limitations applied for system 
volume, then the file _volume_cst.txt is not provided. 
The names of the files for the given initial data are kept in the main data file called 
“data_files.txt”. Examples of data files together with the requirements for their contents are 
provided in detail in Appendix 1. 
The following sequence of subroutines is used to read specific data from the given files: 
GA_Parameters_Data, Constraints_Data, Fault_Tree_Data, Variables_Data, 
Inspect_Interval_Data and Basic_Events_Data. The subroutine GA_Parameters_Data reads 
parameters governing the GA, i.e. population size, crossover rate, mutation rate and 
maximum number of generations. The data is provided in the file _gav.txt. To read the 
available constraints data the subroutine Constraints_Data is employed. The subroutine also 
checks which constraints files are given. If any of the files are not provided validation of the 
corresponding constraints is not checked during the optimisation process. The subroutine 
Fault_Tree_Data reads the fault tree structure presented in a text format and saves it in a 
specific data structure form where one record represents one fault tree gate. The subroutine 
Variables_Data is employed to process the data of FTMPs. If the file _theta.txt is not 
provided it means either times between maintenance inspections for repairable components 
are given or all components are unrepairable. In this case the subroutine Basic_Event_Data is 
used to read failure characteristics of system components, which is stored in a file _bse.aqd. 
This file also contains data of components which will occur in the fault tree after 
implementation of FTMPs. If the file _theta.txt is provided it means there are i maintenance 
intervals considered as design variables and the information obtained from file _bse.aqd is not 
sufficient to perform quantitative analysis. The file _theta.txt stores the list of all basic events 
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of the fault tree where each of them is assigned a number (1, 2,…i) indicating which 
maintenance interval is associated with a system component represented by the basic event. 
To read the data the subroutine Inspect_Interval_Data is used. Once the values of inspection 
intervals are generated the stored data is used to assign these values to corresponding basic 
events. Having the complete failure data the quantitative analysis can be performed. 
4.4.5.2. Construction of the Fault Tree for all Possible Design Alternatives 
Following the initialisation step the programme constructs a fault tree representing all 
possible design cases. The routine Fault_Tree_Construction is illustrated step by step in 
Figure 4.15. The routine is organised using a loop where one FTMP is implemented at each 
iteration. In the data file every FTMP is given with a code number of the associated fault tree 
element and a letter identifying a fault tree modification level. If the modification is made at 
event level then the subroutine Change_Event_Gate is employed to transform the 
corresponding basic event into an OR gate coded as max_gate + 1. Here max_gate is the 
maximum code number of a gate in the fault tree before changes are made. The subroutine 
FT_Modification_Event follows next. It implements a particular FTMP according to the 
values of its parameters given. However if the basic event has not been found the employed 
subroutine returns the value FALSE and no changes are made to the fault tree. 
 
 
Figure 4.15. Algorithm for Construction of a Fault Tree for Possible Design Cases. 
If the modification has been set to be made at a gate level only the code number for the 
corresponding gate is changed to max_gate + 1 using the subroutine Change_Gate_Gate. If 
the identified gate was found the subroutine Copy_Fault_Tree_Part is implemented first. It 
creates a copy of a fault tree structure which will be incorporated as a principal event when 
altering the initial fault tree structure. The details of the utilization of the copied part of the 
fault tree were discussed in Section 4.2.2.5. A particular FTMP at the gate level is 
implemented using the subroutine FT_Modification_Gate. 
 
repeat for all i (i = 1, 2,…total_numbe_of_FTMPs) 
If change made at event level = TRUE 
 If Change_Event_Gate = TRUE 
FT_Modification_Event 
 
Else  
  If Change_Gate_Gate = TRUE 
  Copy_Part_Fault_Tree 
FT_Modification_Gate 
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The systematic coding of names of gates, basic and house events within new branches of the 
fault tree occurs automatically. The same rules apply in both fault tree modification cases, i.e. 
when changes are made at basic event and gate levels. Codes used for gates and house events 
consist of digits. As it was just mentioned earlier, the top gate of every new part of the fault 
tree is named as max_gate + 1 and the rest of the gates have numbers of max_gate + 1 + i, 
where i = 1,2,…,tn_gate (tn_gate is the total number of gates in the new part of the fault tree). 
The actual value for tn is defined according to the FTMP employed and values of its 
parameters. A similar rule applies for names of house events. They have names max_house + 
i, where max_house is the name of the house event with the maximum number in a fault tree 
before the alteration is made, i = 1,2,…,tn_house, where tn_house is the total number of house 
events in the part of the fault tree being incorporated. To identify values for max_gate and 
max_house two subroutines Max_Gate_Number and Max_House_Number are employed 
respectively. 
The names of basic events in the incorporated new part of the fault tree are defined using 
particular rules. Each name is formed to represent the number and the type for the associated 
system component. The name has three parts. The first part is a code which is the same as the 
name of the initial event being replaced. The second part identifies the number of the 
component in a group of redundant components. If no redundant components have been 
introduced then it is coded as 1. The third number defines the type of the associated 
component. All these three parts of the name are separated using a sign “_”. For example, a 
basic event with code 5 is being replaced using Pattern4 (mn = 2, mt = 3, mk = 1). It means 
failures caused by either one or two components are presented and it is possible to choose one 
of three different types of those components. Thus 6 (2×3) new basic events are added to the 
analysed fault tree with the following names: 5_1_1, 5_1_2, 5_1_3, 5_2_1, 5_2_2, 5_2_3. 
The chosen component No 2 type 3 would be represented with the basic event coded 5_2_3 
The code 5_1_1 is assigned to the basic event chosen to be replaced. 
Note, the user should also use the same codes for the basic events when entering the required 
initial data for system components, such as failure rates or cost etc.  
4.4.5.3. Optimisation Part 
The optimisation process is implemented in the routine Genetic. To manipulate populations of 
chromosomes two arrays of variables pop_old and pop_new are employed in the routine. One 
array represents a parent population and another is employed to store an offspring population 
data. Each element of an array represents a chromosome. The number of elements in each of 
Chapter 4. General System Design Optimisation Algorithm 77 
them is equal to the size of the population. An element of the array is a variable of a structure 
type named record. A structure is a collection of variables of different data types. The 
variables in the structure record also called elements or members represent 
chromosome-related data, such as, a binary structure of the chromosome, the fitness value or 
the cost of the system design the chromosome represents. The introduced structure type is 
shown in Figure 4.16.  
 
Figure 4.16.  Members of a Data Structure record. 
The variable chrom is used to store a set of binary numbers, i.e. a chromosome. The variable 
genes is an array of strings of binary numbers of different where each string represents a gene. 
Values of decoded genes are stored using the variable phenotype. The objective function 
value corresponding to the chromosome is assigned using the variable objective. When an 
offspring chromosome is generated the order number of its parent chromosomes in the parent 
population are stored using variables parent1 and parent2. To store system characteristics for 
a system design identified with the current chromosome variables cost_d (design cost), cost_t 
(maintenance testing cost), cost_p (preventive maintenance cost), cost_c (corrective 
maintenance cost), volume, weight and downtime are employed.  
Form_Chromosome is the first subroutine employed which defines the number of genes in the 
chromosome and how many bits comprise each of the genes. The data of the FTMPs and 
maintenance intervals introduced as variables is used. Once the structure for the chromosomes 
is defined the initial population of chromosomes is generated using subroutine 
Init_Population. The structure of the subroutine is given in Figure 4.17. In the current 
subroutine one chromosome is generated at each iteration employing the subroutine 
struct record 
{ 
bool *chrom; 
gene *genes;  
 int *phenotype;  
 double objective; 
 double fitness; 
 int parent1; 
 int parent2; 
 double cost_d; 
 double cost_t; 
 double cost_c; 
 double cost_p; 
 double volume; 
 double weight; 
 double downtime; 
}; 
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Init_Pop_Chromosome. The results obtained are stored as members chrom, gene and 
phenotype of a certain element of an array old_pop.  
The values of maintenance intervals (if they were not defined initially) and structural design 
variables are obtained from the array phenotype and the fault tree representing all possible 
designs is modified accordingly. The process is managed using the subroutine 
Fault_Tree_Design. 
Next, validation of the introduced constraints is checked. If the subroutine 
Check_Constraints_Values returns a result FALSE, the corresponding element of an array 
named valid is assigned the value 0. When the subroutine Check_Constraints_Values returns 
the result TRUE it means all introduced constraints are satisfied and the corresponding 
element of array valid is assigned the value 1. The subroutine also assigns values to the 
variables cost_d, cost_t, cost_c, cost_p, volume, weight and downtime of the considered 
element of the array old_pop. If certain constraints are not considered their corresponding 
variables are assigned the value 0. 
 
Figure 4.17.  Structure of the Subroutine Init_Population. 
If maintenance intervals are considered as variables their generated values need to be assigned 
to the associated components, i.e. basic events, and failure characteristics for the components 
need to be updated. Therefore two additional subroutines are employed such as, 
Assign_Intervals and Update_Failure_Data. This step is omitted if the maintenance intervals 
are defined or are not considered in the analysis. 
The following step is performed to obtain a failure probability value for the generated design 
alternative. The source code used for this purpose is implemented as an independent external 
Repeat until i <= N 
valid = 0; 
while valid = 0 
 Init_Pop_Chromosome 
Fault_Tree_Design 
If Check_Constraitns_Values = TRUE 
 valid = 1; 
Else  
 valid = 0; 
If a file _theta.txt exists 
Assign_Intervals 
Update_Failure_Data 
Quantification 
i = i + 1.  
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process. It returns a failure probability value of the system design considered which is 
assigned to the variable objective. 
One iteration of the loop is completed. Since this was an initial chromosome generation its 
parents are not identified and members parent1 and parent2 for the considered element are 
assigned values of zero. The subroutines are repeated in the described order until a population 
of N chromosomes is generated. 
The initial population is considered as a parent population for the next generation of an 
offspring population. Prior to the generation of any offspring population the details of its 
parent population are stored. The subroutine Statistics is employed to find the average of the 
objective function values and identify the minimal feasible value of the objective function as 
well as the chromosome that yields this minimal value. To report the results the subroutine 
Report_Population is used. Every time the subroutine is called it updates three result files 
“Average_Objective” “Best_Objective” and “Genetic_Results”. As the names suggest, files 
“Average_Objective” and “Best_Objective” store corresponding objective function values 
obtained from the parent population for each generation. The decoded chromosomes, i.e. 
genes’ phenotypes corresponding to the minimal feasible objective function value are stored 
for each parent population in the file “Genetic_Results”. 
The process of generating new populations is organised using a main loop of the routine 
Genetic. A number of iterations in the loop is equal to the maximum number of generations 
which is defined by the user. In order to generate a new offspring population the subroutine 
Generation is employed at each iteration. The subroutine has a loop implemented. In this 
case, during each iteration, at first two parent chromosomes are selected. The subroutine 
Reproduction is employed where the biased roulette wheel method is implemented. The 
subroutine returns the order number of the selected chromosome in the population. These 
numbers are then used in the subroutine Crossover which performs the crossover operation. 
While performing the crossover operation both offspring chromosomes undergo a bit by bit 
mutation governed by the subroutine Mutation. Next the resulting two chromosomes are 
checked if each gene is feasible. If there is at least one infeasible gene it is regenerated using 
the subroutine Repair. The output of the subroutine is assigned to variables chrom, gene and 
phenotype and one iteration is completed. Thus in the subroutine Generation during a single 
iteration the two offspring chromosomes have been generated. Since every time two parent 
chromosomes are selected and two offspring are generated it is required that the total number 
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of chromosomes in a population would be an even number. The output of the subroutine 
Generation is a new population of chromosomes stored using the variable new_pop.  
Following this step the subroutine Fault_Tree_Design is employed for each chromosome in 
the population. It transforms the fault tree with all possible design alternatives to the one that 
represents one particular design case defined by the values of the parameters of the design 
variables coded in the chromosome. Having the fault tree structure specified, appropriate 
characteristics associated with basic events of the fault tree are used to check if the generated 
design satisfies the predefined constraints. The subroutine Check_Constraints_Values is 
employed and an array valid_new is introduced. Each element of the array corresponds to one 
design case and is assigned the value 0 if any constraint is violated and 1 if none of 
constraints are violated. Next, subroutines Assign_Intervals and Update_Failure_Data are 
called if intervals between maintenance routines need to be defined. Otherwise the 
programme of quantitative analysis is called out straight after the constraints-checking 
procedure. The listed subroutines are applied for every chromosome in the population in the 
order introduced. 
The new generation parent population is formed from both the current parent and offspring 
populations. The comparison between offspring chromosomes and their parent chromosomes 
is implemented in the subroutine Replacement as described in Section 4.3.3.3. The resulting 
population of chromosomes is considered as a new parent population which is used to 
produce new offspring chromosomes. Thus the results files “Average_Objective”, 
“Best_Objective” and “Genetic_Results” are updated and a single iteration of the main loop is 
completed. Once the number of iterations completed reaches the predefined number the 
optimisation process is terminated. 
4.5. SUMMARY 
A number of approaches seen in the literature have been developed by which an optimal 
design can be obtained by combining the fault tree analysis method and the optimisation 
technique. However they were developed for a specific example and have not been applied for 
a general case system. The current research detailed so far has created a mechanism to solve a 
design optimisation problem for any safety system. It is based on the following developments, 
created as part of this research: 
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• newly defined FTMPs and utilised to represent possible design alternatives in one 
fault tree for any system analysed; 
• a newly developed optimisation algorithm combining the fault tree analysis and the 
GA without restricted application to one particular system. 
• a newly developed programme code to automate the design optimisation process. 
A specific structure of a system fault tree is used in the developed optimisation algorithm. It 
represents all given design alternatives. The newly developed FTMPs enable the required 
fault tree for any system analysed to be built. Using the FTMPs establishes the possibility to 
analyse design options for any safety system. Thus the application of the algorithm is not 
restricted to one particular system. 
The algorithm discussed in this chapter, GSDOA, was developed to solve non-specific safety 
system design optimisation problems. The objective of the optimisation process is to define a 
particular set of system components that would constitute an optimal system design. As a 
result, the algorithm determines the case where the system failure probability is minimised 
and the utilisation of available resources is optimised. 
The programme code, GSDOP, was developed to implement GSDOA. It has three major 
groups of subroutines. The first group is associated with the initialisation part of the 
programme where the initial data provided is processed. The second group represents 
subroutines employed to implement the required FTMPs and construct the fault tree 
representing causes of failure for all possible design cases. The last group of the programme 
subroutines are employed for the optimisation process. The code allows the user to introduce 
an initial design, specify the possible design changes and limitations on resources and will 
then automatically generate a possible solution. 
The algorithm introduced and the code developed have the potential to be applied to a range 
of safety system. To analyse the performance of the code a number of systems needs to be 
examined. The systems chosen to be analysed are the High Integrity Protection System 
(HIPS) and Firewater Deluge System (FWDS). The results of the application examples are 
discussed in the following chapters, Chapters 5 and 6. 
5. HIGH INTEGRITY PROTECTION SYSTEM 
DESIGN OPTIMISATION USING GSDOA 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the application of the developed GSDOA to solve a 
specific design optimisation problem. It provides guidelines of the GSDOA application 
process and also demonstrates its problem solving capability. A High Integrity Protection 
System (HIPS) has been chosen as an application example. 
In hazardous industrial environments safety systems are designed to protect individuals and 
the workforce by lowering the risk of the occurrence of a system failure. The analysed HIPS 
is a safety system fitted on offshore platforms which aims to prevent a high-pressure surge 
passing through the system. In an offshore platform the high pressure can come from a 
production well and therefore protection is required for the equipment located downstream on 
the processing platform. Thus, the HIPS protects the processing equipment whose pressure 
rating could be exceeded. 
In Section 5.2 the structure of the HIPS and its fault tree are introduced. Design options are 
presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 considers the HIPS design optimisation problem and 
includes detailed discussion about data preparation for the analysis. Implementation of 
FTMPs and construction of the fault tree for all possible design cases of HIPS is also 
discussed in this section. In Section 5.5 performance analysis of the GSDOP is provided 
followed by the discussion of the results of the application, along with the generic 
implications of the analysis. 
The research about the GSDOA and its application example to the HIPS was presented at 18th 
AR2TS and published in the proceedings (D. Astapenko and L.M. Bartlett, System Failure 
Minimisation Using Automated Design Optimisation. Proceedings of the 18th AR2TS 
(Advances in Risk & Reliability Technology Symposium), April 2009, Loughborough 
University, UK, p.347-359). 
5.2. HIGH INTEGRITY PROTECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The basic structure of the HIPS is shown in Figure 5.1. The system has two levels of 
protection, which are the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) (Sub-system 1) and High – Integrity 
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protection subsystems (Sub-system 2). The ESD subsystem is the first level of protection that 
includes Wing, Master and ESD valves (ESDV) and also a pressure transmitter (PT). When 
the pipeline pressure exceeds the permitted value then all the valves in the ESD subsystem are 
closed. The pressure transmitter is used to monitor pressure in the pipeline. The second fitted 
subsystem works in a similar way to the first subsystem, but is independent in operation from 
the ESD subsystem and provides an additional level of protection. It has a fitted HIPS valve 
and a pressure transmitter. 
PT PT
Master Wing ESDV HIPS
Sub-system 1 Sub-system 2
Production
Well
Processing
Platform
Equipment
 
Figure 5.1. High Integrity Protection System 
The causes of failure to protect the processing equipment from the high pressure surge 
passing through are analysed using FTA. The top event for the fault tree is defined as “Safety 
system fails to protect”. It will occur if all the valves along the pipeline fail to close or in 
another words both safety subsystems fail. Thus the input events related by AND gate logic 
are “Wing valve fails to protect”, “Master valve fails to protect”, “ESD valve fails to protect” 
and ”HIPS valve fails to protect”, as shown in Figure 5.2. Note that a number inside the gate 
symbol in Figure 5.2 and numbers in the rest of the fault tree figures in the chapter are used to 
number gates. Gate numbering is utilised throughout the analysis to help trace the 
development of the system fault tree and the implementation of FTMPs. 
 
Safety system fails 
to protect
1
Wing valve 
fails to protect 
Master valve 
fails to protect 
ESD valve 
fails to protect 
HIPS valve 
fails to protect
 
 
Figure 5.2. Top Event of System Fault Tree 
All the system valves are of the “air to open” type. They are controlled by computer logic in 
the following way: if pressure in the pipeline is lower than the permitted value then the 
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solenoid of the valve is energised, the pneumatic line is pressurised and the valve is retained 
in the open state by the associated actuator. If the pressure increases above the acceptable 
value, the circuit of the output channel to the solenoid is opened. The pressure in the pipeline 
is monitored by the pressure transmitter, which sends a signal to the computer and the 
computer causes the circuit to open. Two relay contacts are available to break the circuit. 
Once the circuit is broken the solenoid is de-energised and a vent valve is activated. This 
results in a drop of pressure to the actuator that causes the valve to close.  
First consider the wing valve. The fault tree logic representing its causes of failure is shown in 
Figure 5.3. The wing valve fails to close if either the wing valve itself fails or if the 
pneumatic line to the actuator of the valve remains pressurised. Failure of the valve occurs 
due to failure of either its valve part or its solenoid part which are represented with basic 
events “WV” and “SVW” respectively. The pneumatic line remains energised due to two 
reasons. The first one is the computer failure to send a trip signal. It occurs if either the 
computer logic fails or the pressure transmitter fails and it results in no trip signal to the 
computer. Failure of the computer logic is the basic event “PLC1” and failure of the pressure 
transmitter corresponds to the basic event “PT1”. The second reason why the solenoid valve 
stays energised is that both relay contacts stay closed. This situation in the fault tree is 
described with two basic events “R1/1” and “R1/2” connected with an AND gate. 
 
Wing valve 
fails to protect
Wing valve 
fails stuck
Solenoid stays 
energized
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close
WV
2
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Computer fails to 
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Computer 
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Relay contacts 
stay closed
Relay contact 2 
stays closed
Relay contact 1 
stays closed
R1/2R1/1
4
Solenoid 
fails
SVW
 
 
Figure 5.3.  Fault Tree for Failure of Wing Valve 
The causes of failure of the master and ESD valves are analogous to the ones for the wing 
valve. Therefore the structures of the fault trees for the valves remain the same. The only 
changes that are introduced to the fault tree for each valve correspond to the failure of a valve 
itself and its solenoid valve. In the fault tree for the master valve the basic event “MV” is used 
instead of the basic event “WV” which identifies the failure of the master valve itself. The 
failure of the solenoid valve for the master valve is defined with the basic event “SVM” 
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instead of event “SVW”. Accordingly basic events “ESD” and “SVE” are introduced in the 
fault tree for the ESD valve failure. The passage of fault logic from detection of hazardous gas 
levels to de-energising the solenoids of the wing, master and ESD valves is common for all 
three valves and the event “Solenoid stays energised” is identical to that described for the 
wing valve. Therefore the branching structure of the fault tree for this event, with the same 
gate numbers and the same basic events, is replicated in the fault tree parts for failure of the 
master and ESD valves. 
The HIP subsystem has a pressure transmitter and a computer independent from the ESD 
subsystem. It means the two subsystems do not have any common components even though 
the logic of component failures leading to the subsystem failure is the same. Therefore the 
fault tree representing causes of failure of the valve in the HIPS subsystem has the same 
structure where the basic events are different from the ones in the fault trees for the valves of 
the ESD subsystem. The HIPS subsystem fault tree is shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4. Fault Tree for Failure of HIPS Valve 
5.3. OPTIONS FOR HIPS DESIGN ALTERATIONS 
Having the initial design structure of the HIPS introduced there are a large number of options 
for it to be altered with respect to the minimisation of the system failure probability. Design 
alteration options considered in this case are listed in Table 5.1. The possibility to reduce the 
HIPS failure probability through the choice of performing maintenance at appropriate 
intervals is also considered. Time intervals between each maintenance testing performed for 
ESD (θ1) and HIPS (θ2) subsystems can vary from 1 week to 2 years. The measurement unit 
used for maintenance test intervals is one week. 
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Table 5.1. Structural Design Variables 
Associated 
Component Description of Design Alteration 
Design 
Variable 
Possible Values 
of Parameters  
Number of ESD valves fitted n1 1, 2 ESD Valve Valve type t1 type 1, type 2 
Number of HIPS valves fitted n2 1,2 HIPS Valve Valve type t2 type 1, type 2 
Number of pressure transmitters fitted in 
subsystem 1 n3 1 - 4 
Minimum number of pressure transmitters 
required to function for subsystem 1 k3 1 - n3 
Pressure 
Transmitter 1 
Pressure transmitter type t3 type 1, type 2 
Number of pressure transmitters fitted in 
subsystem 2 n4 1 - 4 
Minimum number of pressure transmitters 
required to function for subsystem 2 k4 1 – n4 
Pressure 
Transmitter 2 
Pressure transmitter type t4 type 1, type 2 
When analysing the possible HIPS design alterations considerations are given to the design 
characteristics of cost and maintenance down time. The following requirements are 
introduced: 1) total system cost (design cost) must be less than 1000 units; 2) maintenance 
down time must be less than 130 hours per year. 
For this example, each considered system component is repairable and can fail in the dormant 
failure mode. Dormant failure is the inability of the component to carry out its desired task on 
demand. The failure rate and mean repair time for each component option is given in 
Table 5.2. A new HIPS design structure needs to meet the defined cost and maintenance 
requirements therefore a design cost and a test time for each potential component is also given 
in the table. 
Table 5.2. Component Data 
Component Failure Rate, h 
Mean 
Repair 
Time, h 
Cost 
Test 
Time, 
h 
Wing valve 1.14× 10-5 36 100 12 
Master valve 1.14× 10-5 36 100 12 
HIPS valve type 1 5.44× 10-6 36 250 15 
HIPS valve type 2 1× 10-5 36 200 10 
ESDV valve type 1 5.44× 10-6 36 250 15 
ESDV valve type 2 1× 10-5 36 200 10 
Solenoid valve 5× 10-6 36 20 5 
Relay Contacts 0.23× 10-6 36 1 2 
Pressure transmitter type 1 1.5× 10-6 36 20 1 
Pressure transmitter type 2 7× 10-6 36 10 2 
Computer logic 1× 10-5 36 20 1 
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5.4. HIPS DESIGN OPTIMISATION PROBLEM 
The given list of structural design variables together with the possible choices of different 
time intervals between maintenance activities provide 42,831,360 different potential HIPS 
design and maintenance alternatives. To analyse each design case individually in order to find 
the one which minimises the failure probability is impractical. The application of GSDOP in 
this case could be very effective. 
5.4.1. Data Initialisation 
The initialisation stage of the optimisation process involves preparation of data in the format 
satisfying specific GSDOP requirements. First of all, code numbers are introduced for gates 
and basic events in the fault tree for the initial HIPS design. The gates are numbered starting 
with a top gate which has a number 1 (Figure 5.2). Next, gates representing the failure logic 
of the wing valve are coded as shown in Figure 5.3. Gates representing the failure logic of the 
master and ESD valves are coded in the same order and so are the gates representing the HIPS 
valve where the last gate has the code 15 (Figure 5.3.). Numbers used to code basic events 
initially given in the fault tree are listed in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Number Codes for Basic Events 
Component Failure Basic Event Code 
Wing valve fails WV 1 
Solenoid valve for the wing valve fails  SVW 2 
First relay contact in the ESD subsystem fails R1/1 3 
Second relay contact in the ESD subsystem fails R1/2 4 
Pressure transmitter in the ESD subsystem fails PT1 5 
Computer logic in the ESD subsystem fails PLC 1 6 
Master valve fails MV 7 
Solenoid valve for the master valve fails SVM 8 
ESD valve fails ESD 9 
Solenoid valve for the ESD valve fails SVE 10 
HIPS valve fails HIPS 11 
Solenoid valve for the HIPS valve fails SVH 12 
Pressure transmitter in the HIPS subsystem fails PT2 13 
Computer logic in the HIPS subsystem fails PLC 2 14 
First relay contact in the HIPS subsystem fails R2/1 15 
Second relay contact in the HIPS subsystem fails R2/2 16 
The given codes for gates and events are used when defining the fault tree structure in a text 
format. The fault tree for the HIPS in the text form is stored in the data file “hips_fts.txt”. The 
content of the data file is shown in Figure 5.5. Here the first number in each row identifies a 
gate code followed by the gate type. Next a number of input gates and events are given and 
first input gates and then input events are listed. An input gate is identified as “G:” and “E:” is 
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used to identify an input event. As a reminder, the rules of transformation of a graphical form 
of a fault tree into a text form are explained in detail in Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Data File hips_fts.txt 
The next step is to prepare the file named hips_var.txt which stores the given list of FTMPs. 
The content of the file is presented in Figure 5.6. The data file was prepared based on the list 
of the design variables. In total six FTMPs are used to implement the given design variables. 
In the file each row corresponds to one FTMP. The first letter (E or G) in the row denotes if 
the FTMP is implemented at event or gate level. Next the code number of event/gate being 
altered follows. The last three numbers are parameter values of the FTMP. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Data File hips_var.txt 
The FTMP given in the file hips_var.txt are implemented within the programme 
automatically. Causes of failure corresponding to design cases with increased numbers of 
pressure transmitters are implemented at event level for both subsystems. Events with codes 5 
(pressure transmitter in the ESD subsystem fails) and 13 (Pressure transmitter in the HIPS 
subsystem fails) are replaced using Pattern5 where mn=4, mt=2 and mk=4. Changes to the 
fault tree representing the introduced possible design alternatives regarding the ESD valve are 
implemented using two FTMPs as follows. The ESD valve section contains the solenoid and 
the valve. The choice to use either a type 1 or type 2 valve refers only to the valve part and the 
solenoid part remains the same. However, when introducing a redundant valve, both the 
E 5 4 2 4 
E 13 4 2 4 
E 9 1 2 1 
G 10 2 1 1 
E 11 1 2 1 
G 15 2 1 1 
1 AND 3 0 G:2 G:7 G:12 
2 OR  2 0 G:3 G:6 
3 OR  2 0 G:4 G:5 
4 AND 0 2 E:3 E:4 
5 OR  0 2 E:5 E:6 
6 OR  0 2 E:1 E:2 
7 OR  2 0 G:3 G:8 
8 OR  0 2 E:7 E:8 
9 OR  2 0 G:3 G:10 
10 OR  0 2 E:9 E:10 
11 OR  2 0 G:12 G:15 
12 OR  2 0 G:13 G:14 
13 AND 0 2 E:16 E:17 
14 OR  0 2 E:13 E:14 
15 OR  0 2 E:11 E:12 
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solenoid and the valve parts are considered. This means that in order to implement the fault 
tree changes corresponding to the possible choices of redundancy, both basic events “ESD” 
and “SVE” need to be replaced. Therefore, first basic event “ESD” (code number 9) is 
replaced using Pattern3 where mt=2. Following, gate number 10 is replaced using Pattern1 
where mn=2 which implements causes of failure for design options with either one or two 
redundant ESD valves. If the FTMPs are implemented in an opposite order, i.e. first Pattern1 
is implemented, then Pattern3 would have to be implemented in each part of the fault tree 
where the branching structure with the top gate 10 was replicated since it includes the basic 
event “ESD”. The design variables for the HIPS valve are implemented in the same manner, 
first basic event “HIPS” and then gate 15 are altered. 
Components in the HIPS are repairable and to find their unavailability values Equation 2.6. is 
employed which uses data of the failure rate, mean repair time and maintence test interval. In 
the case analysed values for maintenance intervals are not specified therefore only failure 
rates and mean repair times of components are provided in the file for failure characteristics. 
Following requirements (see Section A.3 in Appendix 1), digit 1 is used as maintence interval 
value. The fragment of the file is presented in Figure 5.7.  
 
 
Figure 5.7. The Fragment of the File hips_bse.aqd 
The data required for assigning values of maintenance intervals once they are generated to 
appropriate components is given in the data file hips_theta.txt. It stores the list of sets 
comprising of a basic even code and an identification number of associated maintence 
10_1_1   d 0.000005  36  1 
10_2_1   d 0.000005  36  1 
11_1_1_1_1 d 0.00000544 36 1 
11_1_1_2_1 d 0.00000544 36  1 
11_1_2_1_1 d 0.00001  36  1 
11_1_2_2_1 d 0.00001  36  1 
12_1_1   d 0.000005  36 1 
12_2_1   d 0.000005  36  1 
 
………………………………….. 
 
14     d 0.00001  36  1 
15     d 0.00000023 36  1 
16     d 0.00000023 36  1 
ENDOFDATA 
Basic 
Event 
Code 
Failure 
Rate 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
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interval. General information about maintenance test intervals, such as the lower and upper 
bounds of their possible values, is also stored in the file. The fragment of the file is presented 
in Figure 5.8. As a reminder, both basic events for existing components and basic events for 
potential components are required to be listed in the latter data files. The codes for the basic 
events of new potential components are defined using the rules introduced in Section 4.3.5.2. 
 
Figure 5.8. The Fragment of the File hips_theta.txt 
Two types of constraints are considered in the HIPS optimisation problem: system cost and 
maintenance down time over a year. Data required for implementation of the problem 
constraints is stored in two files: hips_cost_cst.txt and hips_mdt_cst.txt. Figure 5.9 shows a 
fragment of the data file for system design cost. The first line stores lower and upper limits of 
the system cost where the lower bound is set to 0 and the maximum cost limit is 1000 units. 
Since only design cost is considered for the HIPS the total number of time units per examined 
period (one year) is equal to 0. After the keyword “COMPONENTS” all fault tree basic 
events with associated design costs are listed. 
The data for the evaluation of the maintenance down time is stored in the file hips_mdt_cst.txt 
(A fragment of the file is shown in Figure 5.10). The file stores lower and upper bounds of 
possible values of maintenance down time which are listed after the keyword “MDT”. The 
key word “UNIT” identifies a total number of time units (used for determination of time 
intervals between maintenance activities) in the examined time period. The total number of 
time units is needed to evaluate the number of times the system is maintained during the 
examined period. Since maintenance test intervals are measured using weeks, the examined 
1 1 104 
2 1 104 
COMPONENTS 
1 1  
1 2 
1 3 
……………… 
2 13_1_1 
2 13_1_2 
2 13_2_1 
2 13_2_2 
……………… 
Identification Number 
of Maintenance Test 
Interval Minimum Value Maximum Value 
Basic Event 
Code 
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period (a year) is divided into 52 weeks. The file also provides numerical values of test time 
and maintenance test interval for each component. Since in the case analysed test intervals for 
system components are considered as design variables and are generated during the 
optimisation process the test interval is set to 1 for each component in the data file. Note that 
limits on the system down time are given in hour units as test times for system components 
are also provided in hours. 
 
Figure 5.9. The Fragment of the File hips_cost_cst.txt 
 
Figure 5.10. The Fragment of the File hips_mdt_cst.txt 
COST 0 1000 
UNITS 0 
COMPONENTS 
1   100 0 0 0 
2   20  0 0 0 
3   0.5 0 0 0 
4   0.5 0 0 0  
5_2_2 10  0 0 0  
5_3_1 20  0 0 0 
------------------- 
16   0.5 0 0 0 
Keywords Minimum value Maximum Value 
Basic 
Event 
Code 
Testing 
Cost 
Corrective 
Cost 
Design 
Cost 
MDT 0 130 
UNIT 52 
COMPONENTS 
………………. 
5_1_1 1 1 
5_1_2 2 1 
5_2_1 1 1 
5_2_2 2 1 
5_3_1 1 1 
5_3_2 2 1 
5_4_1 1 1 
5_4_2 2 1 
……………… 
14   1 1 
15   2 1 
16   2 1 
Basic 
Event 
Code 
Test 
Time 
Test 
Interva
l 
Preventive 
Cost 
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5.4.2. Fault Tree Construction 
The fault tree structure representing the causes of failure for the introduced design alternatives 
of the HIPS occurs automatically within the programme code. It is obtained using the given 
list of six FTMPs. The order the FTMPs are implemented is considered to be the most easy 
and straightforward. These general guidelines were followed when choosing the order: 
• FTMPs can be listed according to the code numbers of events/gates they are 
implemented at. Increasing/decreasing order of code numbers can be used. 
• FTMPs implemented at event level can be listed first followed by those being 
implemented at gate levels. 
• If the situation occurs when failure of the component considered is defined using a 
fault tree structure rather than a basic event and type and redundancy options are 
introduced two FTMPs should be used. First, the FTMP (Pattern 3) for type options is 
implemented at event level which is an input event of this fault tree structure. Next, 
the FTMP( Pattern 1, Pattern 2) for redundancy options is implemented at the gate 
level which is the top gate of the structure. 
Pattern5 associated with event E5 (PT1) is the first FTMP to be implemented. It is used to 
add a new fault tree section which represents the causes of failure to monitor pressure in the 
pipeline in the ESD subsystem where up to four redundant pressure transmitters can be fitted. 
The new fault tree logic is shown in Figure 5.11.  
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Figure 5.11. Pressure Transmitters Fail to Indicate High Pressure 
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The top gate of the incorporated part has a code 16 (max_gate + 1 = 15 + 1). Analysing from 
the top of the structure the first level of gates represents design cases with different numbers 
of pressure transmitters fitted. Here Gate17 represents the failure to indicate a trip when 1 
pressure transmitter is fitted, Gate18 – failure to indicate a trip when 2 pressure transmitters 
are fitted, Gate19 – failure to indicate a trip when 3 pressure transmitters are fitted and te20 
corresponds to failure to indicate a trip when 4 pressure transmitters are fitted.  
A failure scenario is defined according to the values of the following house events: H1 (1 
pressure transmitter is fitted into the subsystem 1), H2 (2 pressure transmitters are fitted), H3 
(3 pressure transmitters are fitted) and H4 (4 pressure transmitters are fitted). Only one house 
event from the group can be assigned a value of TRUE while the rest of them are set to 
FALSE. In the next level of gates the logic of the occurring failures for the different numbers 
of pressure transmitters fitted is broken down. For example, consider the event of failure to 
monitor pressure when two pressure transmitters are fitted (Gate22) shown in Figure 5.12. 
House event H2 would be assigned the value of TRUE in this case. If the system is designed 
to monitor pressure using either of the transmitters then failure of both of them will result in 
the failure to monitor pressure in the pipeline. Conversely, if two pressure transmitters must 
register an increase in pressure, failure of either will result in failure to register the increase in 
pressure. To indicate which design case is analysed one of the house events H7 or H8 is 
assigned the value of TRUE. In both cases the failure of a pressure transmitter is an 
intermediate event. Each of the events terminate with two pairs of basic events coupled with 
house events through an AND gate logic. The structure models an alternative type case for a 
component, i.e. pressure transmitter. This structural relationship is common throughout the 
analysed fault tree structure to model the inclusion of two different transmitter types. 
The failure to monitor pressure when either three or four pressure transmitters are fitted is 
modelled in a similar manner. Note that three possible combinations of two pressure 
transmitters failing will be among all possible causes of failure to monitor pressure if three 
pressure transmitters are to be used. Accordingly, there will be five possible combinations of 
two pressure transmitters failing and three combinations of three transmitters failing if four 
pressure transmitters are in the system. 
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Figure 5.12. Two Pressure Transmitters fail to Indicate High Pressure 
The implementation of Pattern5 to replace event E13 (pressure transmitter in the HIPS 
subsystem fails) results in the incorporation of the fault tree part which represents the causes 
of failure to monitor pressure in the HIPS subsystem. The structure of this part of the fault 
tree is identical to the one that represents the failure of pressure transmitters in the ESD 
subsystem. 
As explained in Section 5.4.1 two FTMPs are used to implement design alternatives 
introduced for the ESD valve. First basic event ESD (code number 9) is replaced using 
Pattern3 where mt=2. The resulting fault tree structure (Figure 5.13) represents causes of 
failure of the ESD solenoid valve for two different types of the valve part. As seen in Figure 
5.13 the solenoid part remains the same. Two house events H67 and H68 are introduced to 
model this valve type as a design alternative. Event code 9 is renamed into code 9_1_1 (ESD 
valve No. 1 type 1 fails) and the new introduced event is coded as 9_1_2 which represents 
failure of ESD valve part No. 1 type 2. 
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Figure 5.13. Fault Tree Structure for Alternatives of Different Type of ESD Valve 
Next, Pattern1 (mn=2 and mk=1) is implemented to model the structural changes in the fault 
tree regarding the possible introduction of a redundant solenoid valve. Failure of the solenoid 
valve is represented using an intermediate event in the fault tree. Therefore the FTMP is 
implemented at gate level (Gate No. 10) to replicate the logic relationship between failures of 
the basic valve components leading to the failure of the valve (Figure 5.14). The resulting 
fault tree structure has two additional house events H69 and H70 to model the redundancy 
level. Since one of the input events of gate 10 represents the earlier introduced alternative of 
different types of the valve part of the ESD solenoid valve (Figure 5.13) this structural 
relationship is mimicked in the fault tree part modelling the inclusion of the redundant valve. 
Therefore other new house events coded H137 and H138 used to model the type of the second 
introduced redundant valve mimic the house events H67 and H68 associated with the first 
redundant valve. The codes of house events H137 and H138 are derived as follows: 
max_house + i, where i is the code of a house event being replicated, i.e. 137=70 + 67 and 
138=70 + 68. The codes of the existing basic events are changed following the rules 
introduced in Section 4.3.5.2 as follows: 9_1_1_1_1, 9_1_2_1_1 and 10_1_1. They represent 
input events of the intermediate event ‘Solenoid ESD valve No.1 fails’. Input basic events of 
the intermediate event ‘Solenoid ESD valve No.2 fails’’ are coded as 9_1_1_2_1, 9_1_2_2_1 
and 10_2_1. 
The design alternatives for the HIPS valve are the same as the ones analysed for the ESD 
valve. Therefore the same FTMPs are used in the same order as the ones for ESD valve. First 
Pattern3 is implemented at event level (code 11), then design alternatives regarding 
redundant HIPS valves are implemented using Pattern1 at gate level (gate code 15). 
 
Chapter 5. HIPS Design Optimisation Using GSDOA 
 
96 
ESD valve 
fails stuck
158
1 valve 
Fitted
H69
159
1 ESD valve is 
fitted and fails
ESD valve No.1 
fails to close
10
ESD valve 
type 1 fitted
H67
156
ESD valve type 
1 fails
ESD valve 
type 1 fails
9_1_1
_1_1
ESD valve 
type 2 fitted
H68
157
ESD valve type 
2 fails
ESD valve 
type 2 fails
9_1_2
_1_1
Valve 
solenoid fails
10_1_
1
155
ESD valve No.1 
fail
2 valves 
Fitted
H70
160
2 ESD valve are 
fitted and fails
2 ESD valves 
fail to close
161
ESD valve No.1 
fails to close
11
ESD valve No.2 
fails to close
173
ESD valve 
type 1 fitted
H137
317
ESD valve No2 
type 1 fails
ESD valve No2 
type 1 fails
9_1_1
_2_1
ESD valve 
type 2 fitted
H138
318
ESD valve No2 
type 2 fails
ESD valve 
type 2 fails
9_1_2
_2_1
Valve 
solenoid fails
10_2_
1
316
ESD valve No.2 
fail
 
 
Figure 5.14. Fault Tree Structure for Design Alternatives of ESD Valve 
 
5.4.3. Chromosome Structure 
The structure of chromosomes utilized during the optimisation process is specified 
automatically by the developed code for each problem analysed. The structure of 
chromosomes for the HIPS optimisation problem is based on the data stored in the files 
hips_var.txt and hips_theta.txt. The file hips_var.txt provides information about FTMPs 
corresponding to the given structural design variables and the file hips_theta.txt stores the list 
of different time intervals between maintenance testing and ranges of their possible values. 
Figure 5.15 shows the complete structure of the chromosome. Here the links between data 
stored in data files hips_var.txt and hips_theta.txt and chromosome structure are 
demonstrated. 
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Figure 5.15. The Chromosome Structure 
As a reminder, parameters of the given FTMPs are coded in the first part of a chromosome. 
Numbers of bits required to code each parameter are found employing Formula 3.4. A 
parameter with its value equal to 1 identifies that the corresponding structural changes are not 
made and therefore no bits are allocated for the parameter. Thus to code parameters of the 
first FTMP, Pattern5, implemented at event E5 (PT1), eight bits are allocated. Here three bits 
are used to code parameter mn which is equal to 4, mt=2 is coded using two bits and three bits 
are utilised to code the value of parameter mk which is equal to 4. Eight bits are allocated in 
the same order for the FTMP applied for the basic event E13 (PT2). Following this, four bits 
are allocated to code parameters of FTMPs representing design options for the ESD valve. 
The first two bits code the value of parameter mt for Pattern3 (mt=2) and other two bits are 
allocated for parameter mn=2 for Pattern1. In the same way four bits are allocated for the 
remaining two FTMPs related to design alternatives of the HIPS valve. 
After allocating 24 bits for the coding of the structural design variables, i.e. their 
corresponding FTMPs, the rest of the bits of the chromosomes are allocated for the two 
maintenance test intervals. A time interval between maintenance for both subsystem 1 and 
subsystem 2 can be from 1 to 104 weeks. This means that in order to code each value in 
binary numbers seven bits are required. Thus the chromosomes used in the HIPS optimisation 
problem have eight genes and thirty eight bits in total. 
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5.5. ANALYSIS OF GSDOP PERFORMANCE SOLVING THE HIPS 
DESIGN OPTIMISATION PROBLEM 
5.5.1. Selection of the Values of the GA Parameters 
GAs are guided search methods and values of the GA parameters such as population size, 
crossover rate and mutation rate influence the convergence of the optimisation process. 
Moreover the best values for the GA parameters, i.e. the ones assuring good convergence to 
the optimal solution, are case dependent. Setting values for GA parameters presents a 
challenge in terms of achieving good performance of the algorithm as there are no precise 
instructions with regards to what the values should be, although some guidance is available 
based on empirical studies [75]. Some common settings for mutation rate and crossover rate 
are presented in [76]. The right size of population is also important. If the population is too 
small it can cause the loss of genetic diversity. On the other hand if a population is too large 
over abundance of genetic diversity can appear [68]. Therefore an option to change the values 
of the GA parameters has been implemented in the GSDOP and the use can define these in 
the data file hips_gav.txt. 
When solving the HIPS problem the choice of GA parameter values was based on studies 
focused on determining good parameter values for genetic operators [77] and a trial-and-error 
approach. In total forty eight sets of different combinations of values of the GA parameters 
were used. The values of the parameters are listed in Table 5.4. Due to the stochastic nature of 
the GA ten runs were performed for each set of parameters. Each time the process was 
terminated after 100 generations. 
Table 5.4. The List of Values of GA Parameters 
          Value No. 
 
Parameter 
1st Value 2nd Value 3rd  Value 4th Value 
Population Size 10 20 30 50 
Mutation Rate 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.1 
Crossover Rate 0.75 0.8 0.95 - 
The numerical quantities used for comparison of the optimisation results are derived as 
averages of the best feasible unavailability values from 10 runs for each combination of GA 
parameters. Thus each set of the GA parameter values is assigned its corresponding minimal 
unavailability value. The average of the best unavailability values is also evaluated for each 
value of the GA parameter considered. The results are presented in table format. Tables 5.5 - 
5.9 are used to analyse the effect of different population sizes on the optimisation results 
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using different combinations of mutation and crossover rates. Tables 5.10-5.14 show how 
combinations of different crossover rates and population sizes influence the optimisation 
process when specific mutation rates are chosen. Accordingly, Tables 5.15-5.19 store the 
results of the optimisation process when each different crossover rate value is combined with 
all possible combinations of mutation rates and population sizes. 
Results in Table 5.5 demonstrate that an average minimal unavailability value obtained after 
100 generations decreases if larger sized populations are used. The minimum unavailability 
value is obtained when the population size is equal to 50 (3.44E-07). Therefore it can be 
stated that the convergence rate of the algorithm can be improved by increasing the 
population size. However computation intensity increases with larger population sizes and 
this needs to be taken into account. 
Table 5.5. Minimal Average System Unavailability Values for Different Population Sizes 
Population Size 
 
10 20 30 50 
Mean of Minimal System 
Unavailability Values 4.44E-07 3.87E-07 3.69E-07 3.44E-07 
As expected, if the population size is small, i.e. 10 chromosomes (Table 5.6), increasing 
mutation rate induces smaller system unavailability values to be found over the limited 
number of generations. When the population of chromosomes is small it takes longer to 
analyse the search space. Therefore the high mutation rate which creates diversity in the 
population enables explorations of diverse regions of the search space. Two different effects 
of crossover rate values can be noticed in this case. When the mutation rate range from 0.001 
to 0.005 is used and the crossover rate increases, so does the average of the minimal system 
unavailability values. However combinations of higher crossover rates and the mutation rate 
equal to 0.01 results in smaller unavailability values to be found. Thus the minimal average 
unavailability value found using a population of 10 chromosomes is equal to 3.48E-07. 
Table 5.6. Minimal Unavailability Values when Population Size is Equal to 10 
Population size = 10 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
0.001 4.977E-07 5.330E-07 5.348E-07 
0.002 4.765E-07 4.665E-07 5.297E-07 
0.005 3.953E-07 3.978E-07 4.098E-07 
Mutation Rate 
0.01 3.844E-07 3.510E-07 3.480E-07 
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The results obtained for a population size of 20 chromosomes are shown in Table 5.7. Here 
the performance of the optimisation algorithm was also improved when the mutation rate was 
increased. The influence of the crossover rate values on the potential of the programme in 
finding the optimal solution varies for every mutation rate. However the tendency that a high 
crossover rate corresponds to a smaller optimal unavailability value remains. 
Table 5.7. Minimal Unavailability Values when Population Size is Equal to 20 
Population size = 20 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
0.001 4.355E-07 3.653E-07 5.343E-07 
0.002 4.212E-07 3.954E-07 3.832E-07 
0.005 3.603E-07 3.837E-07 3.551E-07 
Mutation Rate 
0.01 3.419E-07 3.192E-07 3.526E-07 
For larger populations, i.e. 30 and 50 chromosome populations, the relationship between 
different combinations of mutation and crossover rates and the optimal values was even less 
consistent as shown in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. In both cases the increase of mutation rate up to 
0.005 is beneficial for the optimisation performance. However the mutation rate equal to 0.01 
introduces diversity in the population which has a negative effect on the convergence of the 
process. The negative effect of a diverse population is noticeable when the crossover rate is 
equal to 0.95 and the population consists of 30 chromosomes. Combinations of the latter 
mutation rate with crossover rates equal to 0.8 and 0.95 also result in higher optimal values 
for 50 chromosome populations. In both cases the algorithm performs better if combinations 
of mutation and crossover rate are used such that one rate is low and the other has a high 
value then using combinations where both parameter rates are either low or high. The smallest 
unavailability value is obtained using the highest mutation rate (0.01) and the lowest 
crossover rate (0.75). 
Table 5.8. Minimal Unavailability Values when Population Size is Equal to 30 
Population size = 30 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
0.001 3.948E-07 4.439E-07 3.613E-07 
0.002 3.845E-07 4.315E-07 3.598E-07 
0.005 3.551E-07 3.365E-07 3.403E-07 
Mutation Rate 
0.01 3.251E-07 3.338E-07 3.523E-07 
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Table 5.9. Minimal Unavailability Values when Population Size is Equal to 50 
Population size = 50 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
0.001 3.633E-07 4.036E-07 3.494E-07 
0.002 3.420E-07 3.607E-07 3.483E-07 
0.005 3.220E-07 3.167E-07 3.083E-07 
Mutation Rate 
0.01 3.150E-07 3.435E-07 3.498E-07 
When considering only the mutation rate its value has the same influence on algorithm 
performance as the population size. Smaller unavailability values of feasible chromosomes 
are found when using larger mutation rate values (Table 5.10). The minimal mean of the 
averaged minimal unavailability values is equal to 3.434E-07 and corresponds to the mutation 
rate equal to 0.01. 
Table 5.10. Minimal Average System Unavailability Values for Different Mutation Rates 
Mutation Rate 
 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 
Mean of Minimal System 
Unavailability Values 4.347E-07 4.091E-07 3.567E-07 3.434E-07 
The minimal average system unavailability values obtained using combinations of the GA 
parameter values where the mutation rate is set to 0.001 are listed in Table 5.11. The results 
show that using small population sizes, such as 10 or 20 chromosomes, the approach performs 
better if a low crossover rate is used. However if the population size is increased better results 
are obtained using the crossover rate equal to 0.95. The results imply that a high reproduction 
rate decreases the convergence rate of the algorithm if the diversity in small populations is 
limited. On the other hand, when populations of chromosomes are larger new strings 
introduced more quickly into the population improves the optimisation process. 
Table 5.11. Minimal Unavailability Values when Mutation Rate is Equal to 0.001 
Mutation Rate = 0.001 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
10 4.977E-07 5.330E-07 5.348E-07 
20 4.355E-07 3.653E-07 5.343E-07 
30 3.948E-07 4.439E-07 3.613E-07 
Population Size 
50 3.633E-07 4.036E-07 3.494E-07 
When the mutation rate equal to 0.002 is used it is difficult to identify a clear tendency of 
influence of other parameter values on the optimisation results (Table 5.12). For example, the 
algorithm finds smaller near-optimal feasible solutions when the population size is either 10 
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or 20 if using the crossover rate equal to 0.8 in comparison with the other crossover rates. 
However, if the size of a population is equal to 30 the smallest near optimal solution is 
obtained using the crossover rate equal to 0.95. If the population size is 50 chromosomes then 
the smallest average unavailability value is obtained using the crossover rate equal to 0.75. 
Table 5.12. Minimal Unavailability Values when Mutation Rate is Equal to 0.002 
Mutation Rate = 0.002 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
10 4.765E-07 4.665E-07 5.297E-07 
20 4.212E-07 3.954E-07 3.832E-07 
30 3.845E-07 4.315E-07 3.698E-07 
Population Size 
50 3.420E-07 3.607E-07 3.483E-07 
Opposite to the previous two cases, parameter combinations where mutation rate is equal to 
0.005 (Table 5.13) result in the decreasing minimal near optimal solutions when the 
population size increases for each crossover rate value. Here the influence of the crossover 
rate values to the optimisation process depends on the size of populations used. If a 
population size is equal to 10 chromosomes then higher crossover rates lead to the loss of 
chromosomes with good genetic information. On the contrary, the quicker introduction of 
new chromosome when using the high crossover rate, i.e. 0.95, induces diversity in the large 
populations and therefore the minimal near optimal solution is found when a population of 50 
chromosomes is used. 
Table 5.13. Minimal Unavailability Values when Mutation Rate is Equal to 0.005 
Mutation Rate = 0.005 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
10 3.953E-07 3.978E-07 4.098E-07 
20 3.603E-07 3.837E-07 3.551E-07 
30 3.551E-07 3.365E-07 3.403E-07 
Population Size 
50 3.220E-07 3.167E-07 3.083E-07 
Table 5.14 presents the optimisation results obtained using the mutation rate equal to 0.01 and 
all possible combinations of population sizes and crossover rates. In this situation, if a 
population comprises of 10 chromosomes then smaller unavailability values are obtained 
using higher a crossover rate. Conversely, minimal average unavailability value increases if a 
crossover rate increases when the population size is equal to 50 chromosomes. It follows that 
for the high mutation rate value of either the population size or crossover rate used should be 
small in order to maintain diversity in the population and preserve good genetic information at 
the same time. The influence of different parameter values on the optimisation results is more 
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pronounced for the population size then the crossover rate. Therefore it can also be noted that 
the population size has more influence on the optimisation process than the crossover rate 
when the mutation rate used is equal to 0.01. 
Table 5.14. Minimal Unavailability Values when Mutation Rate is Equal to 0.01 
Mutation Rate = 0.01 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
10 3.844E-07 3.510E-07 3.480E-07 
20 3.419E-07 3.192E-07 3.526E-07 
30 3.251E-07 3.338E-07 3.523E-07 
Population Size 
50 3.195E-07 3.435E-07 3.498E-07 
Increasing the values of the crossover rate has an opposite effect on the optimisation results 
than previously discussed increasing population size or mutation rate. Table 5.15 shows that 
the larger mean value of minimal unavailability values corresponds to the higher crossover 
rate. Thus on average the smallest minimal unavailability values for the HIPS system are 
found using the crossover rate equal to 0.75. 
Table 5.15. Minimal Average System Unavailability Values for Different Crossover 
Rates 
Crossover Rate 
 0.75 0.8 0.95 
Mean of Minimal System 
Unavailability Values 3.824E-07 3.864E-07 3.892E-07 
Using the GA parameter combinations with crossover rate set to 0.75 variations in both 
population sizes and mutation rates have the same effect on the optimisation process. If their 
values increase the minimal obtained unavailability value decreases. The results are presented 
in Table 5.16. 
Table 5.16. Minimal Unavailability Values when Crossover Rate is Equal to 0.75 
Crossover Rate = 0.75 
Mutation Rate  
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 
10 4.977E-07 4.765E-07 3.953E-07 3.844E-07 
20 4.355E-07 4.212E-07 3.603E-07 3.419E-07 
30 3.948E-07 3.845E-07 3.551E-07 3.251E-07 
Population Size 
50 3.633E-07 3.420E-07 3.220E-07 3.195E-07 
It is difficult to identify a consistent pattern of influence of mutation rates and population 
sizes to the optimisation results when the crossover rate used is equal to 0.8 as shown in Table 
5.17. Combinations with population size equal either to 20 or 50 chromosomes result in 
Chapter 5. HIPS Design Optimisation Using GSDOA 
 
104 
smaller optimal unavailability values. The mutation rate equal to 0.01 dominates among other 
mutation rates in the contribution towards better optimisation results. 
Table 5.17. Minimal Unavailability Values when Crossover Rate is Equal to 0.8 
Crossover Rate = 0.8 
Mutation Rate  
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 
10 5.330E-07 4.665E-07 3.978E-07 3.510E-07 
20 3.653E-07 3.954E-07 3.837E-07 3.192E-07 
30 4.439E-07 4.315E-07 3.365E-07 3.338E-07 
Population Size 
50 4.036E-07 3.607E-07 3.167E-07 3.435E-07 
When the crossover rate is high and equal to 0.95 the algorithm performs better if larger size 
populations are used (Table 5.18). Moreover, parameter combinations where population size 
is small result in smaller optimal solutions when the mutation rate increases. However for 
larger population sizes such a consistent pattern does not exist. In this case the overall 
minimal unavailability value is obtained using the population of 50 chromosomes and the 
mutation rate equal to 0.005. 
Table 5.18. Minimal Unavailability Values when Crossover Rate is Equal to 0.95 
Crossover Rate = 0.95 
Mutation Rate  
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 
10 5.348E-07 5.297E-07 4.098E-07 3.480E-07 
20 5.343E-07 3.832E-07 3.551E-07 3.526E-07 
30 3.613E-07 3.698E-07 3.403E-07 3.523E-07 
Population Size 
50 3.494E-07 3.483E-07 3.083E-07 3.498E-07 
From the presented results it follows that the algorithm produces better solutions if a larger 
population size is used. The same principle is valid for the mutation rate. Even though the 
smallest average system unavailability value is obtained using the crossover rate equal to 0.95 
the mean system unavailability values increases if the crossover rate is high (Table 5.15). 
Therefore, a further analysis of the optimisation of HIPS design is performed employing the 
following set of the GA parameter values: the population size equal to 50, the mutation rate 
equal to 0.01 and crossover rate set to 0.75. The analysis is discussed in Section 5.5.2. 
5.5.2. Testing  
To perform further testing the specified set of GA parameter values is used and 10 more runs 
are carried out. The number of generations in a single run of the programme is left the same, 
i.e. 100 generations.  
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The average fitness value in each generation is used as one of the indicating factors when 
considering convergence of the optimisation process. As an example the results obtained per 
generation for runs 3, 5, 7 and 10 are presented in Figure 5.16. The results demonstrate that 
an average population fitness value converges towards the optimal solution. Due to the 
random nature of the GA it is common that unfit genes are introduced in the population which 
results in the fluctuation in average population fitness. However the results are scattered in a 
relatively broad range and the convergence to a particular design can not be identified. This 
occurs due to the inability of the algorithm to ensure a structured random search, and instead 
the search tends to degenerate to unstructured enumerative technique. It was anticipated that 
this situation would change and populations would be dominated by highly-fit chromosomes 
which are similar to the best overall chromosome once a number of generations performed 
before termination of the process would be increased. However, after performing a number of 
runs when the termination condition for the optimisation process was set to 300 generations, 
the desired convergence was not achieved. Figure 5.17 presents the results for three 
experiment runs. 
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Figure 5.16. Average Unavailability Value in Each Generation. Total 100 generations 
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Figure 5.17. Average Unavailability Value in Each Generation. Total 300 generations 
The obtained results suggest that using the current optimisation algorithm the rate at which fit 
chromosomes produce fit offspring and therefore the convergence rate is slow. The cause of 
the current situation could be the approach used to introduce new chromosomes into a new 
parent population. For constrained problems, the optimum solution lies on the boundary of at 
least one of the constraints. The chosen approach preserves genetic information of feasible 
solutions however it restricts the search within the infeasible region (even though it preserves 
good genetic information) therefore limiting the search space.  
Even though the convergence of average fitness values to one particular value representing 
the optimal design case has not been achieved the algorithm shows the capability to find fit 
chromosomes and therefore near optimal design cases in the search space. Figure 5.18 
demonstrate the best feasible unavailability values obtained in each generation in 4 out of 10 
runs. It shows a steady convergence of the best fitness values per generation to a particular 
minimum value. 
The best optimisation solution over 100 generations was obtained during run no 10. The best 
chromosome, i.e. the chromosome that provides the smallest unavailability value arose in 
generation 94 which corresponds to a system unavailability value equal to 3.13E-07. This 
chromosome comprises the following values of genes which are represented in decimal 
format: 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  2  2  46  34. Each of them is associated with a particular design 
variable. Equivalents between genes and values of design variables are listed in Table 5.19. 
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The total cost of the generated system design is 982 units and its maintenance down time is 
equal to 125.21 hours.  
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Figure 5.18. Best Fitness Value per Each Generation 
Table 5.19. Design Variables Values 
Design 
Variable 
Values 
(GSDOP) 
Design 
Variable 
Values 
(overall 
optimal) 
Design 
Variable Description 
2 2 n3 
Number of pressure transmitters for ESD 
subsystem 
2 2 t3 
Type of pressure transmitter in ESD 
subsystem 
2 2 k3 
Number of pressure transmitters required 
to trip in ESD subsystem 
2 2 n4 
Number of pressure transmitters for HIPS 
subsystem 
2 2 t4 
Type of pressure transmitter in HIPS 
subsystem 
2 2 k4 
Number of pressure transmitters required 
to trip in HIPS subsystem 
2 2 n1 Number of ESD valves 
1 1 t1 Type of a ESD valve 
2 2 n2 Number of HIPS valves 
2 2 t2 Type of a HIPS valve 
46 44 θ1 
Maintenance test interval for ESD 
subsystem (in weeks) 
34 33 θ2 
Maintenance test interval for HIPS 
subsystem (in weeks) 
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For comparison, the unavailability of the initial design system is equal to 1.568E-06, the cost 
is 862 units and maintenance down time is 57.2 hours when components of the ESD 
subsystem are tested every 71 weeks and HIPS subsystem undergoes maintence testing every 
102 weeks. The unavailability value of the overall optimal feasible system design (found 
using an exhaustive search) is equal to 3.05E-07, total cost is equal to 982 units and 
maintenance down time equates to 129.75 hours a year. The design variable values 
corresponding to the overall optimal system design are presented in Table 5.19. Thus, using 
the developed GSDOP a HIPS design was identified with a significantly smaller 
unavailability value and design cost compared to the initial system design. The GSDOP also 
identified structural design variable values corresponding to the overall optimal feasible 
system design. Values of the optimal maintenance intervals were very similar to the ones 
found during the exhaustive search. 
5.6. SUMMARY 
In this chapter a systematic approach to system design optimisation has been demonstrated 
with the successful application of the developed GSDOP to solve a specific HIPS design 
optimisation problem. This example is the first step towards the validation of the potential of 
the algorithm for application to a number of safety systems. It demonstrates that the algorithm 
is: 
• applicable to solve a chosen design optimisation problem; 
• scalable according to the size of the system and the optimisation problem analysed. 
In the chapter it has been demonstrated what data needs to be provided by the user and how it 
is utilised in the automated design optimisation process for the specific system problem. It has 
also been illustrated how to provide the set of FTMPs according to the chosen design options 
and how the programme builds the corresponding fault tree representing all possible design 
cases. The chromosome structure defined within the programme for the HIPS problem has 
also been discussed. 
An analysis of the performance of the programme has demonstrated how different GA 
parameter values influence the optimisation results. The size of populations had the most 
pronounced effect on the optimisation process. Larger chromosome populations lead to better 
algorithm performance. In the mean time the balance between high and low values of 
mutation and crossover rates had to be determined in order to achieve faster convergence 
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towards the optimal solution. It has been noticed that a high mutation rate and a low crossover 
rate lead to smaller optimal solutions over a fixed number of generations. 
The programme has an option that allows the user to set values for GA parameters, such as 
the population size, the crossover rate, the mutation rate and the maximum number of 
generations to be performed. Therefore the user can try different combinations of GA 
parameter values for obtaining an optimal solution or use the default options to find a 
near-optimal if not an optimal problem solution. The default population size is 50 
chromosomes, the crossover rate is equal to 0.95 and the mutation rate is equal to 0.01. 
The application of the GSDOP exhibits the potential of the algorithm to solve a system design 
optimisation problem and find the near-optimal solution. However the optimisation results 
have revealed that the implemented GA lacks the ability to converge to a population 
dominated by the fittest designs. The solution to this problem could be a number of 
improvements which would encourage the preservation of elite chromosomes when creating 
new generation populations. A new penalisation method, an approach to form a parent 
population and a scaling procedure are the amendments to be considered to increase the 
effectiveness of the GSDOA and form the future research discussed in the following chapters 
of this thesis. 
6. FIREWATER DELUGE SYSTEM DESIGN 
OPTIMISATION USING IMPROVED GSDOA 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The first application of the GSDOA was demonstrated when solving the HIPS design 
optimisation problem discussed in Chapter 5. The HIPS is a relatively simple safety system 
and therefore when solving its optimisation problem all specifics of the developed algorithm 
could not be demonstrated. Moreover, the potential of the algorithm to solve the design 
optimisation problem for different safety systems should be realised with more than one 
application example. The Firewater Deluge System (FWDS) has been chosen to demonstrate 
both the applicability of the algorithm to a range of safety systems and its ability to analyse 
more complicated problems. Here the complexity of the optimisation of the FWDS is 
determined by the increased size of the fault tree for the initial system design and the larger 
number of design variables defining the size and complexity of the search space for the 
optimisation problem solved. 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, the FWDS and its optimisation problem are 
introduced. System performance principles are explained along with the causes of failure and 
the resulting system fault tree in Section 6.2. The optimisation problem is formulated 
considering the design variables and available resources specified in Section 6.3. Initial data 
arrangements including a detailed explanation of FTMPs used to construct the fault tree for all 
possible design variations are discussed in Sections 6.4. Since the application of the GSDOP 
to the HIPS revealed some shortcomings of the developed optimisation methodology, 
improvements were made to the GA and they are discussed in Section 6.5. The last section of 
the chapter, Section 6.6, discusses the performance analysis of the improved GSDOP in the 
context of the design optimisation problem of the FWDS. 
6.2. DESCRIPTION OF FIREWATER DELUGE SYSTEM 
6.2.1. Performance Principles 
FWDS (Figure 6.1) is a safety system that supplies, on demand, controlled pressurised water 
and foam to a particular area that is protected by a deluge system on an offshore platform. It 
can be used to mitigate the consequences of jet and pool fires and to reduce overpressure of an 
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explosion. There are three major system parts: the Deluge system, the Water Supply and 
Distribution System and the Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (AFFF) Supply and Distribution 
System. 
 
Figure 6.1. The Firewater Deluge System 
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The Deluge system is a fabricated steel framework, called a skid, where the deluge valve set 
together with all associated equipment is mounted on. The main distribution line, water 
closing circuit and control air circuit complete the deluge valve set. The system works in the 
following way. When a signal from the Main Fire and Gas Panel (MFGP) is received air 
pressure is released from the control air circuit by de-energising and opening solenoid valves. 
Air may also be released from the control air circuit manually, i.e. by opening the system 
local manual release valve on the skid. The air pressure drop results in the opening of the 
valmatic release valve and activation of the water closing circuit. Water starts running to drain 
followed by the pressure fall on the deluge valve diaphragm. When the pressure on the 
diaphragm falls to a particular set level, the firewater main pressure overcomes the load, 
controlled by the diaphragm, and water starts to flow into the distribution pipe through the 
nozzles and onto the hazard. 
The deluge valve set is also fitted with an AFFF supply line. When the air pressure drops in 
the control air circuit of the deluge system, the AFFF and valmatic release valves open 
simultaneously. This allows the induction of foam concentrate from the AFFF line via the 
foam proportioner while the water flows through the foam inductor in the main distribution 
line. The distribution network is then supplied with the water and foam (approximately 3%) 
solution through the nozzles and onto the hazard. 
The AFFF system is activated when either the air pressure drops in the control air circuit or 
when any firewater pump starts to supply water at the pressure level that meets the design 
requirements. In order to keep the AFFF system at approximately the same pressure level as 
the firewater system an air driven jockey pump is run continuously. The analysed FWDS has 
two AFFF pumps fitted. One pump is motor driven and supplied from the platform power 
plant. Another one is diesel driven, which is supplied from a diesel tank sized for a 24 hour 
supply. 
The aqueous film-forming foam concentrate is stored in a tank and is distributed through the 
ringmain network when demand arises. The tank has to be filled to a certain level; otherwise a 
low level alarm fitted in the tank sends an alarm signal to the Central Control Room.  
The deluge system is also connected to a pressurised ringmain network. The pressure is 
maintained by a jockey pump that draws water from the sea. If the ringmain pressure falls it is 
detected by the pressure transducer and a signal is sent to the MFGP. As a result the MFGP 
activates the firewater pumps to supply water at a sufficient pressure level that meets the 
deluge requirements. Water into the pumps is taken directly from the sea. Each firewater 
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pump can be activated in two ways: automatically and manually. A pump can be activated 
manually locally or at the fire control panel. 
In the current system design two firewater pumps are fitted and they are powered in the same 
way as the ones for AFFF. One pump is powered from the main electric plant and the other is 
powered from the diesel engines. Note that diesel is supplied to the firewater diesel driven 
pump independently from that of the AFFF pump. 
6.2.2. FireWater Deluge System Failure 
For quantitative system failure analysis components in the FWDS are divided into two 
categories: “wear - out” or “non wear-out”. The unavailability, q, for components of “non 
wear-out” type is determined using Formula 6.1: 
)
2
( θτλ +=q , (6.1) 
here λ is dormant failure rate, τ is dormant mean time to repair and θ is a maintenance test 
interval. Failure of components of “wear-out” type is expressed employing the Weibull 
probability distribution. Thus component unavailability is found using Formula 6.2: 
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here η and β are the scale and shape parameters of the Weibull distribution respectively and t 
refers to time. Preventive maintenance is only carried out on components of wear-out type. 
The initial system design is represented by the fault tree with the top event defined as the 
“Firewater Deluge System Fails to Activate on Demand”. The top event occurs as a result of 
any of the following failures: failure to activate both firewater and AFFF pumps mechanisms, 
i.e. failure of the distribution network, failure to supply sufficient amount of water to the 
ringmain, failure to supply sufficient foam to the ringmain or failure of the Deluge system. 
The event of failure to activate mechanisms of firewater and AFFF pumps is defined as 
“Failure to initiate pumps mechanisms” as shown in Figure 6.2. It occurs as a result of the 
coincident failure of both automatic and manual activation of the pumps. Failure of the push 
button on the MFGP (basic event “PBF”) or the operator’s failure to push the button (basic 
event “OE”) will cause failure of manual activation. Automatic mechanism activation fails if 
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either the firewater pump selector unit fails (basic event “FSU”) or the pressure transmitter on 
the firewater ringmain that senses low pressure fails (basic event “PT”).  
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Figure 6.2. Causes of WFDS failure to activate on demand 
Basic event failure data for the FWDS is provided in Appendix 2. Events considered in the 
distribution network failure process and their corresponding fault tree basic events are listed 
in Table A.2.1. Failure and repair data of each component used for quantitative analysis and 
information regarding the systems’ available resources are provided in Table A.2.2. The latter 
includes the number of hours of manual work required to test the component (HT), the number 
of spares stored (NS), storage cost per component (CS) and component initial cost, i.e. design 
cost (CI). Events due to human error require only specification of the probability of their 
occurrence. Exception applies to the failure event of the manual push button (PBF) which is a 
component failure however its probability of occurrence is specified directly. 
If the firewater pump mechanisms or lines fail the FWDS cannot supply sufficient water to 
the ringmain. The fault tree structure for the failure logic is presented in Figure 6.3.  
Considering that the system initial design has one electrically driven and one diesel driven 
pump, failure will occur if both pumps fail to supply water. Both pumps have similar failure 
scenarios. The failure occurs if the energy supply goes out of order or either the pump itself 
fails or components on the pump line fail. The causes of failure for the diesel driven pump 
and its line leading to the FWDS failure are shown in Figure 6.3. Accordingly, logic relations 
among the electrically powered pump and its line failure events are shown in Figure 6.4. All 
failure events considered leading to firewater supply failure are specified in Table A.2.3. The 
associated component data for the events is given in Table A.2.4. 
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Figure 6.3. Causes of failure of firewater diesel driven pump 
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Figure 6.4. Causes of failure of firewater electrically powered pump 
AFFF supply fails as the result of failures of either the AFFF pump mechanisms or pump 
lines or isolation of the AFFF tank. Since the system design considered has one diesel driven 
and one electrically powered AFFF pump the fault tree structure of the AFFF supply failure is 
similar to that of the firewater supply system. The fault tree is shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. 
All failure events leading to the AFFF supply system failure are listed in Table A.2.5. 
Associated data for these events is given in Table A.2.6 in Appendix 2. 
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Figure 6.5. Causes of failure of AFFF electrically powered pump 
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Figure 6.6. Causes of failure of AFFF diesel driven pump 
The last set of causal relationships resulting in FWDS failure to activate on demand is 
associated with failure of the Deluge system. Its failure occurs if either the AFFF or Water 
deluge skid fails. The causes of failure for AFFF deluge skid are depicted in Figure 6.7. The 
corresponding fault tree of the Water Deluge skid is presented in Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.7. Causes of failure of AFFF deluge skid 
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Figure 6.8. Causes of failure of Water deluge skid 
There are two main events leading to the failure of the AFFF Deluge skid, such as failure of 
the AFFF skid itself or blockage of the inductor nozzle (basic event “AINF”). The logic of 
failure of the AFFF skid itself is broken down into three events. First event, “Isolation valve 
fails” occurs if the AFFF isolation valve is blocked (basic event “AIVB”) or it is left closed 
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(basic event “AHE”). The rest of the events are “AFFF valve fails to open” and “AFFF check 
valve is blocked” (basic event “ACVB”). The AFFF deluge valve fails to open if it fails itself 
(basic event “AV”) or both mechanic (basic event “MRM”) and automatic activation fail. 
Accordingly, the failure of the Water Deluge skid occurs if either the water spray nozzle 
becomes blocked (basic event “WNB”) or the skid fails itself. Failure of the skid occurs if the 
strainer becomes blocked (basic event “WBS”) or either the deluge valve or one of isolation 
valves fails. An isolation valve fails if it is blocked or left closed. Developing further the 
event “Water deluge valve fails to open” requires consideration that restricts activation of the 
valve or failure of the valve itself (basic event “WV”). The valve is not activated if the signal 
to the solenoids is not sent, both fitted solenoid valves remain energised or the valmatic 
relieve valve fails. 
Events considered in the Deluge system failure process are listed in Table A.2.7 and the 
failure and repair data, initial cost and test time for each component are specified in 
Table A.2.8.  
6.3. DESIGN ALTERATION OPTIONS 
The introduced options for the possible FWDS design alternatives lead to a rather 
complicated optimisation problem. First of all, the list of structural design variables together 
with the choices of different maintenance intervals defines a very large set of possible 
candidate solutions. Secondly, the choice of the appropriate FTMPs and the order they are 
implemented are not straight forward. In order to construct fault tree structures incorporating 
certain design alternatives some of the FTMPs need to be implemented at gates which do not 
exist in the fault tree of the initial design and are created during the fault tree modification 
process. Finally, the resulting fault tree representing all possible design cases increases in size 
dramatically. It therefore increases the demand on computational resources. 
The list of structural design variables to be used for possible FWDS alterations is provided in 
Table 6.1. The choice of values of time intervals for three different maintence performance 
tasks is also considered. The maintenance test interval for the firewater and AFFF pump sets 
(θP) can vary from 1 to 28 days. Maintenance of the ringmain (θR) can be performed at time 
intervals ranging from 1 to 24 weeks. The Deluge skid can undergo maintence at time 
intervals (θD) from 3 and up to 18 months. 
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Table 6.1. Structural Design Variables 
Associated System 
Component Description of Design Alteration 
Design 
Variable 
Notation 
Possible 
Values 
Initial 
Design 
Number of firewater diesel driven 
pumps nFD 1, 2, 3, 4 1 
Pump capacity  t1FD 
100%, 50%, 
33 1/3% 100% 
Firewater diesel 
driven pump 
Type of firewater pump (for the 50% 
and 33 1/3% capacity pumps only) t2FD type1/ type2 type1 
Number of firewater electrically 
powered pumps nFE 1, 2, 3, 4 1 
Pump capacity  t1FE 
100%, 50%, 
33 1/3% 100% 
Firewater 
electrically powered 
pump Type of firewater pump (for the 50% 
and 33 1/3% capacity pumps only) t2FE type1/ type2 type1 
Number of AFFF diesel driven pumps nAD 1, 2 1 AFFF diesel driven 
pump Pump capacity  tAD 100%, 50% 100% 
Number of AFFF electrically powered 
pumps nAE 1, 2 1 AFFF electrically powered pump Pump capacity  tAE 100%, 50% 100% 
Number of pressure transmitters  nPT 1, 2, 3, 4 1 
Minimum number of pressure 
transmitters required to function kPT 1, 2, 3, 4 1 Pressure transmitter 
on the ringmain 
Pressure transmitter type tPT 
type1/ type2/ 
type 3 type1 
Inductor nozzle Inductor nozzle material type tIN old/ new old 
AFFF deluge valve AFFF deluge valve type tAD 
type1/ type2/ 
type3 type1 
Deluge nozzle Deluge nozzle material type tDN old/ new old 
Water deluge valve Water deluge valve type  tWD 
type1/ type2/ 
type 3 type1 
Valmatic relief valve Valmatic relief valve material type tVR old/ new old 
Implementation of the listed structural design variables results in the fault tree structure 
incorporating failure events of new components. The data of the new components to be used 
for the quantitative failure analysis and evaluation of other characteristics of the introduced 
system designs is provided in Table A.2.9 in Appendix 2. Note that the notation of the basic 
events used in the table differs from the one required for the GSDOP. Providing data for the 
GSDOP the new components will be coded following the introduced rules as applied to the 
HIPS (Chapter 5). 
The following requirements are also introduced regarding limitations imposed on new system 
design cases: 1) total system design cost cannot exceed 81000 units; 2) maintenance down 
time must be less than 30 days per year. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, specific formulas are implemented in the GSDOA to evaluate 
system design characteristics such as cost and maintenance down time. Equation 4.4 which is 
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used for evaluation of system cost requires cost data for each component. For the analysis of 
FWDS these values are not provided and need to be evaluated. Design cost for each 
component is evaluated by multiplying the given number of spares stored (NS) by the storage 
cost (CS) and adding it up to the given initial cost, i.e.: 
iIiSiSi CNCdcost +⋅=_ ,   (6.1) 
where i identifies a component. Before the analysis a number of parameters also need to be 
specified in order to use Equation 4.14 to evaluate the system maintence down time. One of 
them is the total number of time units per examined time period, TU . In the case analysed it is 
equal to 365 days since a day is the smallest time unit used for defining maintenance 
intervals. 
6.4. DATA ARRANGEMENT FOR THE OPTIMISATION 
The data preparation for the FWDS optimisation problem is organised according to the 
general requirements regarding the application of the GSDOP. The data arrangement in the 
files such as fwds_fts.txt, fwds_bse.aqd, fwds_cost_cst.txt, fwds_mdt_cst.txt, fwds_theta.txt 
and fwds _gav.txt is very similar to the one used for the HIPS system. Therefore to avoid 
repetitiveness in this section the main focus is only given to the data preparation for 
construction of the fault tree representing all possible design cases. 
As it is known fault tree gates and events are identified using coded numbers in all data files. 
Gates of the fault tree of the initial FWDS design are coded as shown in Figures 6.2 -6.8. 
Code numbers for basic events are listed in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Basic Event Codes 
Event Code Event Code Event Code Event Code 
PT 1 E_CVB 21 AD_TIVC 41 AHE 61 
FSU 2 E_PRVO 22 AD_TIVB 42 AV 62 
OE 3 E_DVO 23 AD_LAF 43 MRM 63 
PBF 4 E_SVO 24 AD_OAF 44 SI 64 
DPF 5 E_FB 25 AE_ESF 45 SV1 65 
DM 6 E_IVB 26 AEPF 46 SV2 66 
D_CVB 7 E_IVC 27 AEM 47 WNB 67 
D_PRVO 8 E_ESF 28 AE_CVB 48 WBS 68 
D_DVO 9 E_MF 29 AE_PRVO 49 WIVB1 69 
D_SVO 10 APFD 30 AE_SVO 50 WHE1 70 
D_FB 11 ADM 31 AE_FB 51 WIVB2 71 
D_IVB 12 AD_CVB 32 AE_DIVB 52 WHE2 72 
D_IVC 13 AD_PRVO 33 AE_DIVC 53 WV 73 
D_EF 14 AD_SVO 34 AE_SIVB 54 WVRF 74 
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Event Code Event Code Event Code Event Code 
D_TIVC 15 AD_FB 35 AE_SIVC 55 WSI 75 
D_TIVB 16 AD_DIVB 36 ATIVB 56 WSV1 76 
D_LAF 17 AD_DIVC 37 ATIVC 57 WSV2 77 
D_OAF 18 AD_SIVB 38 AINF 58 WMRM 78 
EPF 19 AD_SIVC 39 ACVB 59   
EM 20 AD_EF 40 AIVB 60   
The FTMPs for the construction of the FWDS fault tree representing all design cases to be 
considered are defined according to the given list of structural design variables. There are ten 
FWDS components chosen to be replaced with new components or component sets and in 
order to construct the fault tree corresponding to the relating changes eighteen FTMPs are 
employed. These are given in data file fwds_var.txt (Figure 6.9). As a reminder, each row in 
the data file is associated with one FTMP. The first letter identifies if replacement is 
performed at gate or at event level which is followed by a gate/event code. The three numbers 
represent parameter values of the corresponding FTMP. 
 
Figure 6.9. Data File fwds_var.txt 
In this case the order the FTMPs are implemented is very important. For instance, to 
implement the design alteration regarding the firewater diesel driven pump four FTMPs are 
required and they need to be applied in a specific order. Moreover, two out of the four FTMPs 
are implemented in the fault tree branches created using the first FTMP. (The step by step 
implementation of the patterns will be discussed later in the next paragraph). It means code 
numbers of the events in the new fault tree part need to be known. It is relatively easy to 
follow the numbering of new gates and events when implementing the first FTMPs. However 
after a number of alterations it might be very complicated to identify the codes manually. 
G 10 1 3 1 
G 59 1 2 1 
G 69 1 2 1 
G 16 1 3 1 
G 223 1 2 1 
G 239 1 2 1 
G 9 4 1 1 
G 15 4 1 1 
G 22 1 2 1 
G 21 2 1 1 
G 28 1 2 1 
G 27 2 1 1 
E 1 4 3 1 
E 58 1 2 1 
E 62 1 3 1 
E 67 1 2 1 
E 73 1 3 1 
E 74 1 2 1 
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Therefore in this case the FTMPs which should be implemented in the added new fault tree 
structures are listed at the top of the list. 
The first three FTMPs from the list (Figure 6.9) are used to make alterations to the fault tree 
to represent possible changes to the capacity and type of the firewater diesel driven pump. 
First the fault tree is altered to introduce the choice of different capacity diesel driven pump, 
i.e. 100%, 50% and 33 1/3% capacity. Since there are two basic events related to the failure of 
the pump Pattern3 (mn=1, mt=3, mk=1) is implemented at Gate 10. The resulting fault tree 
structure contains failure events of the 50% and 33 1/3% capacity pumps. Gates 59 and 69 
represent failure of 50% and 33 1/3% capacity pumps respectively. Thus to implement a 
further choice of a different type and either 50% or 33 1/3% capacity pump Pattern3 (mn=1, 
mt=2, mk=1) is implemented twice at the latter gates. 
The same design alternatives are introduced with regards to the replacement of the firewater 
electrically-powered pump. Thus, two FTMPs need to be implemented within the newly 
added fault tree structure after the introduction of different capacity pumps. Therefore instead 
of continuing to implement the redundancy strategy of the diesel driven pump, first FTMPs 
are introduced to represent the causes of failure when different type and capacity 
electrically-powered firewater pump(s) are used. Pattern3 (mn=1, mt=3, mk=1) is 
implemented at gate number 16 which results in the new fault tree structure representing 
possible choice of three capacity pumps. Following Pattern3 (mn=1, mt=2, mk=1) is applied 
twice at gates 223 and 239. It leads to the fault tree structure where either failure of a type1 or 
type2 pump can be considered for a 50% or 33 1/3% capacity pump installed. 
Fault tree alterations for the implementation of different numbers of redundant firewater 
pumps are completed using two Pattern1 FTMPs. First Pattern1 (mn=4, mt=1, mk=1) is used 
to incorporate a fault tree part which represents different redundancy levels for the 
diesel-driven pump. When introducing a redundant pump it is installed together with a new 
pump line. Either failure of the pump itself or failures of components on the pump line will 
result in the failure of the redundant supply of water to the ringmain. Therefore Pattern1 is 
applied at gate level, gate 9. Accordingly, the second Pattern1 (mn=4, mt=1, mk=1) is 
applied at gate 15 to incorporate a fault tree structure representing the causes of failure for 
different numbers of redundant electrically powered pumps and their lines. Since the FTMPs 
associated with different pump capacities and types were applied first and followed by the 
introduced redundancy alternatives, the redundancy strategy is applied to each pump with 
different capacity and type. 
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Next four FTMPs are used to implement the design alterations regarding AFFF pumps. First a 
diesel driven pump is considered. In this case both the number of pumps is being increased 
and the choice of different capacity pumps is introduced. If the causes of pump failure were 
associated only with the pump itself then one FTMP could be used. However, each redundant 
pump is installed with a pump line and failures of the components on the line need to be taken 
into consideration. Therefore first Pattern3 (mn=1, mt=2, mk=1) is applied at gate level, gate 
22, to represent the causes of failure for different capacity diesel driven AFFF pumps. 
Following this, Pattern1 (mn=2, mt=1, mk=1) is implemented leading to the introduction of 
design cases with redundant sets of AFFF pumps and their lines to supply foam into the 
ringmain. Accordingly Pattern3 and Pattern1 are implemented at gates 28 and 27 
respectively to represent the design changes regarding the AFFF electrically powered pump. 
The rest of the FTMPs can be implemented in any order. In the presented cases Pattern5 
(mn=4, mt=3, mk=4) is implemented first at event level. Basic event No. 1 “Pressure 
transmitter fails” is replaced with a fault tree structure representing the possible design cases 
when up to four pressure transmitters can be installed. The number of transmitters that must 
work can vary from one to four and either of different types of transmitters can be installed. 
Next, Pattern3 is implemented at the following event levels, event 58 (mn=1, mt=2, mk=1), 
event 62 (mn=1, mt=3, mk=1), event 67 (mn=1, mt=2, mk=1), event 73 (mn=1, mt=3, mk=1) 
and event 74 (mn=1, mt=2, mk=1) with regards to the choices of different material type or 
valve type for the AFFF inductor nozzle, AFFF deluge valve, waterspray deluge nozzle, water 
deluge valve and valmatic relief valve respectively. 
After the implementation of all FTMPs the number of gates in the FWDS fault tree increases 
from 45 to 317, the number of basic events increases from 78 to 242 and 131 house events are 
included. 
The structure of chromosomes to be employed is problem-dependant and is defined by the 
programme according to the FTMPs introduced and maintence time intervals considered as 
design variables. There are twenty genes in the chromosome coding the parameters of the 
chosen FTMPs as shown in Figure 6.10. The first six genes, each one comprising of two bits, 
correspond to Pattern3 which was implemented six times. In all those genes parameter mt is 
coded with its value equal to either 2 or 3. The seventh and eighth genes code parameters 
mn=4 of Pattern1 which is applied twice. The next four genes each of the size of 2 bits code 
parameters mt=2 (Pattern3), mn=2 (Pattern1), and mt=2 (Pattern3), mn=2 (Pattern1) which 
represent design alterations of the AFFF diesel-driven and AFFF electrically-powered pumps 
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respectively. Three genes of sizes 3, 2 and 3 bits represent the parameters mn=4, mt=3 and 
mk=4 of Pattern5. The remaining five genes are allocated to code the parameters mt for the 
last five FTMPs implemented. 
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Figure 6.10. Chromosome Structure 
The last three genes in the chromosome are utilized to code values of three time intervals 
between maintence activities. Time units for different time intervals are unified and a day has 
been used as a time unit. Thus to code the maintenance test interval θP, a five bit gene is used. 
Maintenance of the ringmain (θR) can be performed at time intervals ranging from 1 to 24 
weeks or from 7 to 168 days. Therefore eight bits are allocated to code the possible values. 
Finally, a gene of 10 bits is allocated to code the maximum value of the time interval, which 
is 546 days (18 months) between any maintence performance for the Deluge skid (θD). 
6.5. MODIFICATION OF THE GSDOA 
Application of the GSDOA for the optimisation of the HIPS design discussed in Chapter 5 
has revealed the issue of the algorithms ability to converge to a population dominated by the 
fittest designs. It was envisaged that when analysing larger scale systems or solving 
optimisation problems with a large search space the non-convergence problem would be even 
more pronounced. In order to improve the performance of the algorithm a number of 
modifications have been implemented in the algorithm. A penalty function approach for the 
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handling of constraint violations and a new replacement procedure were introduced (Section 
6.5.1). Furthermore, scaling of the fitness function has been implemented (Section 6.5.2). 
6.5.1. Penalty Function Method and New Replacement Procedure 
In the initial GSDOA a death penalty strategy was implemented. Using this approach an 
offspring chromosome which violated any constraint was not entered into the new parent 
population and one of its parent chromosomes was entered instead. Such a strategy restricts 
the search region by allowing the selection of just those population members which do not 
violate any constraint. Although evolutionary strategies normally employ death penalties their 
use may eliminate good genetic material by eliminating those population members which are 
close to being feasible. Therefore an approach of applying some penalties to solutions that 
violate one or more constraints has been introduced. 
Applying a penalty method a constrained optimisation problem is transformed into an 
unconstrained one by associating a penalty, i.e. by adding (or subtracting) a certain value to 
(or from) the objective function, for any constraint violation. The basic approach is to define a 
fitness value for an individual i by extending the domain of the objective function )(XiF  as 
follows: 
i
p
ii
fitness FFF ±= )()( XX   (6.3) 
where ipF  represents either a penalty for an infeasible individual i, or a cost for repairing such 
individual, i.e. the cost for making it feasible [78]. If a minimisation problem is considered 
the value of an objective function is increased by the magnitude of a penalty. 
A number of penalty function categories exist. Coello mentions the following ones [79]: 
static, dynamic, annealing, adaptive, co-evolutionary and the previously employed death 
penalty. The choice of a new penalty method to be implemented has been made according to 
properties of the algorithm, i.e. considering prospective application of the approach to a 
variety of safety system design optimisation problems. Therefore the chosen penalty method 
had to be problem-independent as much as possible and only constraint-specific. For this 
reason the following form of a general penalty function was chosen which was introduced by 
Coit et. al. [80]: 
Chapter 6. FWDS Design Optimisation Using Improved GSDOA 
 
126 
( ) ( ) inc
i i
ifeasallp NFT
Bd
FFF
κ
∑
=






−=
1
,)( xx .         (6.4) 
Here allF is the best unpenalised value of the objective function yet found, feasF is the best 
feasible value of the objective function yet found, iNFT  denotes the near-feasibility threshold 
that corresponds to a given constraint i, ( )Bd i ,x  is a magnitude of violation of a given 
constraint i for solution x , iκ  is the user-specified severity parameter and nc is the total 
number of constraints set for the problem. 
The general form of the penalty function (Formula 6.4) has been specified and modified for 
the developed GSDOA. Four pairs of constraints defining maximum and minimum limits of 
considered factors are implemented in the algorithm. Thus the maximum possible value of 
variable nc is equal to eight. The severity parameter is set to 2 for every constraint resulting in 
a penalty of the square of the Euclidean distance from the infeasible solution to the feasible 
region over all constraints. In the implemented algorithm the dynamic form of the near 
feasible threshold has been used, as it allows the penalty value to be adjusted according to the 
search history. The near-feasibility threshold for each constraint is defined as follows: 
g
NFTNFT oii
⋅+
=
1.01
.  (6.5) 
Here oiNFT  represents the actual value of a constraint i and g denotes the generation number. 
The general form of the penalty function adjusted to the implemented optimisation approach 
can be defined for the case when all constraints are violated as follows:  
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where ∆  is the magnitude of violation of the constraint, i.e. the difference between the actual 
constraint value of a generated system design and the defined constraint value. For example: 
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.maxmax CostCostCost system −=∆     (6.7) 
Thus each individual in a population is evaluated using the formula: 
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If certain constraints are not violated the corresponding summands are eliminated from 
Equation 6.8 automatically within the developed programme. 
To implement the penalisation methodology in the optimisation programme two new routines 
were added: Best and Penalty_Adaptive. Routine Best is used to identify the best unpenalised 
value of the objective function and the best feasible value of the objective function in a 
population yet found. The second routine Adaptive_Penalty estimates any constraint 
violations and returns the value of the penalty magnitude pF . 
With the new fitness penalisation methodology introduced the previously used replacement 
approach also needs to be modified. Several replacement methods used for construction of the 
parent population for the generation of new chromosomes are possible depending on the type 
of GA being used. An accurately chosen replacement methodology can be beneficial to 
improve the algorithm. It can prevent insufficient diversity in the population which can lead 
the algorithm converging too quickly towards a weak solution. 
The new replacement strategy was implemented by employing an algorithm described by 
Chambers [68]. The idea of this algorithm is to replace a parent population with an offspring 
population. If the best parent chromosome is fitter than the best offspring chromosome then it 
replaces the worst offspring chromosome. This is performed every time a new offspring 
population is generated. 
The influence of the alterations made on the algorithm performance has been analysed. The 
initial GSDOP and the one with the newly implemented penalisation and replacement 
methodologies were applied to solve the FWDS design optimisation problem. Two sets of GA 
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parameter values were chosen to compare the influence of different GA parameter values on 
the performance of the algorithms. The first set used includes a population size equal to 10 
chromosomes, crossover rate equal to 0.75 and mutation rate equal to 0.001. From the earlier 
analysis of the HIPS system (Chapter 5) it is known that the algorithm performs better if the 
population size and mutation rate are increased. Therefore the next set of results chosen 
includes a population of 50 chromosomes with crossover rate and mutation rate equal to 0.95 
and 0.01 respectively. Five runs were performed for each set of parameters. A minimal 
system failure probability value, i.e. best feasible fitness value, after 100 generations was 
considered as the problem solution. The obtained results are presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3.  Results of the Application of the Initial and the Improved GSDOP  
Crossover Rate=0.75, 
Mutation Rate=0.001, 
Population Size=10, 
Crossover Rate=0.95, 
Mutation Rate=0.01, 
Population Size=50 
 
Original 
SOGA 
Improved 
SOGA 
Original 
SOGA 
Improved 
SOGA 
Run No.1  0.1701  0.1483  0.1071  0.0928 
Run No.2  0.1153  0.1036  0.1059  0.0938 
Run No.3  0.1643  0.1044  0.1064  0.0965 
Run No.4  0.1646  0.1284  0.1082  0.0936 
Run No.5  0.1676  0.1172  0.1082  0.0952 
Average  0.1564  0.1204  0.1072  0.0944 
The GSDOP with new the penalisation and replacement routines introduced achieves the best 
fitness values which on average are smaller than the ones achieved using the original GSDOP. 
Results are improved by 23% and 12% using the first and the second sets of GA parameters 
correspondingly. Moreover, the difference in the best fitness values achieved for two sets of 
GA parameters decreases from 31% to 22% after implementing the alterations to the initially 
introduced algorithm. It demonstrates the lower sensitivity to variation in GA parameter 
values and increased robustness of the algorithm. 
6.5.2. Fitness Scaling  
Research shows that linear fitness scaling improves the performance of GA algorithms and it 
is especially valuable when small populations are utilised. Scaling of the fitness function has 
been introduced to avoid two problems that can occur during the optimisation process when 
employing GAs. The first one represents the situation when a few extra-ordinary individuals 
appear among other less-fit individuals in the population at early generations. This could lead 
to a situation in which the chromosomes with extraordinary fitness values take over a 
significant portion of the population in just a few generations, leading the process to 
premature convergence. The other problem may occur in later generations when the average 
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fitness value of the whole population is close to the fitness value of the best individual in the 
population. If this situation is left alone, average members will contribute a similar number of 
copies in the future generations and survival of the fittest, which is necessary for 
improvement becomes a random walk among the less-fit solutions. 
The chosen scaling method introduced in [45] defines a linear relationship between an initial 
fitness value and fitness value after the scaling. It calculates the scaled fitness score for a 
given chromosome i, ( )xscaledF , using the chromosome fitness value, ( ) fitnessF x , equal to 
its objective function value if the chromosome is feasible or penalised objective function 
value (Equation 6.8) if the chromosome is not feasible as follows: 
( ) ( ) bFaF fitnessscaled +⋅= xx   (6.9) 
Here parameters a and b are linear function coefficients and are problem-independent. These 
parameters depend on a population and are re-evaluated in each generation. 
In the implemented method the linear function coefficients are selected so that the average 
fitness before scaling and the average scaled fitness values are equal 
( initialscaled avgavg ff = ). The second condition which parameters need to satisfy can be 
described as follows: 
initialscaled avgmultmax fcf =   (6.10) 
where multc  defines the number of expected chromosome copies desired for the best member 
in the population. Goldberg in [45] suggests that the multc  value would be from 1.2 to 2 for 
populations where the number of chromosomes is from 50 to 100. Thus, the value for variable 
multc  has been fixed to 1.2 in the scaling procedure implemented in the modified GSDOP. 
In some cases negative fitness values can be introduced if using the linear scaling procedure. 
To avoid such situations equality between average initial fitness and average scaled fitness is 
maintained and the minimum fitness value condition is introduced. Thus the parameters a and 
b need to be defined such that the following non-negative test condition would be satisfied: 
( )
1−
−
<
mult
maxaveragemult
min
c
ffcf initialinitialinitial       (6.11) 
The minimum initial fitness is then mapped to a scaled fitness equal to 0, i.e. .0=
scaledminf  
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The described scaling procedure was implemented in the GSDOP using three new 
subroutines: Prescale, Scale and Scalepop. The subroutine Scalepop is the main subroutine 
that governs the scaling process and also includes the other two. The subroutine Prescale is 
employed to calculate the linear function coefficients a and b. The subroutine Scale is used to 
scale each chromosomes fitness value at a time. 
For comparison the results of simulations performed are given in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4. Results of the Application of the Initial and the Improved GSDOP  
Crossover Rate=0.75, 
Mutation Rate=0.001, 
Population Size=10, 
Crossover Rate=0.95, 
Mutation Rate=0.01, 
Population Size=50 
 
Improved 
SOGA 
Improved 
(scaling 
implemented) 
SOGA  
Improved 
SOGA 
Improved 
(scaling 
implemented) 
SOGA 
Run No.1  0.1483 0.0945  0.0928 0.0928 
Run No.2  0.1036 0.1515  0.0938 0.0925 
Run No.3  0.1044 0.1025  0.0965 0.0924 
Run No.4  0.1284 0.1144  0.0936 0.0924 
Run No.5  0.1172 0.0937  0.0952 0.0932 
Average  0.1204 0.1113  0.0944 0.0926 
The results show the effectiveness of the scaling procedure in producing fitter chromosomes 
over a fixed number of generations. The results obtained also demonstrate lower sensitivity to 
different values of GA operators. Moreover the application of the scaling reduces the 
fluctuation within average population fitness values, leading to lower average fitness values 
and steady convergence towards the optimal solution as shown in Figure 6.11. 
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Figure 6.11. Average Fitness Values per Generation 
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6.5.3. Structure of the Improved SOGA 
After the implementation of the introduced alterations the structure of the original SOGA 
utilised in the GSDOA has changed. The new SOGA (Figure 6.12) now includes two new 
procedures: penalisation and scaling. Additionally, alterations have also been made to the 
replacement procedure. 
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Figure 6.12. Structure of the improved SOGA 
Thus the initial population in the improved SOGA is generated through the following routine: 
Step 1: Assign a random binary number for each gene in a chromosome. 
Step 2: Check if the obtained phenotype of each gene does not exceed the predefined 
maximum value. If the generated value of any gene is bigger than the maximum possible 
value of the corresponding parameter then generate a new binary number and checked the 
validation again. Repeat until all the generated parameter values are valid. 
Step 3: Use the obtained parameters of the design variables to construct a corresponding 
design case. 
Step 4: Evaluate the objective function value for the design generated.  
Step 5: Evaluated system resources for the design generated. If they do not exceed the 
predefined limits Step 6 follows. Otherwise penalise the objective function value by the 
corresponding magnitude and proceed to Step 6. 
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Step 6: The chromosome enters the initial population. 
Step7: If the number of chromosomes in the population is equal to the predefined value N the 
process is terminated. Otherwise the process is repeated from Step 1. 
Penalisation and scaling are incorporated in the cycle for generation of offspring populations. 
In the new GA a new population of chromosomes is produced by utilising three genetic 
operators as in the originally used GA algorithm. Once the new chromosomes are generated 
the objective function value for each of them is evaluated followed by the inspecting whether 
or not the predefined constraints are violated. If at least one constraint is violated an objective 
function value corresponding to that chromosome is penalised. Next, the new replacement 
procedure follows. The resulting population comprises of offspring chromosomes and one or 
more parent chromosomes if the best parent chromosome is fitter then the best offspring 
chromosome. Fitness values of the chromosomes in the newly formed population undergo the 
scaling procedure. At this stage one generation cycle is completed. The detailed process is 
repeated until the number of performed generations is equal to a predefined maximum 
number of generations. 
6.6. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED GSDOP PERFORMANCE 
SOLVING THE FWDS DESIGN OPTIMISATION PROBLEM 
6.6.1. Analysis of GA Parameters Influence on Algorithm Performance 
Different sets of GA parameter values have been used to solve the FWDS optimisation 
problem and to analyse performance of the improved GSDOP with new approaches 
implemented for penalisation, replacement and scaling. The GA parameter values used were 
the same as the ones for HIPS optimisation problem which had been chosen following 
guidelines provided in literature. However, on the basis of the performance results obtained 
when solving the HIPS optimisation problem (Chapter 4), the size equal to 20 chromosomes 
and the mutation rate equal to 0.002 have been removed from the analysis. Thus the twenty 
seven different combinations of values of the GA parameters have been employed in total. 
The values of the parameters are listed in Table 6.5. As in the previous application example 
due to the stochastic nature of the GA ten runs have been performed for one set of parameters 
and the average of the best feasible fitness values, i.e. minimal feasible values, was calculated 
per each generation. Each time the process was terminated after 100 generations. All obtained 
analysis results can be found in Appendix 2, while this section provides their summary. 
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Table 6.5. The List of Values of GA Parameters 
          Value No. 
 
Parameter 
1st Value 2nd Value 3rd Value 
Population Size 10 30 50 
Mutation Rate 0.001 0.005 0.01 
Crossover Rate 0.75 0.8 0.95 
First the influence of the population size is considered. The average of the minimal feasible 
fitness values obtained for all combinations of crossover and mutation rate values is evaluated 
for each population size. The results are presented in Table 6.6. As expected, the larger 
population size introduces more diversity in the population and therefore improves the 
capability of the algorithm to find a near-optimal solution. If the results are compared with the 
ones of the HIPS problem the difference between average minimal unavailability values is 
much smaller for the FWDS problem. It suggests that either the search space for the problem 
is rather small or the improved algorithm is less susceptible to changes of the population size. 
Table 6.6. Minimal Average System Unavailability Values for Different Population 
Sizes 
Population Size 
 
10 30 50 
Mean of Minimal System 
Unavailability Values 0.1001 0.0954 0.0940 
The averages of minimal feasible fitness values obtained for each combination of crossover 
and mutation rates over 10 runs when the population size has been fixed to 10, 30 and 50 
chromosomes are given in Tables A.2.10-A.2.12. The results suggest that the rate at which 
new chromosomes are introduced is less influential on the optimisation performance than the 
retention of diversity in populations. 
Table 6.7 shows that the average of feasible minimal fitness values evaluated for all 
combinations of different crossover rate and population size decreases if the mutation rate is 
increased. Analysing the influence of the mutation rate (Tables A.2.13-A.2.15) it has been 
noticed that for the small mutation rate the algorithm performs better if an average population 
size is used. Apparently, combinations of small mutation rate and large populations promote 
the production of sub-optimal solutions. The increasing population size and the mutation rate 
encourage the convergence of the algorithm to an optimal solution. However the same rule 
does not apply to the crossover rate. If the mutation rate is lower and equal to 0.05 a trade-off 
between the mutation rate and crossover rate needs to be found. Overall the best feasible 
fitness values for the same combinations of crossover rate and populations size decrease with 
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increasing mutation rate. It shows the importance of the diversity in the population. 
Nevertheless its level needs to be chosen according to the number of chromosomes in the 
populations.  
Table 6.7. Minimal Average System Unavailability Values for Different Mutation 
Rates 
Mutation Rate 
 0.001 0.005 0.01 
Mean of Minimal System 
Unavailability Values 0.0990 0.0958 0.0947 
The average of the best feasible fitness values for all combinations of mutation rates and 
population sizes was also evaluated for each value of crossover rate. The results are presented 
in Table 6.8. It shows that a high crossover rate indicating a quick introduction of new strings 
into the population helps to improve the performance of the optimisation process. 
Table 6.8. Minimal Average System Unavailability Values for Different Crossover 
Rates 
Crossover Rate 
 0.75 0.8 0.95 
Mean of Minimal System 
Unavailability Values 0.1003 0.0947 0.0945 
Results of the analysis performed to identify how combinations of different mutation rates 
and populations sizes influence the FWDS optimisation process for each crossover rate value 
are presented in Tables A.2.16-2.18. Here there is a tendency for the fitness value to decrease 
for increasing values of both analysed parameters, i.e. mutation rate and population size. Even 
though this tendency appears for every crossover rate, the increasing crossover rate does not 
lead to smaller best fitness values. These results justify the earlier made conclusion that the 
choice of values for the mutation rate and population size has a stronger influence on the 
optimisation process than the crossover rate value for solving the FWDS problem. 
Studying the performance results of algorithm after 100 generations, a relationship can be 
identified between the average fitness value of the population and the best feasible solution 
found. The results obtained using populations of 50 chromosomes are shown in Figure 6.13. 
Here the best feasible fitness value is larger then the average population fitness value for 
mutation rates equal to 0.001 and 0.005. When the mutation rate is increased up to 0.01 the 
best feasible fitness value obtained is smaller than the average fitness value. This relationship 
applies to all values of crossover rate. 
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Figure 6.13. Differences Between Average and the Best Feasible Fitness Values 
The optimisation results show that the GA is capable of finding good feasible solutions, but 
converges to an infeasible solution if the mutation rate is lower. If the mutation rate equal to 
0.01 is used the algorithm converges to a feasible solution and the quality of the solution 
improves. It reinforces the hypothesis that increasing diversity increases the possibility of 
obtaining good solutions among the populations. 
The algorithm demonstrates the ability to solve the FWDS design optimisation problem and 
to find a near-optimal solution. The analysis performed when using different values of GA 
parameters and the influence of the parameters on the optimisation process suggests that the 
algorithm performs better if a larger population size and higher mutation rate are used. 
Results obtained for the HIPS (discussed in Section 5.5.1) also indicate that by using a larger 
population size and a higher mutation rate the performance of the algorithm improves. 
Thus to perform further testing on FWDS optimisation problem the mutation rate equal to 
0.01 and population comprising of 50 chromosomes were chosen. Based on the results in 
Table 6.8 the crossover rate equal to 0.95 was included in the set of chosen GA parameters. 
The analysis performed is discussed in the following section. 
6.6.2. Testing 
The set of GA parameters (i.e. crossover rate, mutation rate and population size equal to 0.95, 
0.01 and 50 respectively) identified in the preceding subsection are considered further here 
applying them and by performing ten more runs. The number of generation-iterations in a 
single run of the programme has been left the same, i.e. 100 generations. At the second stage 
of the analysis the number of generation-iterations performed has been increased up to 200. 
Five more runs have been performed to check the level of the improvement in terms of 
Chapter 6. FWDS Design Optimisation Using Improved GSDOA 
 
136 
algorithm convergence. Average fitness value of the population and the best feasible fitness 
value yet found are two quantities evaluated for each generation and represented graphically. 
Figure 6.14 presents the average population objective function values for each generation 
from the four chosen runs. The average objective function value rapidly decreases during the 
first 30 generations. In later generations both the convergence rate and the fluctuation in 
average fitness values decreases significantly. The results demonstrate steady convergence of 
average population fitness and dominance of highly-fit chromosomes in populations with later 
generations.  
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Figure 6.14. Average Unavailability Value in Each Generation. Total 100 generations 
Figure 6.15 presents the best feasible solutions found over 100 generations of four chosen 
simulation runs. It confirms the capability of the algorithm to find good feasible solutions. 
The standard deviation of the best solutions found after 100 generations is equal to 0.00034. It 
suggests that the algorithm exhibits low sensitivity to the random number seed and therefore 
is robust.  
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Figure 6.15. Best Feasible Fitness Value per Each Generation 
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Results obtained from 200 generation runs showed improvement in the best fitness values. 
For instance, the mean of the best solutions after 100 generations was equal to 0.09278 and 
after 200 generations it was equal to 0.09261. The standard deviation of the best solutions 
found also decreased to 0.00031. It suggests that increasing the number of generations 
encourages further exploration of the boundary region between feasibility and unfeasibility, 
leading to better solutions. However one should take into account that increasing the number 
of generations also increase computational burden. Therefore it needs to be assessed if the 
level of improvement in the optimal solutions is worth the computation resources required in 
order to find it. 
The best system design arose during one of the runs in generation 161. The best system 
design includes 2 firewater diesel-driven and electrically-powered pumps. All four pumps 
have 33 1/3% capacity and are identified as type 2 pumps. It also includes 2 AFFF diesel-
driven and 2 AFFF electrically-powered 100 % capacity pumps. The optimal design has 2 
pressure transmitters of type 3 where at least 1 pressure transmitter is required to function. A 
new inductor nozzle and new valmatic relief valve together with an old deluge nozzle are in 
the found optimal design. Finally, both AFFF deluge and water deluge valves of type 3 are 
included in the new FWDS design. The maintenance test interval for the firewater and AFFF 
pump was assigned to 10 days. Time intervals between maintenance of the ringmain and the 
Deluge skid were equal to 12 days (~2 weeks) and 90 days (~3 months) correspondingly. The 
newly designed FWDS with the new maintence scheduling implemented has an unavailability 
of 0.092348. Its cost is equal to 80873 units and maintenance downtime is 29.6 days a year. 
Table 6.9 lists the parameters of the best designs achieved throughout the optimisation 
analysis. Results show that the optimal number of firewater and AFFF pumps is equal to two 
in all best design cases. 33 1/3% capacity firewater pumps appear more often than 50% 
capacity ones and 100% capacity firewater pumps have not been included in any optimal 
design solution found. However, considering the capacity of AFFF pumps, 100% capacity 
dominates in the best designs generated. According to the results, there is no need to increase 
the number of pressure transmitters on the ringmain if it is replaced with a pressure 
transmitter of type 3 in order to reduce the system failure associated with the activation of the 
automatic FWDS mechanism. The new inductor nozzle dominates in the optimal FWDS 
designs. In all listed cases the new valmatic relief valve and the original deluge nozzle are 
introduced. Both AFFF deluge and water deluge valves of type 3 are included in the new 
FWDS designs. The optimal maintenance test interval for the firewater and AFFF pump sets 
varies from 7 days to up to 21. Ringmain maintenance can be performed at 12-day intervals. 
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Finally for all optimal designs found the optimal time interval between maintence of the 
deluge skid is 90 days (3 months). 
Table 6.9. Best Generated FWDS Designs 
Associated System Component Design 
Variable 
Notation 
Design 1 Design 2 Design 3 Design 4 
nFD 2 2 2 2 
t1FD 3 3 2 3 Firewater diesel driven pump 
t2FD 2 2 1 1 
nFE 2 2 2 2 
t1FE 3 3 3 2 
Firewater electrically powered 
pump 
t2FE 2 1 2 1 
nAD 2 2 2 2 AFFF diesel driven pump 
tAD 1 1 2 2 
nAE 2 2 2 2 AFFF electrically powered 
pump tAE 1 1 1 1 
nPT 2 1 1 1 
kPT 1 1 1 1 
Pressure transmitter on the 
ringmain 
tPT 3 3 3 2 
Inductor nozzle tIN 2 2 2 1 
AFFF deluge valve tAD 3 3 3 3 
Deluge nozzle tDN 1 1 1 2 
Water deluge valve tWD 3 3 3 3 
Valmatic relief valve tVR 2 2 2 2 
θP 10 7 16 21 
θR 12 12 12 13 Maintenance test intervals  
θD 90 90 90 90 
Cost 80873 80373 80873 80873 
MDT 29.6 29.7 29 26.8 Characteristics 
Q 0.092348 0.092349 0.092353 0.092478 
 
6.7. SUMMARY 
The successful application of the GSDOA to solve the FWDS optimisation problem proves 
that the algorithm: 
• has potential to be applicable to different safety systems; 
• is efficient in finding good near optimal solutions; 
• is indeed scalable and can deal with large scale complicated problems. 
In this chapter the application of the GSDOA and the implementation of GSDOP to solve the 
FWDS design optimisation problem have been demonstrated. In general, to be able to solve a 
design optimisation problem using the algorithm it is imperative to form the list of FTMPs 
corresponding to the structural design variables of the optimisation problem in question. The 
list of FTMPs for the FWDS and their order in the formed list has been discussed and 
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reasoned. The problem-specific chromosome structure encoding the design variables and 
therefore the FTMPs used has also been detailed in this chapter. Thus the FDWS example 
supports the potential applicability of the algorithm for different safety systems. 
The current FWDS design optimisation problem has been solved using the improved GSDOA 
where new penalisation, replacement and scaling procedures were implemented in the GA. 
The modifications demonstrate that the optimisation process has been improved. The 
modified approach has an enhanced ability to converge on the fittest design. After a number 
of generations the fluctuation of the average fitness values decreases, showing that the 
domination of the designs similar to the best feasible overall design case increases in the 
populations. Results from the optimisation analysis performed for FWDS and previously for 
HIPS also suggest that the algorithm exhibits some sensitivity to the GA parameter variations. 
Therefore, it is suggested to use larger sizes of chromosome populations and a higher 
mutation rate. The crossover rate (if its value is reasonably high) has less influence on the 
optimisation process. 
Solving the more complicated optimisation problem has introduced an increase in 
computational intensity. For comparison, it takes 558 seconds to run a simulation of one 
hundred generations with a 50 chromosome population for the FWDS. A simulation with the 
same parameters takes 220 seconds to run for the HIPS. The computations were carried out on 
a Dual Core 1.60 GHz processor with 1.00GB of RAM on a 32-bit operating system. 
Therefore in order to extend the capability of the algorithm to solve a wider range of problems 
the future work should also focus on improving the performance of the algorithm and 
minimisation of CPU time. It is noteworthy that this can be a key requirement for real-time 
optimisation of engineering systems. 
The application of the GSDOP to solve the FWDS problem has demonstrated that the 
algorithm produces good feasible solutions for the large scale and more complicated problem. 
Despite the fact that it could not guarantee to find the global optimal solution the algorithm 
provided near-optimal solutions using minimal computational resources. To find the global 
optimal solution for such problem using the exhaustive search method significantly more 
computational resources and time would be required. There are 1,911,029,760 combinations 
of the design variables and therefore the design cases to be analysed. Given that it takes 0.1 
seconds to generate a specific system design case and evaluate its failure probability (based 
on the results presented for computation time discussed in the paragraph above) it would take 
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approximately 53084 hours or 6 years to find the global solution using the exhaustive search 
approach. 
The further development of the generalised optimisation methodology focuses on solving the 
design optimisation problems of multi-phased mission systems. 
7. MULTI-PHASED MISSION SYSTEM DESIGN 
OPTIMISATION 
7.1. INTRODUCTION  
A phased mission system represents a system where its performance objectives are divided 
into consecutive, non-overlapping phases. During each phase the system performs a certain 
task or a number of tasks that have to be completed at the same time. The mission is 
considered to be completed if every task in each phase is completed successfully. Failure to 
complete any phase successfully causes the whole mission failure. 
A large number of systems which can employ different technologies such as mechanical, 
electronic, nuclear and chemical devices appear in industry and can be considered as phased 
mission systems. The relevance and significance of optimising phased mission system 
performance and the appropriate use of limited resources is therefore evident. In spite of its 
importance, however, there is limited demonstrated evidence in the literature for research that 
focuses on such phased mission optimisation problems. Susova & Petrov [81] proposed a 
model for aircraft maintenance system optimisation. The model is based on a Markov 
homogeneous process and is employed to ensure aircraft safety and minimise operation costs. 
The research in this project has been focused on the development of an approach to construct 
an optimal phased mission system design with the aim of minimising its failure within the 
context of pre-defined design constraints and resources. The developed approach is based on 
GSDOA which is used for the optimisation analysis of safety system designs (Chapters 4 and 
6). Since any general system - including a safety system - can be considered as a system 
performing a mission consisting of a single phase, GSDOA was altered so that a multi-phased 
mission system analysis can be performed. 
In this chapter an overview of methodologies used for reliability analysis of phased mission 
system is given (Section 7.2). The developed approach and programme code are detailed in 
Sections 7.3 and 7.6 respectively. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and military vessel 
have been selected to demonstrate the methods application. The application examples are 
discussed in Sections 7.4, 7.5 and 7.7. 
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7.2. METHODS FOR RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF PHASED MISSION 
SYSTEMS 
7.2.1. Overview  
When analysing multi-phased mission systems it is necessary to acknowledge that a number 
of system components may stay inactive during some phases, and that they can be employed 
to complete a certain task later in the mission. For example, a braking system of a plane is not 
in use whilst the plane is in the take-off or cruise phase, but it is activated when the landing 
phase starts. The configuration of a system can also vary throughout each phase in the 
mission. Therefore a situation may occur when a component fails at some point during the 
mission and its failure is revealed later or its condition becomes critical just for one particular 
phase. As such, the performance of the system in a certain phase is influenced by results of its 
performance in previous phases.  
The dependencies between phases as well as dependencies between failure behaviours for the 
same components across different phases make reliability analysis of phased mission systems 
complicated. The approaches used to evaluate the reliability of phased mission systems can be 
classified into three major groups. The first group of methods, which are called combinatorial 
methods, are based on FTA, block diagrams and BDD analysis. These methods are usually 
applied to non-repairable systems, since neither fault trees nor block diagrams can easily 
reflect the repair processes. However, Vaurio [82] suggested a fault tree based approach to 
analyse phased mission systems with repairable components. 
The second group of methods use Markov chain based approaches. These methods can be 
adapted to analyse more complicated system behaviour compared with combinatorial 
methods. Markov chain methods can be employed to analyse systems with random phase 
durations and/or repairable components. For example, Alam and Ubaid [83] suggested the 
Markov approach for quantitative reliability evaluation of systems with both deterministic and 
stochastic mission-phase change times. Systems, where the failure rates of components 
change from phase to phase, can also be analysed using this approach. A non-homogeneous 
Markov model was considered by Smotherman and Zemoudeh in [84]. The method is 
applicable for systems where mission-phase change times can be state dependent, mission 
phases are of random duration and repair and failure rates are globally time dependant. 
However, since the number of system states grows exponentially with the number of 
components in the system and that initial conditions are needed to be defined for every phase, 
it restricts the applicability of Markov methods for larger systems. 
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Simulation methods can be used for very complex systems when neither combinatorial nor 
Markov methods can be employed. Despite the fact that these methods have least restrictions 
and both repairable and non-repairable systems can be analysed with different dependencies 
between components, they are the most expensive approaches in terms of computation. 
7.2.2. Non-Repairable Phased Missions 
This part of the thesis is dedicated to the design optimisation of non-repairable phased 
mission systems. Reliability analysis of non-repairable systems can be performed using 
combinatorial, Markov chain or even simulation approaches. However in order to avoid state 
space explosion problems arising in the Markov methods, fault tree and BDD based 
approaches are usually employed. This section reviews combinatorial methods developed for 
the reliability analysis of phased mission systems. 
The fundamental idea of how to employ fault tree analysis for phased missions was 
introduced by Esary and Ziehms in [85]. Their approach is to combine fault trees for failure 
causes of each single phase into one system fault tree and to analyse the system as a single-
phase mission. Their method provides an exact unreliability value for a phased mission 
system where all components are non-repairable and have s-independent failure 
characteristics. 
The method suggested by Esary and Ziehms comprises of four major steps. At first each 
phase fault tree undergoes a simplification stage. The simplification is actually the 
cancellation of a number of minimal cut-sets. If the phase i list of minimal cut-sets contains a 
minimal cut-set that appears in any minimal cut-set from later phases then the minimal cut-set 
is eliminated from the phase i list. For example, phase 1 has three minimal cut-sets: {A,B}, 
{A,C} and {A,D}. Phase 2 has the following minimal cut-sets: {A,B} and {E,F}. The cut set 
{A, B} can be cancelled from phase 1 since it also appears in phase 2 and it means that if the 
system fails in phase 1 it will still be in the same state in phase 2. As a result just the two 
remaining cut-sets in phase 1 are used for further analysis. 
The second step of the method involves basic event transformations. At this stage every basic 
event in phase i is replaced by a series of basic events where each of them represents the 
corresponding component failure in every phase up to and including phase i. For example, 
basic event A in phase 3 would be replaced by components A1 + A2 + A3. It means that if 
component A is failed in phase 3, it could have failed during phase 1 or phase 2 or phase 3, 
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since the component is non-repairable. Using fault tree analysis, basic event A would be 
replaced by an “OR” gate with corresponding input events A1, A2 and A3. 
At the third step the individual transformed phases are joined in a series to form a single 
system. The modified fault tree for each phase becomes an input event of the “OR” gate that 
leads to the fault tree top event “Mission Failure”. A multi-phase mission system can then be 
analysed as a single-phase mission system. Minimal cut sets can be identified from the new 
logic model and the usual quantitative evaluation technique can then be used to obtain the 
system unreliability value. 
Somani and Trivedi introduced a new technique for phased mission system analysis based on 
Boolean algebraic methods [86]. Specifically, the logic expressions are employed to represent 
phase failure combinations (PFC) for each phase. Phase failure combinations for any phase i 
consists of those combinations which represent failure modes in phase i (Ei) but are not failure 
combinations in any of the subsequent phases (Ei+1, Ei+2,…, En):  
( )niii EEEPFC UUI ...1+=    (7.1) 
In the approach they also introduced the notation to denote failure of a component in each 
phase equivalent to the one used by Esary and Ziehms in [85]. According to the notation 
event Ai indicates failure of component A during an interval from the start of the mission to 
the end of the analysed phase i. Using the new notation a Boolean expression specifying 
failure combinations for subsystems presented in Figure 7.1 and used, for example, for 
system phase i, can be expressed as follows: 
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Algebraic rules were introduced to simplify the logic expressions for PFCs, where i and j are 
two phases and i < j: 
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Figure 7.1. Fault trees of phases X, Y and Z 
Thus employing the earlier introduced Boolean rules system unreliability can be found using 
the following equation: 
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where P(En) is the probability of failure of the last phase n and P(PFCi) is the probability of 
phase failure combinations for phase i. The probability of phase failure combinations are 
computed for each phase i ( 1...,,2,1 −= ni ). The logical expressions are derived using the 
phase fault trees and their probabilities are found using a failure distribution function for each 
component. 
Ma and Trivedi in [87] introduced a method to analyse and solve phased mission systems by 
combining a phase algebra approach with a cancellation methodology. This method is based 
on the approach represented by Somani and Trivedi in [86]. The new improvements made the 
method more computationally efficient compared the original approach. The authors 
introduced the minimal cut-sets cancellation rule, which was originally implemented by Esary 
and Ziehms. The second improvement of the algorithm refers to the introduced formula of the 
sum of disjoint phase products, which is a phased-extension of the formula for the sum of 
disjoint products . Thus Equation 7.4 for the unreliability of a phased mission system can be 
rewritten as: 
∑
=
=
n
i
iSYS DPCPQ
1
)(   (7.5) 
where n denotes the total number of phases in the mission and DPCi is a disjoint phase 
constituent for phase i. If PEi represents a set of generally non-disjoint minimal cut-sets then 
the phase constituent can be defined as iii PEPEPEPEPC 121 ... −= , where 1< i ≤ n. A PCi is 
defined as DPCi if the phase products in PCi are mutually disjoint. 
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La Band and Andrews in [88] proposed a new method for phased mission system analysis 
which was also based on the fault tree approach. By employing the new method, the 
unreliability of each phase can be determined in addition to the whole mission unreliability. 
Actually, the whole mission unreliability is the sum of unreliability values of all phases in the 
mission: 
∑
=
=
n
i
iMISS QQ
1
,  (7.6) 
where Qi  denotes unreliability of phase i and the total number of phases in the mission is 
equal to n.  
In the proposed methodology for Equation 7.6 to be valid, fault trees for each phase need to 
be modified following certain rules. The first rule is equivalent to the basic event 
transformation rule introduced by Esary and Ziehms in [85]. According to that rule every 
basic event of a fault tree needs to be represented as an “OR” gate with i basic events for any 
phase i. Each basic event represents the component failure event in every phase up to and 
including phase i. As an example, the failure of component A in phase 2 is presented in 
Figure 7.2. Here, A1 is the failure of component A in phase 1, and A2 represents the failure of 
the component in phase 2. 
 
Figure 7.2. Representation of event A as an “OR” gate 
The second rule specifies combinations of the causes of success of previous phases with the 
causes of failure for the phase being analysed. In other words, if a system fails in phase i, it 
means it could not have failed during any previous phase j (j = 1, 2, …, i-1). Therefore, 
system failure in phase i is represented by an “AND” gate that incorporates the success of 
previous phases j (using “NOT” logic) and the failure for phase i. Figure 7.3 represents the 
failure of a system in phase 2. Phase 2 failure is shown as a combination of success in phase 1 
and failure in phase 2. In phase 2 components A, B and C are replaced using “OR” gates to 
indicate that the components could have failed during phase 1 or phase 2, as shown previously 
A1 A2
Component A 
is failed in
Phase 2
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in Figure 7.2. The overall mission unreliability is then equal to the sum of unreliability for all 
phases (as stated in Equation 7.6). 
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Figure 7.3. An example of system failure during Phase 2. 
The representation of the mission fault trees necessitate a different approach for quantification 
analysis of the mission. In the general case, minimal cut-sets could be determined from a 
phase fault tree and the inclusion-exclusion formula would be applied in order to find each 
phase reliability. Since any phase after the first phase incorporates causes of success of 
previous phases and they are represented using NOT logic, the phase fault tree will be non-
coherent. Therefore in this case prime implicants identify the sets of basic events that cause 
system failure in any phase, except the first one to occur. The authors introduced a fault tree 
modularization technique in order to enable prime implicates to be found more efficiently. 
When applying the inclusion-exclusion formula for the established prime implicants the 
authors introduced a new algebra over the phase to manipulate the derived logical 
expressions. The summarised algebraic laws are presented (Equation 7.7). The following 
notation is used to represent the presented laws. Ai denotes the failure of component A in 
phase i and iA  represents the functioning of component A throughout phase i. Phase i appears 
some time before phase j, i.e. i < j. Therefore the new notation Aij was introduced that 
indicates the failure of a component A at some time from the start of phase i to the end of 
phase j. 
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In the algorithm [88] a fault tree conversion to its corresponding BDD was implemented after 
the required alterations to the mission or each phase fault tree were made, i.e. just before the 
quantification process is started. It improved the efficiency of the analysis but on the other 
hand, problems associated with constructing large BDDs appeared. For example, it requires a 
global variable ordering scheme to construct these BDDs. Prescott et. al. [89] presented a 
novel BDD based approach for phased mission analysis to overcome the global variable 
ordering scheme requirement. In the proposed approach at the first step the fault trees for 
mission phases are converted to BDDs. Since each BDD is converted by employing its own 
variable ordering scheme, the size of the BDD is minimised. 
The second step of the algorithm concerns to the assignment of the time intervals over which 
each of the system component contributes to the phase failure for each constructed BDD. 
Each component is assigned an indicator variable: 
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Here k identifies a component, ti is a start time of the interval and tj is the end of the time 
interval. Since failure of a component can contribute to the failure of the phase at any time 
from the start of the mission to the end of the phase, ti denotes the start of the mission and tj 
marks the end of the phase. 
If considering the success state of a component, i.e. when component k does not fail from the 
start of the mission until a certain time ti, it can also be expressed using an indicator variable: 
( ) ( )∞= ,,0 ikik txttx   (7.9) 
From Equation 7.9 it follows that if component k has not failed by time ti then it must fail 
some time later. 
The authors use the same approach as described in [88] to represent mission failure during 
any phase. The mission fails in phase i, if it did not fail in any of the previous i – 1 phases and 
failure occurs in the phase i. If Fj represents the logical expression for the top event to occur 
in phase j and Phj denotes mission failure in phase j then the following equations are valid: 
Chapter 7. Multi-phased Mission System Design Optimisation 149 
jjj FFFFPh
FFPh
FPh
121
212
11
....
..................
,
,
−
=
=
=
  (7.10) 
Using this approach Equation 7.6 is valid which can be rewritten using the new notation: 
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where n is the total number of phases in the mission. 
The next algorithm step involves building the logical expressions for mission failure in each 
phase following the rule identified with Equations 7.10 and using the appropriate BDDs. 
When connecting a number of BDDs to construct a logical expression for mission failure in 
phase i, some BDDs might contain identical variables. However these variables are treated as 
being independent since time intervals were associated with each of them in order to take into 
account the existing dependencies among them. 
The quantification process involves the analysis of BDDs representing mission failure in each 
phase, i.e. BDDs constructed for each Phi (i=1, 2, …, n). In order to find the logical 
expression of a possible outcome represented by the BDD, every possible path from a BDD 
root node to a terminal 1 node has to be identified. In the proposed approach a simplification 
process of each path takes place at the same time that the path is traversed. It involves 
manipulating the time intervals associated with those variables that occur more than once 
along the path. The following rules apply: 
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When the path logic is simplified, the probability values for each path variable are calculated 
and then multiplied together to give the path probability. The probability of each variable 
needs to be determined according to Equation 7.13 where t0 denotes the starting time of the 
mission and Qk is the cumulative failure distribution function for component k. 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )

∞=−−
∞≠−−−
==
jik
jikjk
jik tttQ
tttQttQ
ttxP
if,1
if,
1,
0
00
    (7.13) 
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Finally, the probabilities of all paths starting from the corresponding BDD root node and 
terminating at terminal 1 nodes are summed which gives each phase a failure probability 
value, i.e. P(Phi). The overall mission failure probability is found using Equation 7.11. 
To summarise, the method introduced by Prescott et. al. converts each phase fault tree to a 
BDD at the beginning of the analysis. Later all dependencies between components in different 
phases are incorporated in each BDD. It means that a global ordering scheme of variables is 
not required when constructing BDDs. The potential to minimise the size of the BDDs to be 
quantified also exists. Overall, it makes the algorithm computationally more efficient then the 
previously mentioned algorithms. Owing to these properties this algorithm was chosen to 
perform the quantification analysis in the phased mission design optimisation algorithm. The 
algorithm is discussed in the following section (Section 7.3). 
7.3. PHASED MISSION SYSTEM DESIGN OPTIMISATION 
ALGORITHM (PMSDOA) 
7.3.1. Introduction 
The phased mission system design optimisation algorithm (PMSDOA) has been developed to 
solve multi-phased mission system design optimisation problems. On the basis that the 
GSDOA is applicable to single phased mission systems it has been used as a foundation to 
construct the new algorithm. The main techniques and performance principles implemented in 
the GSDOA have been adopted in the PMSDOA. Amendments introduced in the new 
approach were required due to specific characteristics and principles of a phased-mission 
system operation. 
The PMSDOA has the same conceptual structure as that of the GSDOA. It contains two main 
parts as shown in Figure 7.4. In the first part all the possible system designs are introduced. 
The fault tree modification patterns chosen according to a given list of structural design 
variables are implemented in the fault tree for each phase. The second part comprises the 
quantitative system analysis and the optimisation technique. The quantitative system analysis 
is implemented to evaluate the mission failure probability for different design cases. The 
resulting fault trees from the first part of the algorithm are utilised. Different system designs 
are generated using the initially applied optimisation technique – the single objective GA 
(SOGA).  
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Some changes have been introduced in both parts of the algorithm. First of all considering a 
multi-phased mission system a number of fault trees need to be analysed at the same time. 
Thus, the methodology used to represent all possible design alternatives needs to be modified. 
Quantification of system failure is performed employing the new methodology designed for 
multi-phased mission systems. 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Structure of Phased Mission System Design Optimisation Algorithm 
With the same performance principles as the GSDOA the new algorithm has the potential to 
solve optimisation problems of different phased mission systems, i.e. it is not restricted in 
applicability to a particular system. However, it is designed for non-repairable phased mission 
systems. A number of assumptions are considered. System components are assumed to be 
working at the mission start. If a component failure occurs it therefore remains present in the 
system. It is also assumed that the length of each phase is determined and known. 
The PMSDOA has been built gradually extending its capability to solve a wider range of 
problems. At the first stage a methodology for a simple optimisation problem was developed. 
The objective of the analysed problem was to minimise the overall mission failure probability. 
Next, constraints for system design regarding the overall mission were introduced. Finally, 
the approach was extended by introducing constraints for system design characteristics at 
different phases of the mission. In this section algorithm development is discussed in detail 
emphasising the alterations and improvements made to the algorithm. Application examples 
are also presented. 
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7.3.2. Fault Trees for all Possible Design Alternatives 
One of the characteristics of the GSDOA is the utilisation of system fault trees to represent 
the initial system design as well as all possible design alternatives introduced. The adaptation 
of the methodology for multi-phased mission systems is a complex process; amendments to 
the methodology have been introduced due to the increased number of fault trees being 
analysed at the same time. 
It is known that a given set of structural design variables with their parameter values defines 
the possible system design alternatives. Even though a phased mission system performs 
different tasks throughout a mission and has an individual fault tree for each phase its design 
is unchangeable from the beginning to the end of the mission. Therefore the given set of 
structural design variables applies to each phase of the mission and the same design 
alternatives should be represented in all of its fault trees. However it is also known that a 
number of system parts may be inactive during certain phases which results in the use of 
different fault trees for different phases. This means that in some cases particular design 
alternatives cannot be represented in every phase fault tree. As such, individual subsets of 
structural design variables need to be assigned for each phase. Each subset contains only 
those variables which correspond to failure events stated in the phase fault tree. 
In the programme the subsets of FTMPs representing the corresponding structural design 
variables are formed when constructing the fault trees, incorporating the failure causes of all 
possible system design alternatives as follows. One phase fault tree is considered at a time 
starting with the first phase. The initial design fault tree is traversed to locate any events 
corresponding to design variables from the given list. When such an event is found the 
required alterations are made, i.e. the event is replaced by an associated sub-tree structure 
defined using a certain FTMP. After the fault tree is checked for all events from the given list 
and the required modifications are made, the fault tree for the second phase is traversed and 
searched for the events identified to be replaced. The task is completed when the required 
alterations are made for the last phase fault tree. 
As a reminder, a sub-tree of each FTMP includes a group of house events linked with each 
other. These links identify which house events are set to TRUE and which are set to FASLE. 
The rules defining the links were introduced when discussing GSDOA. When analysing 
phased mission systems one phase fault tree is altered at a time and the FTMPs which are 
only relevant to this fault tree are used. Thus, house events appearing in the fault tree are not 
linked to house events in the rest of fault trees. For example, house events of the first phase 
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fault tree are linked with house events used only in this fault tree and do not have any links 
with house events in fault trees of the second or any other phase. This means that there is no 
need to introduce additional rules defining the links of house events between different fault 
trees. Moreover the existing house event rules can be applied by analysing each fault tree of 
the mission individually. However, a group of house events corresponding to the same design 
variable can appear in a number of fault trees. In this case values of house events within the 
group need to be the same in each phase fault tree in order to maintain the consistent system 
design throughout each phase. For this purpose a data record is kept for each implemented 
FTMP. It includes the list of fault trees where it has been implemented and a set of house 
event values once they are specified. Using such records house events within the groups of 
house events representing the same design alternative are assigned the same values 
throughout the mission fault trees. 
House events belonging to a particular phase fault tree are identified according to the house 
event numbering rules. House events in a fault tree for phase i are numbered from hi-1 + 1 to 
hi-1 + hi. Here hi-1 is the total number of house events in phase i – 1 and hi  is the total number 
of house events in a fault tree for phase i. For the first phase hi-1 is equal to 0, thus house 
events would be numbered 1,…, h1. House events in the second phase would have numbers h1 
+ 1, h1 + 2,…, h1 + h2. House events in the rest of the fault trees would be numbered 
accordingly. Being able to differentiate house events for each phase fault tree enables groups 
of house events that are linked together to be identified easily. The numbering rules for house 
events within a linked group remain the same as the ones in GSDOA. 
7.3.3. Evaluation of Phased Mission System Failure Probability  
It is known that FTA is not a computationally efficient methodology to quantify system 
failure. In the GSDOA the BDD methodology has already been used instead. Therefore the 
BDD based approach introduced by Prescott et. al. [89] and discussed in Section 7.2 has been 
chosen to evaluate the mission failure probabilities.  
The employed BDD method can only be applicable once a system design is specified, i.e. 
once a fault tree representing the specific design is constructed. In the single phase algorithm 
a trimming operation was introduced before the fault tree is converted into its BDD. Although 
fault tree trimming and conversion slowed down the optimisation process, it allowed the size 
of the tree being analysed to be greatly reduced. The general system optimisation problems 
solved using this methodology were relatively small. When solving a phased mission system 
problem the number of fault trees analysed increases considerably and the old methodology 
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becomes computationally inefficient. Therefore an improved approach has been introduced. 
In the new approach the conversion of mission fault trees to their corresponding BDDs is 
completed only once, after fault trees that account for all possible design alternatives are 
constructed. The resulting BDDs are then utilised for specification of system design cases. 
The implementation of the new approach is based on properties of both house events and 
BDDs. Using BDD analysis the probability of occurrence of the top event of the 
corresponding fault tree is equal to the probability of the sum of the disjoint paths from the 
root node to each terminal 1 vertex. The probability of any disjoint path is obtained by 
multiplying probabilities for the variables along the path. Therefore if a house event set to 
FALSE is assigned the failure probability value equal to 0 each path containing such a house 
event will have a failure probability value equal to 0. Accordingly a house event set to TRUE 
needs to be assigned a value equal to 1. As a result BDD paths with house events set to 
FALSE states will be eliminated and the remaining paths will represent a specific system 
design case. 
By employing this methodology the need to trim fault trees for each generated design can be 
overcome. Moreover, the conversion of each phase fault tree to its BDD - as is required for 
the evaluation of the mission failure probability - can also be omitted. Owing to the generally 
increased number of fault trees in phased mission system analysis, this methodology becomes 
especially beneficial and computationally more efficient than that used in GSDOA. 
7.3.4. Mathematical Representation of the Problem (Overall Mission 
Constraints) 
The initial phased mission system design optimisation problem is introduced as the 
minimisation of the failure probability for the overall mission by altering the system design 
structure. Mathematically the problem is expressed as follows: 
( )missionQ Xmin .   (7.14) 
Here ( )missionQ X  is the mission failure probability. X (n–dimensional vector of independent 
variables) is the result of the union of vectors of the failure probability values of system 
components that ensure successful system performance and their individual or combined 
failures cause mission failure: 
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Here, m is the number of phases in the mission. Each vector Xj represents the failure 
probability values of the system components whose failures contribute towards the system 
failure during phase j (j = 1, 2, …, m). In other words, X is a vector of failure characteristics 
of components of a system with a specific design. 
As in the GSDOA case the objective function cannot be expressed in an explicit form and the 
methodology based on fault tree and BDD analysis is employed to evaluate the value of the 
function as discussed in Section 7.3.3. Using the BDD based approach introduced by Prescott 
et. al. [89] for quantitative system analysis the mission failure probability is expressed as a 
sum of phase failure probabilities (Equation 7.6). Therefore the optimisation problem can be 
defined as follows: 
( ) ( )ijm
j
jmissioni QQ XX ∑
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1
min ,  (7.16) 
where ( )ijjQ X  is the probability of failure during phase j for the system with design i.  
The requirements for a new design are typically associated with its reliability, cost, weight 
and system size. In the proposed optimisation algorithm reliability (unreliability) of a phased 
mission system is the optimisation objective. The remaining factors are considered as 
optimisation problem constraints. Thus the possibility to set a limitation on the system cost, 
weight and volume has been implemented in the algorithm. Three inequalities are introduced 
regarding design limitations: 
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Here min means a defined minimal resource value, accordingly max is a maximum defined 
value and mission identifies an existing value of a design characteristic for a specific system 
design case. To use the resources efficiently it may be useful to have minimum and maximum 
constraints. If only maximum limit values are needed then the minimum constraint values 
become equal to zero. 
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Amounts of resources utilised for a specific design alternative are calculated using the 
methodology employed in GSDOA. As such the total system design cost is found by 
summing the design cost of each component, i.e. employing Equation 4.4. Since in this case 
only unrepairable systems are considered the maintenance cost is eliminated from the formula 
resulting in the following expression: 
∑
=
==
ncm
i
iDmission dcostCostCost
1
_   (7.18) 
were idcost _  is the design cost of a component i and ncm is the total number of different 
components fitted in the system and subject to failure. Accordingly system weight and 
volume are evaluated using Equations 4.12 and 4.13 correspondingly. 
When solving a system design optimisation problem it is not an obligation to use all three 
constraints. Only one or two constraints can be introduced for a particular phased mission 
design optimisation problem. It is not a requirement that only limitations to system cost, 
weight or volume are analysed. Other limitations can also be used if values of the introduced 
limited attributes for the overall system can be evaluated using a formula equivalent to 
Formula 7.18. 
7.3.5. Development of Phased Mission System Design Optimisation 
Programme (PMSDOP) 
The programme code for PMSDOA has been developed using the basis of the original 
GSDOP code and implementing the required amendments. Throughout the development 
process some of the existing routines have been modified and a number of new routines have 
been introduced which are discussed in this section. However, the structure of the code has 
been preserved as the one of GSDOP presented in Section 4.3.5. 
As a reminder, phased mission system design optimisation programme (MPSDOP) has three 
groups of routines. The first group of routines is utilised to read the required data from the 
data files. Routines in the second group control the construction of the mission fault trees 
representing all possible system design alternatives and their conversion to BDDs. Finally, the 
third group comprises of one main routine and a number of subroutines implemented for the 
optimisation process. To avoid repetition only new routines and subroutines developed with 
regards to the analysis of phased mission systems are introduced in this section. 
Chapter 7. Multi-phased Mission System Design Optimisation 157 
7.3.5.1. Data Processing 
For the performance of the optimisation analysis the required problem data is presented in two 
groups of files. The first group combines files storing the data of GA parameter values, design 
variables and system component data such as cost, weight and/or volume together with the 
imposed limitation on each characteristic. The files storing the names of mission phases also 
belong to this group. The second group comprises pairs of files storing data for individual 
phases of the mission. The data files needed for the analysis and links among all data files are 
shown in Figure 7.5. 
mission_var.txt
mission_gav.txt
mission_cst.txt
mission_fts.txt
phase1.txt 
phase2.txt 
phase3.txt 
data_files.txt
mission_var.txt
mission_gav.txt
mission_cst.txt
mission_fts.txt
phase1.txt
phase1.aqd
phase2.txt
phase2.aqd
phase3.txt
phase3.aqd
 
 
Figure 7.5. Example of Data Files 
As in the GSDOP the initial data file named “data_files.txt” is utilised in the PMSDOP to 
store names of the first group of data files. The files listed are named using the same principle 
as the one in GSDOA. Since only unrepairable systems are analysed the data and therefore 
files associated with system maintenance are not considered. Another change introduced is 
that the file _fts.txt stores the names of data files where fault tree structures for each mission 
phase are stored. 
Data specific to each mission phase is stored in two files for each phase. The first file stores 
the fault tree structure of the phase of the initial system design. The second file of type .aqd 
and named as the first file stores the failure characteristics of the system components 
considering that component failure occurs during this phase. 
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Eight routines are used to read all the data from the provided files. New routines File_Names 
and Data_Phases were specially introduced for a phased mission optimisation problem. The 
routine File_Names is used to read the names of files where mission fault tree structures are 
stored. The routine Data_Phases is employed to read each phase initial fault tree structure 
from a data file. A subset of design variables for each phase is formed using the routine 
Data_Variables. The routines Data_Files, Data_Constraints and Basic_Event_Data have 
been adapted for phased mission analysis from the GSDOA. 
7.3.5.2. Preparation for Quantitative Analysis 
The preparation for quantitative analysis stage involves the construction of a fault tree for 
every mission phase which represents the causes of the system failure for each possible 
system design during that phase. The process is performed employing the routine 
Phase_Fault_Tree_Construction. It is organised using a loop where one phase fault tree is 
modified at a time using a corresponding subset of FTMPs. 
A computational method to convert the failure logic represented by each fault tree to a BDD 
structure was implemented using a programme developed at Loughborough University by 
Remenyte-Prescott [74]. A routine Files_Bdd is used to provide the required data for this 
process. The conversion of the fault trees into BDDs completes the preparation stage for the 
optimisation process. 
7.3.5.3. Optimisation Algorithm 
The optimisation algorithm is implemented in the routine Genetic which was adapted from 
GSDOP. The optimisation of a phased mission design starts with the generation of an initial 
population of chromosomes providing values for utilised design variables. The information 
obtained is then passed to a new routine called Mission_Fault_Tree_Designs which is 
employed to assign the appropriate Boolean states of the house events in each phase BDD. In 
this routine the rules for assigning values to house events are implemented which ensures that 
the values of house events associated with the FTMP representing a particular design variable 
are the same throughout all mission BDDs where the FTMP has been implemented. 
With given component failure characteristics, BDDs incorporating all possible design 
alternatives (constructed for each mission phase) and values of house events specified, the 
mission failure probability for the generated designs can be evaluated. The programme code 
used for the quantification analysis has been developed previously at Loughborough 
University by Remenyte-Prescott and is based on the methodology introduced by Prescott et. 
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al. [89]. The executable file of the code has been incorporated in the algorithm source code as 
an independent process and as a result provides the mission failure probability and failure 
probability values for each phase. 
Two other new subroutines developed are associated with limitations imposed on the system 
design characteristics. The subroutine Mission_Resources_Values evaluates system cost, 
weight and volume (if these characteristics are considered) and returns the value 0 if at least 
one constraint is violated. Otherwise it returns the value 1. The subroutine 
Mission_Penalty_Adaptive replaces the subroutine Penalty_Adaptive previously used in the 
improved GSDOP (Chapter 6). However, the methodology for penalising fitness values of 
infeasible chromosomes remains the same. 
The rest of the subroutines and routines employed in the optimisation process are directly 
adopted from the GSDOP. Thus no changes have been made in the subroutines developed to 
perform the generation of new populations, crossover and mutation operators and scaling of 
chromosomes fitness values. 
7.4. UAV DESIGN OPTIMISATION USING THE PHASED MISSION 
DESIGN OPTIMISATION ALGORITHM 
7.4.1. Introduction to a Phased Mission of an UAV 
The algorithm developed for phased mission system design optimisation problems has been 
applied to optimise the design of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for a six-phase mission. 
For the problem analysed the emphasis is only given to the minimisation of the mission 
failure probability and design limitations are not considered. Thus, the UAV design 
optimisation problem is analysed as a single objective unconstrained optimisation problem. 
The purpose of the analysis is to validate the capability of the developed optimisation 
algorithm to solve a phased mission optimisation problem. 
The UAV is remotely controlled and can perform specific tasks for the duration of its defined 
mission. UAVs have been used in a variety of forms and for a variety of missions. They can 
be employed to perform military, civil or research missions. In military applications UAVs 
are commonly used for missions which would otherwise present a high risk as manned 
missions. Civil use of UAVs may include aerial photography and observation of traffic 
patterns. UAVs can also serve as upper atmospheric weather stations. 
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A generalised mission for a simplified architecture UAV is analysed. It consists of six phases 
occurring in the following order: take-off, climb, en-route in controlled airspace, en-route in 
uncontrolled airspace, descent and landing. The UAV mission is considered successful if the 
aircraft completes all phases successfully.  
The first phase of the mission, i.e. the take-off phase, is considered to be unsuccessful and 
mission failure occurs if the landing gear cannot be retracted or either the braking system, 
propulsion system or avionics system fails. If the take-off phase is aborted for any reason or 
communication errors occur these will also lead to phase failure. Note that a communication 
mistake can occur in any phase and cause mission failure, and so it appears in each phase fault 
tree. The detailed fault tree for the take-off phase is shown in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.6. Fault Tree for the Take-off Phase. 
Following take-off a UAV starts climbing to a particular altitude. During this phase failure in 
the propulsion or the avionics systems will cause mission failure. Other causes of failure for 
the phase include flight surface failures or the occurrence of a severe storm. The phase fault 
tree is presented in Figure 7.7. Failure logic for both fuel systems identified with transfer 
symbols 1 and 2 are developed further in Figure 7.10. 
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Figure 7.7. Fault Tree for Climb Phase 
When the required altitude is reached the en-route phase starts. The phase is divided into two 
phases. At first a UAV flies through controlled airspace after which uncontrolled airspace 
follows. When the UAV enters controlled airspace the navigation system together with the 
propulsion and avionics systems are in use. Failure in any of these systems as well as storm 
occurrence or an air collision will result in mission failure. The same cause of failure appear 
when the UAV flies through uncontrolled air space. However, when the UAV is in controlled 
airspace an air collision with another aircraft may occur due to an air traffic control failure. 
The sense and avoidance system has to fail for an air collision to occur if the UAV is in 
uncontrolled airspace. As an example, a fault tree of the en-route phase in uncontrolled 
airspace is shown in Figure 7.8. The fault tree for the en-route phase in control airspace is 
similar where the basic event avoid is replaced with a basic event atc which identifies failure 
of air traffic control. Fault trees for failures of fuel systems are presented in Figure 7.10. 
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Figure 7.8. Fault Tree for the En-route Phase 
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The descent phase follows the en-route phases. During this phase a UAV changes altitude 
before starting to land. UAV failure causes in this case are identical to the ones that appear 
when the vehicle is changing its altitude after the take-off phase. Therefore the fault tree for 
the descent phase is identical to the fault tree of the climb phase shown in Figure 7.7. 
The last phase of the UAV mission is the landing phase. As shown in the phase fault tree in 
Figure 7.9 the braking system, propulsion system and avionics system are in use during this 
phase. Failure of any of these systems causes the mission failure. The phase and at the same 
time the whole mission can also fail if the landing gear cannot be extended or the flight 
surfaces fail. If the mission has to be finished in a certain time then abortion of the landing 
phase for any reason will also result in phase failure. 
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Figure 7.9. Fault Tree for the Landing Phase 
The fuel systems are one of several UAV subsystems which operate throughout the mission. 
Failure of any of them can cause mission failure during any phase. Failure causes for both 
fuel systems are shown in Figure 7.10. 
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Figure 7.10. Fault Trees of Fuel Subsystems 
7.4.2. UAV Design Alternatives 
The objective of the introduced UAV design optimisation problem is to minimise the overall 
UAV mission failure probability by altering the initial vehicle design and constructing an 
optimal design case. All structural design variables and their parameter values considered for 
the optimisation problem are presented in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1. Design variables 
Associated 
System 
Component 
Description of Design Alteration 
Possible Values of 
Parameters of 
Design Variables 
Landing gear Type of a landing gear type1, type 2 
Antiskid valve Type of an antiskid valve type1, type 2, type 3 
Number of brake sets 3, 2, 1 
Type of a brake set type1, type 2 
Brakes 
Minimal number of failed brakes that 
cause failure to brake 3, 2, 1 
Number navigation subsystems 2, 1 
Type of a navigation subsystem type1, type 2 
Navigation 
system 
 Minimal number of failed navigation 
subsystems causing navigation failure 2, 1 
Number of sense and avoidance 
subsystems 2, 1 Sense and 
avoidance system  Type of a sense and avoidance 
subsystem type1, type 2 
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Basic event failure probability data used to perform quantitative analysis of system failure is 
presented in Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 in Appendix 3. Table A.3.1 provides failure probability 
values of system components that are in the initial system design together with the probability 
values of occurrence of the external factors leading to system failure. The failure data for new 
components which appear in the potential design cases is provided in Table A.3.2. It is 
assumed that failure characteristics of each component do not change through each phase, i.e. 
their failure probability values in each phase are the same. 
As it is known, the programme constructs a chromosome structure corresponding to the 
problem analysed by utilising values of the parameters of FTMPs. Figure 7.11 presents the 
binary form of the chromosome structure. Here the first two bits refer to the first design 
variable, i.e. the type of the landing gear. The second two bits are used to represent the type of 
an antiskid valve. The third group of genes are used for the parameters of the design variable 
referring to the brake sets while the fourth group is used to code parameters of the design 
variable associated with the navigation system. The last two couples of two bits are used to 
define the number and type of a sense and avoidance system(s). 
 
 
Figure 7.11. Structure of Chromosome 
 
7.4.3. Analysis of Optimisation Results 
Two aspects have been considered throughout the analysis of the application of PMSDOP. 
One of them is the ability of the algorithm to find the optimal (near-optimal) solution. For this 
purpose the global minimum fitness value has been identified employing the exhaustive 
search method and evaluating all possible design alternatives. The smallest UAV mission 
failure probability value that has been found is equal to 0.111118 while the initial design 
UAV failure probability is 0.135871. The combination of values of design variables 
corresponding to the minimal mission failure probability is presented in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2. Values of design variables for the optimal UAV design 
Changeable 
Component 
Description of Modifications / Design 
Variable 
Design Variable 
Value (New Design) 
Initial 
Design 
Landing gear Type of a landing gear type 2 Type 1 
Antiskid valve Type of an antiskid valve type 2 Type 1 
Number of brake sets 3 1 
Type of a brake set type 2 Type 1 Brakes Minimal number of failed brakes that 
cause failure to brake 3 1 
Number of navigation subsystems 2 1 
Type of a navigation subsystem type1 type1 Navigation 
system Minimal number of failed navigation 
subsystems causing navigation failure 2 1 
Number of avoidance subsystems 2 1 Sense and 
avoidance system Type of an sense and avoidance subsystem type1 type1 
Another aspect of the analysis considered is the sensitivity of the optimisation process to 
variations in the values of the GA parameters. The optimisation process was performed 
employing a set of different combinations of GA parameter values. Different values of 
population size, crossover rate and mutation rate were employed while the number of 
generations was initially chosen equal to 100. Three population sizes were analysed: 50, 30 
and 10 chromosomes. Mutation rates were chosen equal to 0.001, 0.005 and 0.01 and 
crossover rate values were equal to 0.75, 0.8 and 0.95. These values are based upon the earlier 
experiments from application examples of GSDOA. 
For each set of GA parameter values the best fitness value was the main quantity considered 
in each generation. Due to the stochastic nature of GAs the simulations were run five times 
for each combination of GA parameter values. Following this the averages were derived for 
the best fitness values at each generation. The standard deviation was also evaluated for each 
set of five best fitness values taken from the last generations. Finally, an average number of 
generations needed for the global minimal fitness value to be found was derived for each set 
of five runs. All results are provided in Appendix 3. 
In total one hundred and thirty five runs were carried out to investigate all GA parameters. 
The main findings are summarised in this section. When the size of chromosome populations 
was small, i.e. equal to 10, the results showed that the trade-off between the rate at which new 
strings are introduced and the rate of diversity created in the population needs to be found in 
order to increase the convergence rate of the algorithm. For instance, if the crossover rate is 
high then fewer generations are required to approach a near minimal solution when smaller 
mutation rate values are used. Conversely, using the low crossover rate and higher mutation 
rates a near optimal solution is found with less generations. The results are presented in 
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Figures A.3.1-A.3.2 in Appendix 3. The lowest fitness value after performing 100 generations 
was obtained using the mutation rate equal to 0.01 for all crossover rate values. The global 
minimum solution was obtained in at least one out of the five runs for all combinations of GA 
parameters. The average number of generations required to be performed in order to find the 
global minimum for each combination of parameters is presented in Table 7.3. Results show 
that on average the smallest number of generations was performed when the mutation rate 
was equal to 0.05 for any value of crossover rate. 
Table 7.3. Number of Generations Performed to Find the Minimal Fitness Value 
Crossover Rate 0.75 0.8 0.95 
Mutation Rate 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.005 0.01 
Number of Generations 81 71 74 82 56 58 88 25 54 
Means of best fitness values when 30 chromosome populations were used are presented in 
Figures A.3.5-A.3.7 in Appendix 3. In this case the fitness values approached a near optimal 
and/or optimal value in less than 20 generations for all combinations of crossover and 
mutation rates. During all five runs the global minimum was found by employing mutation 
rates 0.005 and 0.01 in combination with every crossover rate value introduced. Average 
numbers of generations performed to find the optimal solution (Table 7.4) tended to decrease 
with the increasing mutation and crossover rates. They are also smaller than the ones obtained 
when using 10 chromosome populations. 
Table 7.4. Number of Generations Performed to Find the Minimal Fitness Value 
Crossover Rate 0.75 0.8 0.95 
Mutation Rate 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.005 0.01 
Number of Generations 45 27 20 35 27 19 17 23 36 
For populations of 50 chromosomes differences between convergence rates are small and less 
significant for different combinations of crossover and mutation rates than the ones obtained 
when using populations of a smaller size as shown in Figures A.3.9-A.3.11 in Appendix 3. 
After increasing the population size, the global minimum fitness values were found in 100 
generations for all five runs using each combination of the mutation and crossover rates. It 
was noticed that the algorithm requires more generations to be performed in order to find the 
optimal solution if the mutation rate is increased as shown in Table 7.5. It suggests that the 
high mutation rate tends to convert the GA into a random search procedure when the 
population size is large. 
 
Chapter 7. Multi-phased Mission System Design Optimisation 167 
Table 7.5. Number of Generations Performed to Find the Minimal Fitness Value 
Crossover Rate 0.75 0.8 0.95 
Mutation Rate 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.005 0.01 
Number of Generations 23 33 23 17 23 25 17 30 33 
 
7.4.4. Summary of the Analysis 
The analysis carried out to identify GA parameter values that result in good algorithm 
performance revealed three sets of parameter values. The first set of parameters includes the 
population size of 30 chromosomes, the crossover rate equal to 0.95 and the mutation rate 
equal to 0.001. The second and the third sets have the mutation rate of 0.001, population size 
50 and crossover rates 0.8 and 0.95 respectively. In this case the quality of optimisation 
algorithm in terms of performance has been interpreted according to the smallest number of 
generations required to find the global minimum and the smallest standard deviation of the 
best fitness values after 100 generations from five runs. 
The computations were carried out on a Dual Core 1.60 GHz processor with 1.00GB of RAM 
on a 32-bit operating system. The average CPU time to evaluate an objective function value 
was equal to 0.143 seconds and the average time to generate a single population was equal to 
6.43 seconds. For this analysis the mutation rate equal to 0.01 was used along with the 
population size of 50 chromosome and the crossover rate equal to 0.95. 
The application example of the UAV design optimisation problem has shown the capability of 
the developed algorithm to solve a design optimisation problem of an unconstrained 
multi-phased mission system. During the optimisation process the global optimum of the 
problem has been found. It is the set of values of structural design variables corresponding to 
the minimum mission failure probability selected from the introduced design alternatives. The 
analysis results also suggest that combinations of a large population size and a high crossover 
rate tend to reduce the number of generations required to be performed in order to find the 
optimal solution. Furthermore, the optimisation process is more sensitive to the size of 
population rather than the values of GA operators. 
7.5. MILITARY VESSEL DESIGN OPTIMISATION USING PMSDOP 
(CASE 1) 
The military vessel performing a mission “Harbour/ Sea Training” is the second example of 
the application of PMSDOP. The military vessel design optimisation problem has been 
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chosen to demonstrate the capability of the developed algorithm to solve larger scale and 
more complex problems. The objective of the optimisation is to choose a vessel design that 
would successfully complete a specified mission with minimal failure probability and optimal 
usage of available resources. Therefore given limitations to vessel cost and weight have been 
considered throughout the optimisation process. More complexity to the analysed problem has 
been added by considering that the failure probability values of vessel components are not the 
same in each phase.  
7.5.1. Initial Military Vessel Design 
The simplified vessel structure comprises of six independent systems: propulsion & power 
system, electrical distribution system, cooling water system, hydraulic system, hydroplanes & 
steering system and rudder control system. In this example the systems are analysed as non 
repairable systems. The first propulsion & power system comprises two major subsystems: 
propulsion power provision and primary propulsion. The fault trees for the subsystems are 
shown in Figures 7.12 and 7.13 respectively. Failure of either subsystem causes power 
disruption in the vessel. All failure causes, i.e. basic events of the fault trees for the propulsion 
& power system are listed in Table A.3.6 in Appendix 3 together with their failure probability 
values. 
 
Figure 7.12. Propulsion Power Provision Fault Tree 
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Figure 7.13. Primary Propulsion Fault Tree 
The electrical supply system includes alternating current generation, alternating current 
supply, direct current generation and direct current supply subsystems. Alternating current 
subsystems are constructed of two redundant units. For example, alternating current can be 
supplied by two redundant switch boards and the alternating current generation subsystem has 
two redundant turbine generator units. Both the direct current generation and direct current 
supply subsystems are constructed to have single units, i.e. no component redundancies are 
implemented in the subsystems. The fault tree of the system is presented in Figures 7.14 and 
7.15. Table A.3.7 (Appendix 3) provides the list of basic events in the fault trees and their 
failure probability value. 
 
Figure 7.14. Electrical Supply System Fault Tree 
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Figure 7.15. Fault Tree for Turbine Generators 
The fresh water cooling system has two redundant paths. Each path includes an inlet and an 
outlet hull valves, two flexible coupling units, a sea water service unit, a pump and a heat 
exchanger. Therefore the system fails if failures in both paths appear. A fault tree in Figure 
7.16 shows all possible system failure causes. Failure data of system components is provided 
in Table A.3.8 in Appendix 3. 
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Figure 7.16. Fresh Water Cooling System Fault Tree 
The hydraulics system comprises of the following subsystems: external hydraulics, aft 
hydraulics and main hydraulics subsystem. Failure modes of the external and main hydraulics 
subsystems are identical. The subsystems fail if either plant or hydraulics unit fails. Aft 
hydraulics subsystem has two different redundant plants. One of them uses alternating current 
and the other uses direct current. Causes of failure for the hydraulics subsystems are shown in 
the fault tree in Figure 7.17. System component failure data is presented in Table A.3.9 in 
Appendix 3. 
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Figure 7.17. Hydraulics System Fault Tree 
The hydroplanes control system comprises of aft hydroplane and forward hydroplane control 
units. Each subsystem has an individual control surface, a ram servo unit and an order 
transmission box. Hydraulic tilting and air tilting cylinders together with emergency air 
control are additionally installed in the aft hydroplane control subsystem. The forward 
hydroplane subsystem also has a tilting cylinder. The fault tree for the hydroplanes control 
system is given in Figure 7.18 and component failure data is provided in Table A.3.10 in 
Appendix 3. 
 
 
Figure 7.18. Hydroplanes Control System Fault Tree 
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Finally, the rudder control system failure may be caused by failure of control surfaces, rudder 
ram failure, ram servo unit failure or rate control failure. Table A.3.11 in Appendix 3 provides 
the system components failure data. 
The analysed mission of the military vessel is divided into phases according to tasks needed 
to be completed. The mission comprises four phases carried out in the following order: 
harbour shore support, transit shallow water, receive broadcast and again harbour shore 
support. During the mission the number of earlier described systems being in use varies. For 
example, during the Harbour phase the vessel does not perform any task and therefore the 
electrical supply system alone is required to operate. Therefore the phase fault tree 
corresponds to the electrical supply system fault tree which was presented in Figures 7.14 and 
7.15. When the vessel transits to deep waters or in order to perform the task of the Broadcast 
phase all six systems are in operation. Failure of the mission during those phases will occur if 
any of these systems fail. Therefore the fault trees for the latter phases comprise the fault trees 
given for the different ship systems as shown in Figure 7.19. 
 
 
Figure 7.19. Transit Shallow Water Phase Fault Tree 
 
7.5.2. Military Vessel Design Alternatives 
Six components have been chosen to be replaced if necessary in order to develop new design 
alternatives which would reduce the failure probability of the mission. As in the previous 
optimisation examples, the possible modifications to the vessel systems designs are 
characterised with the list of structural design variables. The list is provided in Table 7.6. 
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Table 7.6. Design Variables and their Values 
Component Design Variable Description Design Variable Value 
Number of CW Pumps 3, 2, 1 
Number of CW Pumps Required to trip 3, 2, 1 Circulating Water (CW) Pump  
Type of a CW pump Type 1, Type 2 
Number of Feed Pumps 4, 3, 2, 1 
Number of Feed Pumps required to 
Trip 4, 3, 2, 1 Feed Pump 
Type of a Feed Pump Type1, Type 2 
Number of Ahead Valves 3, 2, 1 Ahead Valve Type of an Ahead Valve Type 2, Type 1 
Number of MG VFRs 2, 1 Motor Generator  (MG) Voltage 
and Frequency Regulator (VFR) Type of a MG VFR Type 1, Type 2 
External Hydraulic Plant Type of an External Hydraulic Plant Type 1, Type 2 
Main Hydraulic Plant Type of a Main Hydraulic Plant Type 1, Type 2 
Owing to the potential introduction of new components and their arrangements new basic 
events are incorporated in the fault trees of the mission phases. As a reminder, if design 
alterations result in incorporation of components that differ from those originally used their 
corresponding basic events have also different failure probability values. In the case analysed 
there are six such components. The list of basic event failure probability values corresponding 
to the new components is provided in Table A.3.12 in Appendix 3. 
Development of potential vessel design alternatives involves the considerations of two design 
characteristics, such as cost and weight of the military vessel. A new design is required not to 
exceed the initial design cost and weight which are 400 units and 21000 units respectively. 
Cost and weight values for the individual vessel components are estimated. Units of 
measurements are non-dimensional for both component characteristics. The cost and weight 
of each component are provided in Table A.3.13 in Appendix 3. 
As there are 12 design variables specified for the military vessel design optimisation problem, 
the chromosome structure created for the optimisation process comprises 12 genes. The first 
three genes are used for design variables associated with the CW pump. The second group of 
three genes relates to the feed pump. The third group of genes is employed to code the 
number and type of ahead valves in the vessel. The next two genes refer to the VFR of the 
motor generator. Finally the last two genes are used to identify the types of external and main 
hydraulic plants respectively. The complete structure of the chromosome is presented in 
Figure 7.20. 
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Figure 7.20. Structure of Chromosome 
7.5.3. Analysis of Optimisation Results 
Solving the military vessel design optimisation problem the same aspects of the algorithm 
performance have been considered as the ones in the UAV optimisation case. These are the 
ability of the algorithm to find the global optimal solution and the influence of different 
values of GA parameters to the optimisation process. Thus first the minimum failure 
probability value and the corresponding optimal set of values of design variables have been 
found by performing an exhaustive search. The smallest vessel mission failure probability 
value was equal to 0.0945415 considering the limitations set on the overall vessel cost and 
weight. The failure probability of the initial design vessel is 0.1231664. The list of the values 
of design variables corresponding to the optimal design is presented in Table 7.7. The cost of 
the optimal design vessel is 399.9 units and its weight is equal to 20376 units.  
Table 7.7. Design Variables and their Values 
Component Design Variable Description 
Design 
Variable 
Value for the 
Optimal 
Design 
Design 
Variable 
Value for 
the Initial 
Design 
Number of CW Pumps 2 1 
Number of CW Pumps Required to 
Operate 1 1 CW Pump  
Type of a CW pump Type 2 Type 1 
Number of Feed Pumps 2 1 
Number of Feed Pumps required to 
Operate 1 1 Feed Pump 
Type of a Feed Pump Type1 Type1 
Number of Ahead Valves 3 1 Ahead Valve Type of an Ahead Valve Type 2 Type 1 
Number of MG VFRs 2 1 MG VFR 
 Type of a MG VFR Type 1 Type 1 
External Hydraulic Plant Type of an External Hydraulic Plant Type 2 Type 1 
Main Hydraulic Plant Type of a Main Hydraulic Plant Type 1 Type 1 
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The same scheme to analyse the performance of the algorithm is used as the one for UAV 
problem. The algorithm efficiency is studied for the sets of GA parameters where population 
size is equal to 50, 30 or 10 chromosomes, mutation rate is equal to 0.001, 0.005 or 0.01 and 
crossover rate value is equal to 0.75, 0.8 or 0.95. As done previously, simulations are run five 
times for each combination of GA parameter values and the best feasible chromosome fitness 
value yet found is stored at each generation. The means of the best feasible fitness values over 
five runs for each generation are used to compare algorithm performance. The standard 
deviation and the best mean feasible chromosome fitness value obtained in 100 generations 
for each set of five best fitness values are also evaluated. All detailed results can be found in 
Appendix 3. 
The means of best feasible chromosome fitness values yet found at each generation for every 
combination of crossover and mutation rates when population size is set to 10 chromosomes 
are shown in Figures A.3.12-A.3.14 in Appendix 3. The mean values are noticeably bigger for 
the combination of both small mutation and crossover rates. It means that the results tend to 
converge to a local minimum when the diversity of a population is small. Increasing the 
crossover rate eliminates the problem of population diversity when using a small mutation 
rate. Utilising populations of 10 chromosomes the GA with both higher mutation and 
crossover rates has produced design options with on average smaller failure probabilities. The 
results are given in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8. Mean Values of the Lowest Failure Probability after 100 Generations 
Mutation  
Rate 
 
Crossover 
 rate 
0.001 0.005 0.01 
0.75 0.098335 0.094922 0.094934 
0.8 0.095628 0.095027 0.095212 
0.95 0.095406 0.095189 0.094765 
When the population size has been increased up to 30 chromosomes the optimisation results 
obtained using different mutation rates for the same crossover rate have assimilated. The 
biggest improvement in optimisation results appear on average in 25 generations. From the 
results in Table 7.9 it can be seen that when using different mutation rates the minimum mean 
failure probabilities are less diverse in their values when the crossover rate is 0.75 than using 
the crossover rate equal to 0.95. The tendency also appears for the minimum mean values to 
decrease when at least one value of the genetic operator increases. The global minimum was 
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found at least in one run out of five for every mutation rate when the crossover rate was equal 
to 0.8 and using mutation rates of 0.001 and 0.01 when the crossover rate was 0.95. 
 
Table 7.9. Mean Values of the Lowest Failure Probability after 100 Generations 
Mutation  
Rate 
 
Crossover 
 rate 
0.001 0.005 0.01 
0.75 0.094736 0.094778 0.094695 
0.8 0.094768 0.094668 0.094728 
0.95 0.094676 0.094828 0.094562 
When the population size is increased up to 50 chromosomes the biggest improvements in 
optimisation results appear on average in 20 generations. Therefore when increasing the 
population size the chances to find an optimal solution in fewer generations are also 
increased. In this case the mean fitness values obtained are smaller for combinations of a 
mutation rate of 0.01 with every crossover rate as seen in Table 7.10. Standard deviations of 
the minimum values of five runs were also the smallest when combinations of GA parameters 
included a mutation rate equal to 0.01. These results are presented in Figure A.3.23 in 
Appendix 3. The global minimum was found at least once for every combination of crossover 
and mutation rates when using a population of 50 chromosomes.  
 
Table 7.10. Mean Values of the Lowest Failure Probability after 100 Generations 
Mutation  
Rate 
 
Crossover 
 rate 
0.001 0.005 0.01 
0.75 0.094755 0.09461 0.094588 
0.8 0.094736 0.094732 0.094571 
0.95 0.094632 0.094591 0.094571 
 
7.5.4. Summary of the Analysis 
Since GA parameters as the factors influencing the performance of the algorithm tend to be 
less problem-dependent there is scope to find sets of their values aimed at improving the 
performance of the GA in more general applications. The performed analysis has shown that 
on average the best performance of the algorithm is achieved when using a population of 50 
chromosomes, crossover rate equal to 0.95 and mutation rate equal to 0.01. In this case the 
global optimum solution was identified. It was also noticed that in solving the larger-scale 
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constrained problem, better optimisation results were obtained using the higher mutation rate 
(0.01) rather then using the lower one as used when solving the UAV optimisation problem. It 
suggests that a large population size and high crossover and mutation rates are promising in 
achieving good performance of the algorithm for larger constrained optimisation problems. 
For the analysis of the timescales of the optimisation process the population of 50 
chromosomes with the mutation rate equal to 0.01 and the crossover rate equal 0.95 were 
used. As previously the computations were carried out on a Dual Core 1.60 GHz processor 
with 1.00GB of RAM on a 32-bit operating system. The average CPU time to evaluate the 
military vessel mission failure probability value was equal to 0.164 second and the average 
time to generate a single population was equal to 9.454 seconds. 
The military vessel design optimisation example indicates the ability of the algorithm to solve 
a large scale and complex optimisation problem for a phased mission system. Moreover it 
provides evidence that the algorithm is not a system-specific optimisation tool and has the 
potential to analyse a range of optimisation problems for different phased mission systems. 
The developed approach combining FTA and the GA is a novel optimisation tool. Its novelty 
pertains to its application to solve design optimisation problems of phased mission systems 
and the potential to analyse a range of different optimisation problems. Systems having 
components with changing failure probabilities across phases and constraints defined for 
systems overall cost, weight and/or volume can be analysed.  
7.6. SYSTEM DESIGN LIMITATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL PHASES 
At the initial development stage of PMSDOA the optimisation objective was to minimise the 
overall mission failure probability subject to the overall system cost and/or weight and/or its 
volume. In some cases a number of system parts can be inactive during some phases and they 
are not considered when performing both qualitative and quantitative phase failure analysis. 
Only active subsystems are analysed. It follows that it would be beneficial to introduce design 
constraints only for active subsystems in every phase. 
Introduction of constraints for each phase individually enables the impact of design alterations 
to both subsystems in use and the overall system to be analysed. Defined constraint limits and 
design requirements set for different phases control the choice of design alterations for 
specific subsystems and therefore a more precise analysis of the overall system design 
characteristics can be performed. The capability to analyse either a single subsystem or a 
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group of subsystems depends on the system being analysed. For example, if analysing the 
earlier introduced military vessel mission, it is possible to define design requirements for only 
one specific subsystem, as the electrical distribution subsystem is active during the first and 
the last phases. 
The developed PMSDOA has been enhanced with the possibility to use additional constraints 
set at each phase of the mission. Two groups of constraints were introduced. The first group 
refers to system characteristics such as cost, weight and volume. The characteristics evaluated 
for a particular phase refer only to the subsystems active in that phase. In order to quantify the 
corresponding properties, characteristics of components in each subsystem are added up. For 
example, consider system cost in phase j. System cost, i.e. cost of subsystems which are 
active, is evaluated as follows:  
∑
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   (7.19) 
Here jincm  is the total number of different components subject to failure included in 
subsystems which are in use in phase j, costk is the cost for a component k which has an 
associated basic event in the phase fault tree. The subsystems analysed represent a system 
with a particular design i.  
If any costs referring to the phase cannot be associated with any of the basic events then these 
costs are included as an additional fixed cost in the total phase cost: 
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If a design of any active subsystem during the phase analysed is changed then the phase cost 
will also change. Such a methodology allows the cost of certain subsystems to be separated 
from the overall system cost and analysed individually. For example, consider again a harbour 
phase of the military vessel where only an electrical distribution subsystem is active. In this 
case the phase cost is equal to the cost of the subsystem. Thus alterations to vessel design can 
be identified which do not overcome the predefined cost limits of the electrical subsystem. 
The system weight and volume for a particular phase can be estimated using the same 
formulas with corresponding component characteristics. 
Chapter 7. Multi-phased Mission System Design Optimisation 179 
Since the optimal usage of available resources is considered both minimum and maximum 
constraints are introduced for the design characteristics for each phase. The constraints for 
resources can be defined as follows: 
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where j identifies a phase number, min means a defined required minimal limit of a system 
attribute, accordingly max is a maximum defined limit and mission identifies the system 
attribute for a particular design when performing a task in phase j.  
In some cases design alterations can result in the reduction of system failure probability 
during certain phases but at the same time they can increase the system failure probability for 
the other phases. The second group of constraints are placed on phase failure probability 
values for different phases. The following set of equations (7.22) is used: 
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Here Qi(Xi) identifies the mission failure probability in phase i, Qi(Xi)max is the maximum 
allowed system failure probability value in phase i and m defines the number of phases in the 
analysed mission. The number m varies for different systems. Implementing these constraints 
allows component combinations to be identified that minimise the failure probability of the 
whole mission without exceeding limits set for system failure probability values during each 
phase. It also ensures that the improvement achieved for the whole mission is not a result of a 
significant improvement in one phase and significant decline of reliability in another. 
The amendments introduced to the algorithm extend its possibilities of applications. Problems 
analysed can be specified more accurately resulting in more precise optimisation results. 
The improved PMSDOA was applied to solve both the UAV and military vessel design 
optimisation problems. In the application examples constraints for failure probabilities and/or 
design characteristics for each phase were introduced. The application examples of PMSDOP 
to solve the UAV design optimisation problems were published in the proceedings of ISSC 
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conference [90] and International Journal of Performability Engineering [91]. The application 
examples of the improved PMSDOA to solve the military vessel design problems were 
published in the proceedings of the conference ESREL-2008 [92] and the International 
Journal of Reliability and Safety [93]. The military vessel design optimisation problem with 
constraints defined for the electrical distribution system and the overall vessel is discussed in 
detail in the following section (Section 7.7). 
7.7.  MILITARY VESSEL DESIGN OPTIMISATION PROBLEM WITH 
CONSTRAINTS ADDED AT EACH PHASE (CASE 2) 
In this section the application of the improved PMSDOP to solve the earlier analysed military 
vessel design optimisation problem (Section 7.5) is discussed. The problem has been extended 
and constraints for system cost and weight of active subsystems for each phase together with 
system failure probabilities during every phase have been introduced. The aim of the 
application is to analyse the capability of the algorithm to solve a larger scale and more 
complex optimisation problem with an increased number of constraints. 
Owing to the fact that only the electrical subsystem is active during the harbour phase its own 
design characteristics can be analysed together with the overall ship characteristics. The limits 
introduced for to system failure probabilities for each phase allows the overall system failure 
probability to be minimised and at the same time a failure probability of the electrical 
distribution to be maintained below the predefined limit. Similarly the introduced cost and 
weight constraints at each phase are the limits for cost and weight of the electrical distribution 
system and the whole vessel. Thus in the application example three sets of constraints are 
considered: 
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Here j is phase number and j = {1, 2, 3, 4}; j designnewQ _ denotes the failure probability of a 
new design vessel during phase j while jQmax  is a predefined limit of a probability that the 
vessel fails during the same phase. The remaining variables identify the cost and weight for a 
new design and the predefined limits in the corresponding phases. 
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All limits for constraints were evaluated. Probabilities of mission failure in each phase of the 
initial military vessel design were employed as guidance limits of the failure probability 
constraints used for the optimisation problem. Limits for cost and weight constraints were 
also estimated according to the initial design vessel cost and weight in each phase. The limits 
introduced are listed in Table 7.11. 
Table 7.11. Limits of Constraints 
Phase Failure Probability Cost Weight 
Harbour  0.0058 120 1300 
Transit 0.055 400 21000 
Broadcast 0.058 400 21000 
Harbour 0.0053 120 1300 
In order to analyse the influence of different GA parameter values on the performance of the 
algorithm the same values of crossover and mutation rates were used as the ones in the 
previous application examples. However the previous examples of applications of both 
GSDOA and PMSDOA have revealed that populations of 10 chromosomes produce the worst 
results. Furthermore owing to the fact that this is a more complicated problem a larger 
population size has been introduced and populations of 30 and 70 chromosomes were utilised. 
The termination condition, i.e. the number of generations performed, has also been changed 
and reduced to 75 generations. This allows the reduction of the time required to find an 
optimal solution. However it still needs to be investigated to ensure that by performing just 75 
generations a global minimum can be found. 
As in the previous cases five simulations were run for each combination of different values of 
GA parameters. The average and best fitness values were the two main quantities considered 
in each generation. These derived values were then used for further analysis. In addition, the 
average number of generations, needed to be performed in order to find the global minimal 
fitness value, was also derived for different combinations of crossover and mutation rates. 
An exhaustive search has also been performed for this problem. The global feasible minimum 
value of mission failure probability was the same as that for the first ship optimisation 
problem, i.e. 0.094542. The list of the values of design variables defining the optimal ship 
design is presented in Table 7.7. However, if the cost limits for the second and third phases 
were just a few units higher, for example 402 units, the set of design variable values 
representing the optimal system design would have been different from that for the first ship 
optimisation problem. 
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7.7.1. Analysis of Optimisation Results 
The average fitness values for each generation obtained when using sets of different GA 
parameter values are presented in Figures A.3.24-A.3.27 in Appendix 3. They show the best 
feasible fitness values for each generation for the same sets of algorithm parameters.  
To summarise, the average fitness values are larger when populations of 70 chromosomes are 
used. A higher mutation rate also increases the average fitness values for all three crossover 
rate cases. On the other hand both the size of a population and mutation rate have contrasting 
effects on the best fitness values. The best fitness values converge to a minimum value faster 
when a population of 70 chromosomes is used. It is also obvious that a higher mutation rate 
influences the results in the same way if the low crossover rate is used. However it cannot be 
stated that by using higher mutation rates fewer generations are performed before the 
minimum fitness values has been found when using crossover rates equal to 0.8 and 0.95. The 
average numbers of generations required to obtain the optimal fitness values are presented in 
Table 7.12. It can be seen that the algorithm finds the optimal solutions in fewer generations if 
the crossover rate is increased in combination with a large population size and high mutation 
rate. 
Table 7.12. Number of Generations Performed to find the Minimal Fitness Value 
 Population Size =70 Population Size = 30 
Mutation  
Rate 
Crossover 
Rate 
0.001 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.005 0.01 
0.75 75 75 67 75 75 75 
0.8 38 75 32 75 75 75 
0.95 38 71 32 75 75 75 
 
7.7.2. Summary of the Analysis 
The military vessel design with the lowest failure probability which satisfies constraints 
defined for the electrical distribution system and the overall vessel has been identified using 
few sets of different values of GA parameters. The best performance of the algorithm has 
been achieved using a population of 70 chromosomes, mutation rate equal 0.01 in 
combination with two crossover rate values: 0.8 and 0.95. The observation was made after 
taking into account the number of generations required to be performed before the optimal 
solution had been found. 
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The successful application example demonstrates the potential of the algorithm to solve large 
scale and strongly constrained phased mission system design optimisation problems. When 
analysing the influence of GA parameters on the performance of the algorithm it was noticed 
that the same rules can be applied for choosing crossover and mutation rate values for both 
the highly constrained and the less constraint optimisation problems. The algorithm performs 
better if both the mutation and crossover rates are high. Moreover by increasing the number of 
constraints considered, the population sizes should also be increased in order to find an 
optimal or a near-optimal solution when it is envisaged that a relatively small number of 
generations will be performed. 
7.8. SUMMARY 
The research detailed in this chapter has focused on the development of a basic methodology 
to solve multi-phased mission system design optimisation problems which has not been 
systematically treated in the literature. The following goals have been achieved: 
• The methodology implemented to solve safety system design optimisation problems 
has been successfully adapted to multi-phased mission system design optimisation 
problems.  
• The programme code, PMSDOP, for the new PMSDOA has been developed to 
automate the design optimisation problem for a chosen phased mission system. 
• The PMSDOA and PMSDOP maintain the essential property of the original approach, 
i.e. potential application to a broad range of multi-phased mission systems. 
• The new PMSDOA has been applied to solve different optimisation problems catering 
for:  
1) the overall mission failure minimisation considering mission constraint 
limitations; 
2) the overall mission failure minimisation considering phase failure and explicit 
phase constraints limitations. 
 
Three application examples of the developed PMSDOA have been analysed. The solved UAV 
design optimisation problem was relatively simple. No constraints were considered in the 
analysis. The first military vessel design optimisation problem was more complex and larger 
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scale than the UAV problem and had limitations introduced for the overall vessel cost and 
weight. In the second vessel design problem restrictions were introduced on the cost and 
weight of active subsystems and mission failure probability during each mission phase. 
The optimal designs were found corresponding to the global minimum failure probabilities of 
the missions for all three cases. As expected the optimisation process converged much slower 
and more generations were required to find the global minimum value when larger scale and 
more complex problems were solved, i.e. ship optimisation problems. 
A study of the influence of different GA parameter values on the optimisation process was 
also carried out. Results showed that the algorithm performed better when larger population 
sizes and both higher crossover and mutation rates were used. It was also noticed that the 
algorithm performance is more sensitive to population size than the chosen variations of 
crossover and mutation rates.  
Consideration is needed for the computational intensity and processing time of the PMSDOP. 
Differences in computational intensity and processing time between the two problems were 
evident. It took on average 220 seconds to run 100 generations using 50 chromosomes 
populations for the UAV problem. While solving the military vessel design optimisation 
problem the average run time was 560 seconds using the same values of GA parameters. In 
addition, it requires more generations to be performed in order to find a global solution. In 
solving the current problems the run time is not an issue as the analysis does not need to be 
performed in real-time. However, improvements made to the quantitative system analysis 
methodology as well as advancements of the implemented GA could significantly reduce the 
processing time and improve the efficiency of the programme. This could improve the 
potential of the algorithm to solve real time and more complex mission design optimisation 
problems. 
  
8. DESIGN OPTIMISATION OF MULTI-
PHASED MISSION SYSTEM CONSIDERING 
MULTIPLE MISSIONS  
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
Most real world systems are designed to perform a number of missions. When improving a 
phased mission system design it is desirable that it would also improve the likelihood of 
success of its different missions. In some cases a system design that guarantees a low failure 
probability for one mission may have no influence on system performance in another mission 
or may increase its failure probability in the worst case. Thus, optimisation of phased mission 
system design should involve an analysis of all the missions the system is designed for or at 
least those deemed the most critical. 
A problem of optimisation of a system design involving a number of missions can be 
analysed as a multi objective optimisation problem. In this case the failure probabilities of 
each mission being minimised are the objectives of the problem. A system design that 
provides a trade-off across the minimal failure probabilities for each mission is the solution of 
the problem. A number of constraints can also be included in the problem being solved.  
Building upon the developed single objective PMSDOA, a multi objective optimisation 
technique has been developed. The new algorithm has been named as the multiple phased 
missions system design optimisation algorithm (MPMSDOA). 
In this chapter a brief introduction is given about multi-objective optimisation (Section 8.2). 
Evolutionary algorithms used for multi-objective optimisation and the detailed explanation of 
the adapted multi-objective genetic algorithm follow in Section 8.3. In Section 8.4 the 
methodology developed to solve multi objective phased mission design optimisation problems 
is introduced. The last section (Section 8.5) of the chapter addresses the application example 
of the developed approach and discusses the optimisation results obtained. 
8.2. MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMISATION 
A multi-objective optimisation problem has more than one objective which are to be 
minimised or maximised. Without loss of generality (a component to be maximised can be 
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converted into a minimisation objective by multiplying by negative one), consider the 
problem of simultaneously minimising the k components kif i ,...,1, = , of a vector function f: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )xxx kfff ,...,1= .  (8.1) 
Here ( )nxx ...,,1=x  is an n-dimensional decision variable vector in the decision variable space 
X [94]. The decision variable space is generally restricted by a number of constraints. Thus 
the multi-objective optimisation problem can be stated as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )xxx kfff ,...,minmin 1=   (8.2) 
subject to the following constraints: 
( )
( ) .,...,1,0
;,...,1,0
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  (8.3) 
The solution to the problem is a vector ( )nxx *,...,** 1=x  which minimises a given set of 
objective functions. 
Single-objective optimisation algorithms have one objective to be optimised and so they 
provide one unique solution for it. A general multi-objective optimisation problem presents a 
set of solutions and each of them represents a trade-off in the objective space. For example, 
consider a situation when system reliability needs to be improved at as low a cost as possible. 
One way to improve it is by introducing redundant components. The new components will 
increase the cost of the system. The more redundant components are introduced the more 
expensive the system becomes. If the system reliability needs to be improved and its cost 
minimised the two objectives will be conflicting. A system with minimum cost will have a 
low reliability rate. Conversely, the system with high reliability will cost more. The problem 
will not have one unique solution. Instead there will be solutions where a trade-off between 
reliability and cost exists. Thus a resulting outcome to a general multi-objective optimisation 
problem is a set of optimal solutions, each of which satisfies the objectives and is not 
dominated by any other solution [95]. 
Due to the existence of conflicting objectives the concept of domination is used in multi-
objective optimisation algorithms. If considering a minimisation problem, dominance of one 
solution over another can be defined as follows: 
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Definition 8.1. A solution ( )nxx ,...,1=x  is said to dominate another solution ( )nyy ,...,1=y  
( )yx p , if both conditions are true [94]: 
The solution x is no worse than the solution y  in all objectives, i.e. { }ni ,...,1∈∀ , 
( ) ( )yx ii ff ≤ . 
The solution x is strictly better than the solution y  for at least one objective function, i.e. 
{ } ( ) ( )yx ii ffni <∈∃ :,...,1 . 
If any of the above conditions is violated, the solution x  does not dominate the solution y .  
Definition 8.1 defines the relationship between any two solutions. Three types of relationships 
can be identified between solutions on the basis of dominance [94]: a) solution x  dominates 
solution y , b) solution x  is dominated by solution y , c) solutions x  and y  do not dominate 
each other. 
For a given finite set of solutions there exist groups of solutions of different non-domination 
levels [45]. One of the groups represents solutions which are non-dominated with respect to 
each other. 
Definition 8.2. Among a set of solutions X, the non-dominated set of solutions P* are those 
that are not dominated by any member of set X. 
Definition 8.3. A solution ( )nxx ,...,1=x  is set to be Pareto-optimal if and only if there is no 
other solution ( )nyy ,...,1=y  in X for which ( )yif  dominates ( )xif . 
The non-dominated set of Pareto-optimal solutions is called the Pareto-optimal set. Any two 
Pareto-optimal solutions do not dominate each other. This set also has the property of 
dominating all other solutions which do not belong to this set. In other words, any solution in 
the Pareto-optimal set will dominate any other solution from outside the set. For a given 
Pareto-optimal set the corresponding objective function values in the objective space are 
called the Pareto front. It follows that the search space of objectives can be divided into two 
non-overlapping regions. One region is optimal and another is non-optimal. Thus the solution 
of the multi-objective optimisation problem is a set of solutions from the Pareto optimal set.  
There are two goals in multi-objective optimisation. The first goal is to identify a set of 
solutions as close as possible to the Pareto-optimal set. The convergence of the solutions to 
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the true optimal solutions corresponds to convergence of the single objective optimisation 
algorithm to an optimal unique solution. The second goal is entirely specific to a multi-
objective optimisation problem. Solutions in the best-known Pareto set should be as diverse as 
possible. Only a diverse set can provide a good set of trade-off solutions amongst the 
objectives. 
The discussed multiple Pareto optimal solutions do not exist for all multi-objective 
optimisation cases. The optimal Pareto set contains more than one solution only if the 
objectives of the problem are conflicting to each other. If the objectives are not conflicting to 
each other, the cardinality of the Pareto-optimal set is one. It means that any objective 
function has the same optimal solution [94]. 
8.3. MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMISATION TECHNIQUES 
A number of classical search and optimisation techniques exist to deal with multi-objective 
optimisation problems. Coello et al. [96] grouped them into three categories: enumerative, 
deterministic and stochastic. The classical methods combine the objectives into a single, 
parameterized objective function by analogy to decision making before search. The 
parameters of this function are systematically varied by the optimizer. Each time an 
optimisation run is performed one particular Pareto-optimal solution is achieved. Thus the 
method needs to be applied several times with different parameter settings in order to find 
different solutions and achieve the approximate Pareto-optimal set. The weighted sum 
method, ε -constrained method, weighted metric methods and goal programming method are 
a few representatives of the classical techniques. Debs [94] mentioned potential difficulties 
which may accompany these techniques. For example, most algorithms need to be applied 
many times in order to find the approximation to the Pareto-optimal set. Some of the 
techniques may require additional knowledge about the problem being solved. Sometimes 
they may be sensitive to the shape of the Pareto front. Moreover classical methods are rather 
inefficient for problems having discrete search spaces. Due to their drawbacks these methods 
are not widely used in practice to solve multi-objective optimisation problems. 
Recently, GAs have become established as an alternative to classical methods to explore the 
Pareto-optimal front in multi-objective optimisation problems. These algorithms have proven 
themselves as a general, robust and powerful search mechanism. They have the ability to find 
multiple Pareto-optimal solutions in a single run, they work without derivatives, converge 
speedily to Pareto-optimal solutions and handle combinatorial optimization problems. GAs 
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are also less susceptible to the shape or discontinuity of a Pareto front and have the potential 
to converge to Pareto-optimal solutions with a high degree of accuracy [97]. 
The first multi-objective GA was proposed by Schaffer in 1984 and was called vector 
evaluated GA (VEGA). The next important contribution towards the development of a GA 
based optimisation technique was made by Goldberg [45]. He introduced the new non-
dominated sorting procedure. Since then many researches have developed different versions 
of multi-objective optimisation algorithms. Several survey papers have been published on 
evolutionary multi-objective optimisation where authors have attempted to summarise studies 
in the field from different perspectives and introduced comparative analysis of different 
algorithms [98], [99], [100]. Generally speaking, multi-objective GAs can be categorised on 
the bases of elitism, diversification approaches or different fitness assignment strategies [95]. 
Fonseca and Fleming [99] compared the fitness assignment procedures and distinguished 
plain aggregating approaches, population-based non-Pareto approaches, and Pareto-based 
approaches. The first group of methods combine the objectives into one higher scalar function 
that is used for fitness calculation. The objectives may be combined using either addition, 
multiplication or any other combination of arithmetic operations [98]. There are, however a 
number of problems applying such approaches. For example, some accurate scalar 
information on the range of the objectives needs to be provided in order to avoid dominates of 
one objective over the others. On the other hand, if the required information is available this is 
not only the simplest approach, but also one of the most efficient [98]. Popular aggregation 
methods are the Weighted-sum Approach, Target Vector Optimization, and the Method of 
Goal Attainment. 
As the title implies, Population-based non-Pareto approaches are based on population policies 
or special handling of the objectives and generate multiple non-dominated solutions. However 
actual definition of Pareto optimality is not directly implemented in these algorithms [99]. 
Some of the most popular approaches that belong to this category are the earlier mentioned 
VEGA, Lexicographic Ordering and Weighted Min-max Approach.  
The idea of using Pareto-based fitness assignment was first proposed by Goldberg. All 
approaches of this type use Pareto dominance in order to determine the reproduction 
probability of each individual [101]. Examples of such approaches are Multi Objective 
Genetic Algorithm (MOGA), Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA) proposed 
by Srinivas and Deb [102] and Niched Pareto Genetic Algorithm (NPGA).  
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Other well known algorithms that have also been widely studied [95] are: Strength Pareto 
Evolutionary Algorithm (SPEA), Improved SPEA (SPEA2), Pareto-Archieved Evolution 
Strategy (PAES), Rank-Density Based Genetic Algorithm (RDGA) and Random Weighted 
Genetic algorithm (RWGA). 
8.3.1. Handling of Constraints 
Solutions of some real-world problems may be constrained by a number of restrictions 
imposed on the decision variable. A number of different constraint handling strategies exist 
for a single objective GA [96], [103]. One of the strategies is to create such genetic operators 
that always produce feasible solutions. A repair process can also be implemented where 
infeasible solutions are transformed in to being feasible. Another methodology employs a 
penalty function to increase the fitness of infeasible solutions (when a minimisation problem 
is considered). There is also a methodology called death penalty. When using this 
methodology all infeasible solutions are discarded from the analysis process.  
The first three penalty strategies can be directly applied in a multi-objective GA [95]. 
However implementation of the penalty method is not straight forward in those multi-
objective GAs where fitness assignment is based on the non-dominance rank of a solution. 
Otherwise if fitness assignment is based on objective function values, as in plain aggregating 
approaches, penalty function strategies can also be implemented directly. 
Several methods have been developed specifically to solve constraint multi-objective 
problems. For example, Jimenez et al. [104] proposed a niched selection strategy to deal with 
infeasibility while maintaining diversity and dominance of the population. Deb et al. [105] 
proposed a constrained tournament method where the constraint-domination concept and 
binary tournament selection method based on it are implemented. 
8.3.2. Performance Metrics 
There are multiple optimisation goals in the multi-objective optimisation, unlike the single 
optimisation goal for a single objective optimisation. The first goal requires a search towards 
the Pareto-optimal set and to discover solutions as close to the Pareto optimal solutions as 
possible. The second goal requires a search along the Pareto-optimal front in order to find 
solutions as diverse as possible in the obtained non-dominated set. Since the two goals of the 
optimisation are distinctive and somewhat conflicting, no single metric can be used to assess 
the performance of the algorithm in an absolute way. Therefore at least two performance 
metrics should be used [94]. 
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A number of different performance measures have been suggested. Fonseca and Fleming 
[106] developed statistical methods. Zitzler and Thiele in [101] used dominated area in the 
objective function space. Visualization of a Pareto set of solutions can also be used to 
demonstrate the performance of the algorithm [107]. The quantitative metrics (performance 
metrics) give a quantitative performance measurement and also are simple to formulate. 
The performance metrics can be categorized in three groups: metrics that measure the 
convergence to the Pareto-optimal front explicitly, metrics that are used to measure diversity 
among the obtained solutions explicitly and the ones which measure both goals of multi-
objective optimisation [94]. Three metrics are given here which were chosen as potential 
metrics to evaluate the performance of the developed algorithm. 
Generational distance [94] or simply called the convergence metric [105] measures how far 
the given solutions of the obtained Pareto-optimal set are on the average from the true Pareto-
optimal front. For each solution obtained, a minimum Euclidian distance between the solution 
and the solutions on the Pareto-optimal front is computed [107]: 
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where |P*| is the cardinality of an obtained Pareto-optimal set P*, ||· || is Euclidian distance 
metric and PT is the true Pareto-optimal set of the problem. A small value of this metric 
indicates good convergence towards the Pareto-optimal front. 
Let *1P  and 
*
2P  be two obtained Pareto sets. The function C maps the ordered pair ( *1P , *2P ) 
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2P are dominated by or equal to 
solutions in *1P . The opposite, value 
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
 *
,
*
21 PPC = 0 means that no solution in 
*
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by any of the solutions in *1P . The measure C, which is also sometimes called coverage 
metric, can be extended for the performance measure of an algorithm if a true Pareto set is 
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known [97]. Thus the metric ( )TPPC *,  will determine what proportion of the solutions 
obtained in the Pareto-optimal set are dominated by members of the true Pareto-optimal set. 
The spacing metric evaluates diversity among non-dominated solutions. A number of 
definitions of this metric have been proposed [97], [107]. For the algorithm analysis the 
following metric was employed [105]: 
( )∑
=
−=
*
1
2
*
1 P
i
i ddP
S ,   (8.6) 
where id  is the minimum value of the sum of the absolute differences between the value of 
the objective function of the i-th solution and the values of the objective function of any other 
solution in the P*, i.e.: 
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In Equation 8.6 d  is the mean value of the distances id is given by: 
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This spacing metric measures the standard deviations of different id  values. When the 
obtained solutions are near uniformly spaced, the distance measure will have a small value 
[105]. 
8.3.3. Proposed Multi-Objective Optimisation Technique 
The purpose of this part of the research was to expand the application of the originated system 
design optimisation tool and develop a methodology for optimising a design of the system 
performing a number of multi-phased missions. The developed optimisation approach needed 
to be altered and a multi-objective GA (MOGA) has been used instead of a single-objective 
one. The RWGA which transforms a multi-objective problem into a single-objective one can 
be easily adapted as an optimisation technique in the earlier developed PMSDOA. Moreover, 
the complexity of the algorithm is smaller than other multi-objective evolutionary algorithms 
while the algorithm can be very efficient [98]. Therefore the RWGA has been chosen as the 
Chapter 8. Design Optimisation of Multi-phased Mission System Considering Multiple Missions 
 
193 
core to the new developed GA. This section provides a detailed explanation of the developed 
MOGA. 
Murata and Ishibuchi [108] proposed a weighted-based algorithm where the following 
weighted sum approach is used in order to combine multiple objective functions into a scalar 
fitness function (it is assumed that all the objective functions should be minimised): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),w...w...w 11 xxxx kkii ffff ++++=    (8.9) 
were x is an n-dimensional decision variable vector (a string if using GA terminology), ( )xf  
is a combined fitness function, ( )xif  is the i-th objective function, wi is a constant weight for 
( )xif , and k is the number of objective functions. 
If a weight vector ( )nw,...,w1=w  is constant for each generation, the search direction in the 
genetic algorithm becomes fixed. In the proposed approach random weights are introduced to 
search for Pareto optimal solutions. A normalised weight vector w  is randomly generated for 
each solution during the selection phase at each generation. A random real number is assigned 
to each weight using the following equation: 
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where rj is a non-negative random number and ∑
=
=
n
i
i
1
1w . This approach utilizes multiple 
search directions in a single run without using additional parameters [95]. 
The elite preserve strategy was also implemented in the original algorithm. After a new 
population is generated a random portion of it is replaced with an equal number of solutions 
chosen from the external population. The external population is stored and updated at every 
generation. However in the algorithm developed for the optimisation of multiple phased 
missions a different strategy was used for maintaining non-dominated solutions. 
The implemented elitist strategy to preserve non-dominated solutions and induce convergence 
of the population towards Pareto optimality was based on that proposed by Marseguerra et al. 
[109]. During the optimisation search, non-dominated solutions are stored and updated using 
an external archive. The maximum size of the archive is set to 2N, where N is the number of 
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strings in the population. Non-dominated solutions of a current population are compared with 
those stored in the archive after each generation using the concept of dominance described in 
Definition 8.1. The following outcomes are possible: 
1. If a new solution dominates an existing member of the archive, the dominated 
solution is replaced. 
2. If a new solution is dominated by any member of the archive, no changes are made to 
the current archive. 
3. If the new solution and the rest of the archive members do not dominate each other 
either of the following rules apply: 
3.1. If the archive is not full, the new solution is added into the archive, 
3.2. If the archive is full, the new individual replaces the member of the archive which 
is the closet to the new solution in the solution space. The Euclidean distance is used 
to measure the distance between two solutions. 
The concept of elitism is implemented by introducing members of the external population of 
non-dominated solutions into the selection procedure. The mating pool of parent strings ready 
to undergo the selection process is combined with members of the current population where 
Nelite random strings are removed and replaced with the Nelite randomly selected members of 
the archive. Typically Nelite is not more than N/4. 
The procedure of the proposed algorithm can be summarised as follows: 
Step 1: Random population of N chromosomes is generated. 
Step 2: Fitness values are assigned to each generated solution P∈x : 
1. A random number ri in [0,1] is generated for each objective i, i = 1,…,k. 
2. The random weight for each objective is generated using Formula 8.10. 
3. Fitness of the solution is calculated using the given Formula 8.9. 
Step 3: The selection probabilities are specified for each string of the population as follows: 
( )
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)( , where ( ){ }Pxxff ∈= |minmin    (8.11) 
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Step 4: Pairs of parents are selected using probability values from Step 3. Single point 
crossover is performed to produce N offspring chromosomes. While performing crossover 
mutation is carried out with a predefined mutation rate. 
Step 5: The external population of non-dominated solutions is updated. 
Step 6: Nelite random strings are removed from the current population and replaced with the 
Nelite randomly selected members of the external elite population. 
Step 7: If the maximum number of generations has not been reached the algorithm is started 
from Step 2. Otherwise the external archive of non-dominated solutions is the final set of 
Pareto-optimal solutions. 
Both tasks required in the multi objective algorithm are presented in the proposed GA. It 
converges to the Pareto–optimal solutions as the application analysis discussed later in this 
chapter will show. The diversity in the non-dominated solutions is maintained in two ways: 1) 
a random weight vector is used to evaluate each solution stimulating to search for different 
solutions in the Pareto-optimal region, and 2) a proportion of the population is replaced with 
the solutions from the external set [94]. 
8.4. MULTIPLE PHASED MISSIONS SYSTEM DESIGN 
OPTIMISATION ALGORITHM (MPMSDOA) 
In real world problems it is common that one system is designed to perform a number of 
different missions. It is therefore possible that the system reliability changes with every 
mission owing to the different tasks performed. If the system structural design and therefore 
its reliability has been improved on the basis of one mission analysis the resulting outcome 
does not provide information on how these changes influence system performance in the rest 
of the missions. Moreover the changes may result in an undesirable decrease of system 
reliability in some of the missions. If all missions to be performed are analysed every time an 
alteration is introduced in the system design this problem can be overcome. 
8.4.1. Mathematical Representation of the Problem 
Following the considerations above it was decided to alter the PMSDOA and to adapt it to 
analyse systems designed for multiple multi-phased missions. In the earlier developed 
PMSDOA (Chapter 7) the problem was formulated as the minimisation of the overall mission 
failure probability. The multiple missions problem can also be solved as a minimisation 
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problem where each mission is assigned one objective function. Thus the problem to be 
solved can be defined as follows: 
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  (8.12), 
Here ),...,,( 21 inxxx is a set of failure probability values of system components that ensure 
normal system performance and their individual or combined failures cause mission failure 
during different phases. ni is the number of potential failures of components of a particular 
design i system. ),...,,( 21 inmission
j xxxQ  is the jth (j = 1,…, k) mission failure probability for a 
system with design i which is identified with a specified set of system components. k is the 
number of objectives or missions being analysed. The objectives are independent and 
therefore each mission failure probability is evaluated individually. 
It is common that alterations made to the system design are subject to a number of constraints 
for real world problems. Following the previously developed system design optimisation 
algorithms, possible limitations for the system cost, weight and volume in each mission have 
been implemented: 
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Here min means a defined minimal resource value, accordingly max is a maximum defined 
value and mission identifies an existing value of a design characteristic for a specific system 
design case analysed, j denotes the mission number being analysed (j= 1,2,…,k). The 
approach for the evaluation of these characteristics is identical to the one presented for the 
PMSDOA (Section 7.3.4). 
8.4.2. Algorithm Particulars 
The general structure of the new algorithm for system design optimisation for multiple phased 
missions (MPMSDOA) remains very similar to the PMSDOA and is presented in Figure 8.1. 
The only difference is in the type of the optimisation algorithm used, which in this case is 
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MOGA. Thus, at first fault trees representing all possible system design alternatives are 
created for each considered mission. As in the PMSDOA FTA and BDD analysis are 
employed and the fault tree structure alterations are made using rules of FTMPs. The 
generation of system design alternatives and the assessment of their unreliability is governed 
by the MOGA. 
 
Initial Phased 
Mission System 
Design
FTMPs
All Possible Design 
Alternatives
Quantitative Failure Analysis of 
System Designs Optimisation
Optimal Phased 
Mission System 
Design
BDD
FTA
MOGA
BDD
 
Figure 8.1. Structure of the MPMSDOA 
The data required for the optimisation process includes a number of different data groups. An 
initial system design is given in the form of fault trees constructed for each phase of every 
mission analysed. To construct fault trees representing all possible design alternatives a list of 
components chosen to be replaced and associated design variables with their parameter values 
are used. Failure and design characteristics of all potential system components which are used 
for qualitative system design analysis also need to be provided. The exception to this applies 
only to design characteristics for components since they do not need to be given if no 
restrictions to the system design are considered. On the other hand, if system design 
restrictions are considered they should also be provided. Finally, the user can also define the 
GA parameter values as in the earlier versions of the optimisation algorithm. 
It is considered that the analysed system performs one mission at a time. As such the missions 
can be treated as being independent and can be analysed individually. Therefore the 
optimisation approach is developed so that fault trees representing all possible system design 
alternatives are constructed for each mission at a time. Thus, FTMPs corresponding to design 
variables found in fault trees for phases of the first mission are implemented first. Next, the 
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corresponding FTMPs are employed to alter the fault trees of the second mission. The process 
is continued until the last mission fault trees are modified. Moreover, the methodology for 
implementation of FTMPs in one mission fault trees can be directly adapted from the 
PMSDOA. The resulting fault trees are then converted to their BDDs and are used for 
quantitative system failure analysis in this form. 
The optimisation part of the MPMSDOA implements the MOGA which is based on RWGA 
and was discussed in detail in Section 8.4. The main principle of the algorithm is to combine a 
number of objective functions into one scalar function. The number of objectives is not fixed 
in the algorithm, allowing the analysis to be performed for various numbers of missions. It 
therefore ensures the potential of the algorithm to analyse different design optimisation cases. 
The principles for the evaluation of the objective functions (in this case more than one 
objective function is assigned for each chromosome) remain the same. 
The process to find values of objective functions for each chromosome, i.e. to evaluate a 
particular design system failure during each mission, is organised as follows. Once a 
generated chromosome is decoded and the phenotypes of its genes are obtained sets of house 
events introduced in the fault trees (BDDs) are defined accordingly. Since the missions are 
considered to be independent the quantitative analysis for each mission is also performed for 
each mission at a time. Thus first house events of the first mission are set to either 0 or 1. The 
same procedure is then performed for the second and the following missions. The house event 
numbering rules and the rules for the assignment of their values according to the generated 
values of the design variables are the same as the ones in the PMSDOA. The next stage 
involves evaluating the failure probability for the mission. Having values of house events 
defined, each mission can undergo the quantification process. As one mission is analysed at a 
time, the same algorithm as the one implemented in the PMSDOA is used. 
8.5. UAV DESIGN OPTIMISATION USING THE MPMSDOA  
8.5.1. Problem Overview 
The UAV design optimisation problem presented earlier when discussing the PMSDOA has 
also been chosen as an application example of the MPMSDOA and multiple phased missions 
system design optimisation programme (MPMSDOP). 
The UAV considered in the analysis is designed to perform two missions. One mission that 
needs to be performed involves flying over controlled airspace. It consists of the following 
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phases: take-off, climb, en-route (in controlled airspace), descent and landing. The second 
mission requires operation of the UAV over uncontrolled airspace. The phases constituting 
the mission are the following: take-off, climb, en-route (in uncontrolled airspace), descent and 
landing. Fault trees for each phase are the same as the ones given in Section 7.4. No 
constraints for any mission were defined. 
For the UAV design optimisation with respect to its failure minimisation during both missions 
replacements of seven components have been considered. The complete list of structural 
design variables and their values is given in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1. Design variables 
Component Description of Modifications / Design Variable 
Possible Values of 
Design Variables 
Landing gear Type of a landing gear type1, type 2 
Antiskid valve Type of an antiskid valve type1, type 2, type 3 
Number of brake sets 3, 2, 1 
Type of a brake set type1, type 2 
Brakes 
Minimal number of failed brakes that 
cause failure to brake 3, 2, 1 
Engine 1 Type of engine 1 type1, type 2, type 3 
Engine 2 Type of engine 2 type1, type 2, type 3 
Number navigation subsystems 2, 1 
Type of a navigation subsystem type1, type 2 
Navigation 
system 
 Minimal number of failed navigation 
subsystems causing navigation failure 2, 1 
Number of sense and avoidance 
subsystems 2, 1 Sense and 
avoidance system  Type of a sense and avoidance 
subsystem type1, type 2 
While developing the algorithm it has been considered that the reliability characteristics of the 
components could vary for both different phases and missions. Certain existing external 
factors can influence these changes. For example, if a mission is performed only under 
extreme weather conditions, some UAV parts can have higher failure probabilities. On the 
other hand, the same parts operating under normal weather conditions would have lower 
failure probabilities. It was decided to introduce such a situation in the UAV analysis. The 
estimated failure probabilities for the majority of components are the same throughout both 
missions. However potential new components have different failure characteristic for mission 
Chapter 8. Design Optimisation of Multi-phased Mission System Considering Multiple Missions 
 
200 
1 and mission 2. The data for quantitative analysis is provided in Appendix 4. Failure 
probabilities for the components in the initial design are given in Table A.4.1. Table A.4.2 
provides data of failure characteristics for the possible new components. Using the data and 
considering the initial UAV design failure probabilities of the first and the second missions 
are equal to 0.14276 and 0.16792 respectively. 
8.5.2. Analysis of Optimisation Results 
The introduced UAV design optimisation problem has been used to analyse the performance 
of the developed MPMSDOA. As in the previous optimisation cases, the optimisation process 
was performed by employing different combinations of GA parameter values. Different 
values of population size, crossover rate and mutation rate were employed. Three population 
sizes were analysed: 30, 50 and 70 chromosomes. Three mutation rates were used: 0.001, 
0.005 and 0.01. Crossover rate values were equal to 0.75, 0.8 and 0.95. The algorithm was set 
to terminate after 100 generations for any combination of GA parameter values. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, two goals are needed to be achieved in any multi-
objective optimisation. The obtained results need to converge to the Pareto-optimal set and 
diversity in the solutions of the obtained Pareto-optimal set needs to be maintained. To 
evaluate if each of the goals is obtained three performance metrics were used in the 
optimisation analysis of the UAV design. For each combination of GA parameter values the 
convergence metric, function C and spacing metric were obtained. The obtained results are 
presented graphically and can be found in Appendix 4. It is known that GAs have a stochastic 
nature, therefore five independent runs were made for each combination of GA parameter 
values and the average values were evaluated for all three metrics. These values were 
considered in the comparative analysis of the algorithm performance. 
The true Pareto-optimal set is required for the evaluation of all three performance metrics. 
The set contains 120 members for the problem solved which were identified after performing 
an exhaustive search. The results of the search are presented in Figure 8.2. It can be seen that 
the true Pareto-optimal set is not distributed uniformly and its elements arrange in ten 
clusters. Therefore it is expected that the obtained non-dominated sets of solutions will not be 
spread uniformly. Some of the obtained optimal solutions, i.e. sets of the optimal values of 
design variables, are presented in Table 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2. True Pareto-optimal Set 
Table 8.2. Values of design variables for the optimal UAV design 
Component Description of Modifications / Design Variable 
Design Variable Value 
(New Designs) 
Landing gear Type of a landing gear type 1 type 1 type 2 
Antiskid valve Type of an antiskid valve type 3 type 2 type 1 
Number of brake sets 3 3 1 
Type of a brake set type 1 type 1 type 2 Brakes 
Minimal number of failed brakes that 
cause failure to brake 3 2 1 
Engine 1 Type of engine 1 type 1 type 3 type 3 
Engine 2 Type of engine 2 type 2 type 1 type 2 
Number navigation subsystems 2 2 1 
Type of a navigation subsystem type 1 type 1 type 2 
Navigation system Minimal number of failed navigation 
subsystems causing navigation 
failure 
2 2 1 
Number of avoidance subsystems 2 2 1 
Sense and 
avoidance system  Type of an sense and avoidance 
subsystem type 2 type 1 type 2 
missionQ1  0.12710  0.11808  0.14318  
 
missionQ2  0.14356 0.15400 0.12440 
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Figures A.4.1-A.4.4 in Appendix 4 present the results of metrics obtained using different 
combinations of mutation rates and population sizes with the crossover rate equal to 0.75. The 
average distance between the solutions of the obtained Pareto set and the solutions of the true 
Pareto set decrease significantly in 20 generations for all combinations of GA parameters 
used. The convergence of the results is clear; it can be stated that the mutation rate has an 
apparent influence on the optimisation process. The metric values decrease if the mutation 
rate is increased for all population sizes. If the metric values obtained using the same mutation 
rate and different population sizes are compared it can be seen that the smallest metric values 
are associated with a population size of 70 chromosomes for all mutation rates. Values of 
Function C tend to decrease when the mutation rate and the population size increase. The 
spacing metric gained higher values when populations of 70 chromosomes were used. Since 
the true Pareto-optimal front is not spread uniformly and forms a number of clusters it was 
expected that the obtained sets of non-dominated solutions will have even more clusters of 
solutions. However, the obtained values of the spacing metric are rather small which shows a 
good spread of the non-dominated solutions. 
Figures A.4.5 – A.4.8 in Appendix 4 provide evaluation results of the algorithm performance 
when GA parameter combinations comprised different mutation rates and the population sizes 
and the crossover rate equal to 0.8. In these runs the convergence to the Pareto-optimal set is 
slower using combinations of mutation rates equal to 0.001 and 0.005 and population size of 
30 chromosomes. The non-dominated sets obtained when using a population of 50 
chromosomes with mutation rate equal to 0.01 and population of 70 chromosomes with a 
mutation rate of 0.005 are the closest to the true Pareto-optimal set. In the final 
non-dominated sets obtained the proportion of solutions, which are weakly dominated by 
solutions of the true Pareto-optimal set, is smallest for all GA parameter sets with population 
size equal to 70 chromosomes. However, the increased value of the crossover rate resulted in 
the increased number of dominated solutions in the final non-dominated sets. The increased 
value of crossover rate also influenced the maintained diversity in the optimal sets obtained. 
The spacing values have increased for all combinations of mutation rate equal to 0.01 and 
different population sizes.  
Results of the generational distance obtained using combinations of GA parameter sets with 
the crossover rate equal to 0.95 are given in Figures A.4.9 - A.4.12 in Appendix 4. The 
consistent pattern of decreasing convergence metric values with increasing mutation rates 
noticed earlier does not exist for this case. The smallest generational distances for populations 
of 30 and 50 chromosomes were achieved using a mutation rate equal to 0.005. However, the 
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overall smallest average distance between the obtained set and the true Pareto-optimal set was 
obtained using a mutation rate equal to 0.01 and a population size of 70 chromosomes. The 
results of coverage metric (Function C) imply that the algorithm performs better using 
population size of 70. This fact can also be justified by analysing the evaluation results of the 
maintained population diversity. The spacing metric takes smaller values for every mutation 
rate when using populations of 70 chromosomes than employing any other size of the 
population. 
8.5.3. Summary of the Optimisation Analysis 
The given analysis suggests that differences in values of the mutation rate and the population 
size have less influence on algorithm performance when a crossover rate equal to 0.95 is used. 
However the algorithm produced better results overall when larger population sizes were 
used. The exact influence of the mutation rate on the algorithm performance has not been 
identified. The Pareto-optimal set obtained maintained diverse solutions and was the closest 
to the true Pareto-optimal set when the population of 70 chromosomes, crossover and 
mutation rates equal to 0.95 and 0.01 respectively were employed. 
8.6. SUMMARY 
During a system design process the objective is to design a cost effective and reliable system. 
Considering systems performing phased missions, it is often assumed that they are designed 
to perform one specific task. However, most real world systems perform a number of different 
missions. Thus the challenge arises how to optimise the phased mission system design which 
would be suitable for a number of operation tasks and would be reliable within the context of 
pre-defined design constraints and resources. In this chapter such problems were considered 
and the main interest was focused on the following: 
• development of the basic design optimisation algorithm, MPMSDOA, to optimise the 
design structure of systems which are constructed to perform a number of different 
phased-missions; 
• development of the code, MPMSDOP, to automate the design optimisation process; 
• development of the MPMSDOA and MPMSDOP to be problem-independent, i.e. 
potentially any system performing any number of missions could be analysed; 
• demonstrate the application of the algorithm to solve a chosen system design 
optimisation problem. 
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The developed algorithm defines the system design from the given list of possible design 
alternatives such that a trade-off between failure probability values of different missions is 
achieved. If failure data of system components given for different missions are conflicting or 
design alterations have a different impact on the system reliability during different missions a 
set of optimal design solutions is provided. Otherwise the algorithm will produce one optimal 
design case. 
The MPMSDOA has been applied to optimise a UAV designed to perform two different 
missions. Some components had failure characteristics which were different for each mission 
and were conflicting. The performance of the algorithm was analysed using the number of 
different combinations of GA parameter values. As in the previous application examples, the 
algorithm tended to find good solutions quicker if higher mutation and crossover rates were 
used and large chromosome populations were utilised. The obtained results have 
demonstrated the capability of the algorithm to solve the optimisation problem and find a sub-
set of the true Pareto-optimal set. 
The major drawback of the algorithm that has been noticed is the increasing performance time 
when larger systems or systems designed to perform more missions are analysed. Attention 
should be given to the improvement of the phased mission quantification technique in this 
case. The multi-objective GA implemented in the algorithm is one of the simplest examples 
of MOGA. Therefore the use of a more sophisticated MOGA could also improve the 
optimisation process, for example, less generations could be required to find the Pareto-
optimal solutions. The improved algorithm could be applied to a larger range of systems. 
More complex systems and a larger number of missions could also be analysed. 
 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
9.1. SUMMARY 
Following an extensive critical review on the available design reliability optimisation 
techniques, the development of a generic optimisation approach applicable to a diverse range 
of real engineering systems was deemed necessary. The majority of the methods used for 
reliability design optimisation problems consider simple or well-structured systems. 
Moreover, usually only one or two means through which system reliability can be enhanced 
are considered. For example, a number of methods take into account the possible choices of a 
redundancy strategy or increasing the reliability of constituent components in the system, or a 
combination of both strategies. In some cases system performance is optimised through 
maintenance scheduling. However, real world systems are usually very complex and therefore 
the list of methods applicable to such problems is rather short. It is possible to analyse a 
simplified structure of the real system, however, in this case there is a compromise in the 
accuracy of the results. Additionally, it is worth considering a set of different means through 
which system availability/reliability can be enhanced such as redundancy allocation, 
reliability allocation, repair/ preventive maintence scheduling and/or decreasing the downtime 
of the system. 
The development of a General System Design Optimisation Algorithm (GSDOA) was 
completed in order to create a technique which identifies the optimal system design with the 
optimal usage of available resources, such that the best performance possible is obtained. 
GSDOA has the potential to be applicable to a diverse range of real engineering systems. The 
benefit of using the general algorithm is the ability to identify an optimal or near optimal 
design case for any system considered rather than developing the system dependant approach. 
In the approach availability/reliability has been chosen to indicate the performance of a 
system. Improvement of system availability/reliability has been considered through the 
optimal allocation of redundancies and/or component reliabilities which may be subject to 
constraints and maintenance scheduling, if a repairable system is analysed. For quantitative 
comparison of different design options unreliability/unavailability measures have been 
utilised. Limitations for system cost, weight, volume and maintenance down time have been 
considered as possible constraints for the available resources. 
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The developed approach uses a combination of FTA and BDD analysis to introduce and 
evaluate the design proposals. Since FTA provides a schematic visual representation of the 
possible combinations of system conditions that could lead to its failure it is employed to 
represent all potential design configurations through their failure causes. The first major 
development was to devise patterns to enable transformation of an initial design fault tree into 
one for all possible designs so the optimisation approach could be applied. Moreover the fault 
tree modification patterns (FTMPs) were developed to represent any design alteration in the 
fault tree for any system under consideration. House events which are incorporated when 
applying the FTMPs developed enable the construction of a single fault tree representing 
causes of the system failure mode for all possible design alternatives. By setting certain house 
events to TRUE while the rest of them are set to FALSE the corresponding branches are 
switched on and off which results in the fault tree for a specific design alternative. Possible 
design alternatives for a considered system case are determined using the FTMPs which are 
chosen according to the list of design parameters (component selection and/or redundancy 
type and levels) given.  
The conventional techniques for the quantitative analysis of fault trees can be computationally 
intensive and require the use of approximations, which inevitably leads to a loss of accuracy. 
The BDD technique is used as an alternative approach for performing the required analysis. 
Converting the fault tree, representing all possible design alternatives, into its BDD rather 
than converting individual design fault trees to their BDDs enhances the computational 
efficiency of quantitative failure analysis for any problem solved. 
In the approach developed new possible optimal design solutions are generated and analysed 
using a simple GA. The GA provides a means of optimisation which is capable of coping with 
all requirements of the design problems considered. First of all the design parameters, i.e. 
decision variables used, are discrete numbers. The objective function of the optimisation 
problem formulated is not in a closed mathematical form and FTA and BDD analysis are used 
to evaluate its values. System design alterations are subject to a number of constraints which 
need to be considered during the analysis. Finally, the approach is not one system orientated 
which means the chosen technique needs to be easily adaptable for solving design 
optimisation problems for different systems. 
A computer programme has been developed to automate the application of the GSDOA to 
solve system design optimisation problems. The approach has been assessed through the 
consideration of two systems of increasing complexity; namely the High Integrity Protection 
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System (HIPS) and the Fire Water Deluge System (FWDS) relating to an offshore platform. 
Through applying the approach the applicability to different system problems and scalability 
of the technique has been addressed. The application of the initial GA tested on the HIPS has 
highlighted potential areas of improvement. This resulted in the development of an approach 
with the improved GA which was applied to the FWDS. The improved GA has fitness 
scaling, an adaptive penalty methodology and a new population replacement strategy 
implemented. This in turn leads to the applicability of the method to complex engineering 
systems. 
The development of the approach applicable to a range of different systems made it possible 
to adapt it to analyse multi-phased mission systems. Phased mission systems are important in 
various applications, e.g. military operations; however there is no demonstrated evidence in 
the literature for research about the design optimisation problems of such systems. The 
alterations made to the algorithm were with regards to the evaluation of system performance 
during each phase of the mission. In the Phased Mission System Design Optimisation 
Algorithm (PMSDOA) the initially-developed methodology of FTMPs has been amended to 
introduce house events and therefore design alternatives in the fault tree for each phase. Each 
phase fault tree represents only those possible design alternatives whose failure contributes to 
the failure of the phase in question. The GA implemented has been amended to include 
limitations on available resources and system performance characteristics throughout the 
whole missions as well as each individual phase. The initially developed computer code has 
also been amended to implement the corresponding alterations of the algorithm. 
Three application examples of the new optimisation approach have been investigated. First a 
relatively simple unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) design optimisation problem was solved. 
Next military vessel design optimisation problems of increasing complexity followed. The 
optimal designs were found corresponding to the global minimum failure probabilities of the 
missions within the limits of defined available resources (if such were considered) for all 
three cases. The application examples proved the scalability of the algorithm and its 
applicability to different systems. 
The use of the optimisation approach was further developed adapting it to solve design 
optimisation problems for multi-phased mission systems considering more than one mission. 
It is common that one system is designed to perform a number of different missions, e.g. a 
military vessel. Therefore design optimisation problems of such systems are relevant, even 
though such problems have not been considered before. In this case the amendments to the 
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algorithm were made with regards to the analysis of system performance and design 
alternatives in different missions. In the Multiple Phased Mission System Design 
Optimisation Algorithm (MPMSDOA) the system unreliability for each mission analysed is 
evaluated individually using the methodology developed in PMSDOA. The initially used 
single objective GA has been replaced with the multi objective GA since a trade-off of system 
performance in different missions was required. The programme code was developed which 
automates the reliability design optimisation process for multiple multi-phased missions. All 
new developments were successfully implemented in the UAV design optimisation problem. 
It is known that GAs require tuning of their parameters to achieve good performance results. 
The influence of different values of GA parameters on the performance of the developed 
algorithm has been analysed for each instance of the application example. The tendency has 
been noticed that the developed algorithm performs better, i.e. finds an optimal solution in 
fewer generations, if larger size populations, comprising of 50 or 75 chromosomes, are used. 
In some cases, there is a trade-off between mutation rate and crossover rate. The general 
tendency, however, is that a higher mutation rate and a higher crossover rate improve 
convergence of the algorithm. Thus a population of 50 chromosomes, a mutation rate equal to 
0.01 and a crossover rate equal to 0.95 are the recommended default values to be used for 
solving optimisation problems. 
9.2. CONCLUSIONS  
The developed FTMPs enables all proposed design options to be modelled in a single fault 
tree by transforming an initial design fault tree into one for all possible designs. The FTMPs 
are developed to be applicable for any system under consideration. 
The application of FTA and BDD analysis for the evaluation of the objective function, i.e. 
system unavailability/unreliability means that the developed algorithm can be applied to solve 
optimisation problems for complex engineering systems. Moreover, this methodology enables 
the development of a general optimisation approach adaptable to any system since the 
individual FT and BDD is constructed and analysed for the system under consideration. 
The application examples proved the scalability of the developed optimisation approach. The 
algorithm is capable of solving reliability optimisation problems for industrial systems of 
different degrees of complexity. 
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The significant novelty of the developed optimisation methodology is its capability to analyse 
phased mission systems and provide their optimal design solutions. The algorithm is also 
applicable to solve design optimisation problems of the phased mission systems which are 
involved in more than one mission. 
The employment of the MOGA which does not depend on the form of the objective functions 
and their evaluation methodology assures that the algorithm developed for multiple multi-
phased missions is not the one-problem oriented approach. Furthermore, it provides a number 
of good solutions which are critical in the system design process. 
The objectives of the research have been met resulting in the developed automated general 
GA based optimisation approaches for the construction of an optimal system design case with 
minimal unavailability/unreliability and optimal utilisation of available resources. The 
approaches are applicable to general systems, multi-phased mission systems and multiple 
multi-phased missions systems. 
9.3. FUTURE WORK 
Future work would involve application of the developed automated algorithms to a variety of 
different engineering systems. It is foreseen that analysis of more complicated problems will 
introduce additional computational intensity in terms of evaluating the objective function, 
which may incur a processing time issue. The issue of scalability may pose the most difficulty 
with an upper limit being needed on the number and complexity of each phase (due to 
processing consideration) when solving problems of phased mission systems. Therefore, 
future work should focus on improving the performance of the algorithm to minimise CPU 
time and improve the convergence rate. 
The GA has proven itself to be a very flexible and useful technique for the optimisation of 
system designs. Hybrid optimisation techniques combining GA with heuristic algorithms, 
simulation annealing methods, ant colony optimisation or neural networks could be very 
promising optimisation techniques in this field. They have the ability to retain the advantages 
of GAs in robustness and feasibility but significantly improve their computational efficiency 
and searching ability in finding the global optimum. This could also enable analysis of 
larger/more complex systems. Another way to improve performance of the optimisation 
process is to handle constraints as additional objectives by transforming a single objective 
constrained optimisation problem into a multi-objective one. Multi-objective optimisation 
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techniques seem one of the most promising in solving constrained optimisation problems. In 
this case a MOGA or a hybrid MOGA could be implemented.  
FTA and BDD analysis are very useful techniques for the assessment of system failure 
characteristics. However the results of the application examples have highlighted the need to 
improve the efficiency of the methodology for objective function evaluation. Incorporating 
the use of alternative analysis techniques, for example, the ones used in real time analysis 
could provide a solution for the efficiency problem. Furthermore, incorporating the use of 
alternative methods, such as Markov methods, could expand the applicability of the 
optimisation approaches to a more diverse range of systems, such as where inter-dependency 
between components exists. 
There are a number of other aspects of the design optimisation approaches developed that 
could be improved. For example, it would be useful if the user could define the possible 
minimum value of a design variable instead of using the default value which is equal to 1. 
Moreover, the order FTMPs are implemented could be chosen automatically within the 
programme ensuring the optimal size and complexity of the resulting fault tree. The data 
provision could be made more user-friendly. It is also envisaged from the methods that there 
is scope to easily alter the range of constraints considered. 
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APPENDIX 1  
The correct and sufficient data is critical for finding a solution for the optimisation problem to 
be solved. This section provides guidelines for data presentation in the required format. Each 
subsection is denoted to a set of data stored in a single file. It provides a detailed explanation 
of the file content based on a specific example. It also specifies the main rules to be followed 
to assure the data is presented in a correct format. 
A.1. FILE – fts.txt 
The file _fts.txt stores the fault tree structure of the initial system design in the text format. It 
is required that names (codes) of fault tree gates and basic events contain only digits. 
Therefore code-names should be introduced to basic events and/or gates whose names do not 
meet this requirement. It is also important that each basic event and gate code-name is unique, 
i.e. two or more fault tree components cannot have the same code-name.  
Consider the fault tree example in Figure A.1. In the given example, gate codes correspond to 
the given gate numbers. The basic event codes to be used are provided in Table A.1. 
 
 
Figure A.1  Example Fault Tree 
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Table A.1  Number Codes for Basic Events 
Basic 
Event Code 
A 1 
B 2 
C 3 
D 4 
E 5 
F 6 
G 7 
Each row in the file contains data of a single gate and it starts with the gate code. Note that 
gates can be listed in any order in the file. The only requirement is that the top gate data is 
written in the first row of the file. 
After a gate code the gate type follows identified with a key word ‘OR’ or ‘AND’. The next 
two numbers identify the total number of input gates and events that the considered gate has. 
It is required that the first figure denotes the total number of input gates. Finally, the code-
names of input gates and input events are listed. Each gate code-name comprises an 
identification symbol ‘G:’ and its code. Accordingly an input event code-name comprises of 
the symbol “E:” and its code. 
Consider the example fault tree in Figure A.1. The fault tree has six gates, thus six data rows 
will be needed in order to present its structure in a text format. The top gate is an AND gate 
and has two input gates coded as 2 and 3. Thus the first row of the fault tree data file would 
be: 
1 AND 2 0 G:2 G:3 
Gate 2 is an OR gate and also has two input gates. In the data file it would be written as 
follows: 
2 OR 2 0 G:4 G:5 
Gate 3 is an AND gate. It has one input gate and two inputs events. In this case the data in the 
text format would be provided as follows: 
3 AND 1 2 G:6 E:3 E:7 
The rest of the gates have two input basic events each. For example, the data row for gate 4 
would be: 
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4 AND 0 2 E:1 E:2 
To summarise, there are three main requirements for the presentation of the fault tree 
structure. Names of basic events and gates contain only digits. The top gate data has to be 
written in the first row of the file. First the total number of input gates is to be written 
followed by the total number of input events. Accordingly foremost input gates are listed and 
then the list of input events is given.  
A.2. FILE _var.txt 
The file stores the data required to implement changes in the system design regarding the 
structural design variables introduced for the problem solved. In the file each row represents a 
fault tree event (gate or basic event) chosen to be replaced and parameters of a FTMP, 
associated with a particular design variable or a set of variables, which defines the fault tree 
structure to be incorporated instead. Each row is started with the fault tree event 
identification. For this reason, either symbol ‘G’ (gate) or ‘E’ (basic event) is used followed 
by the event code. Next values are written for the FTMP parameters. The values for the 
parameters are written in the following order. First mn value is given, then mt is defined and 
finally an mk value is written (see Section 4.2.2). 
Consider the previous example fault tree in Figure A.1. Two FTMPs are introduced, Pattern 1 
(mn = 2, mt = 1, mk = 1) and Pattern 4 (mn =3, mt = 2, mk = 1). The events chosen to be 
replaced are gate 6 and basic event 4 respectively. The data file for the chosen modifications 
would consist of two rows: 
G 6 2 1 1 
E 4 3 2 1 
A.3. FILE _bse.aqd 
Basic event failure data is stored in the file with the ending _bse.aqd. Every row in the data 
file corresponds to a single basic event which is coded with a unique code-name. As 
mentioned earlier (Section A.1) it is required to use only digits for codes of basic events. It is 
also essential to proved new basic events, which occur after implementation of modification 
in the fault tree, and their correct code-names following the rules introduced in Section 
4.3.5.2. 
Appendix 1 222 
The programme is developed to utilise three different types of component failure data. 
Depending on a component failure type, a number of numerical parameters used to find the 
basic event probability will vary. An identification letter written next to the basic event code 
is used to determine the model to be used. Letter ‘d’ identifies a dormant failure probability. 
In this case failure rate, mean time to repair and maintenance test interval values are provided 
for the basic event. Letter w, which identifies that component failure times are distributed 
under the Weibull distribution, is followed by values of the distribution parameters β and η, 
and a maintenance test interval value. Note that in both cases, in order to find the component 
unavailability value the maintenance test interval value is required. However, if maintenance 
test intervals are design variables, then a digit 1 is to be written as a maintenance test interval 
value. Finally, in the data file letter f is to be used if a component unavailability value is given 
which will be written after the letter. 
The last row containing a key word ‘ENDOFDATA’ identifies the end of list of basic events. 
Consider the fault tree example given in Figure A.1. All basic events and their failure data are 
presented in Figure A.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2  File _bse.aqd 
 
1  d  0.000007 0.000004  30 
2  d  0.000014 0.000004  30 
3  d  0.000021  0.000004  30 
4_1_1  w 2  14035  40 
4_2_1  w 2 14035  40 
4_3_1  w 2 14035  40 
4_1_2  w 1 12075  55 
4_2_2  w 1 12075  55 
4_3_2  w 1 12075  55 
5_1_1   w 4 17050  30 
5_2_1   w 4 17050  30 
6_1_1  f 0.00001 
6_2_1   f  0.00001 
7  f  0.0000005 
ENDOFDATA 
Basic 
Event 
Code 
Failure 
Rate 
Failure 
Probability 
Maintenance 
Interval 
Mean 
Repair 
Time 
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In the file fault tree basic events are named using their code-names given in Table A.1. Basic 
events 1, 2 and 3 are given failure rate, mean time to repair and maintenance test interval 
values. Failure rates for basic events 4 and 5 have a Weibull distribution and for events 6 and 
7 actual failure probabilities are defined. Assuming that the FTMP from Section A.2 are being 
implemented the list of basic events increases as new basic events are introduced. 
A.4. FILE _cost_cst.txt 
If the system design improvement is restricted by its cost, then a data file with the ending 
cost_cst.txt is required in order to solve the optimisation problem. The file is used to store 
values for design cost limits as well as each component cost. 
In the first row of the file following the key word ‘COST’ minimum and maximum design 
cost limits are to be written, whereby the first number represents the minimum value. For 
evaluation of maintenance costs the total number of maintence interval time units covering an 
examined time period (one year) is provided after the keyword ‘UNITS’. If maintenance costs 
are not considered for a problem solved, value 0 should be written.  
After the keyword “COMPONENTS” component cost data is provided. Each subsequent row 
corresponds to a single basic event. As in the file with the ending _bse.aqd, a row starts with 
the unique event code. Then component costs are listed. First component design cost is to be 
written. Next, maintenance costs are listed in the following order: a single maintenance test 
cost, component maintenance and repair costs. If any of the mentioned costs is not considered 
a zero value has to be written.  
As an example, the fault tree in Figure A.1 is considered that is modified using FTMPs as 
described in Section A.2. The optimal design cost cannot exceed 20 units. Figure A.3 
demonstrates the data file contents where maintenance costs are considered for only basic 
events 1, 2 and 3. 
A.5. FILE _mdt_cst.txt 
The data required to implement systems down time constraints is stored in the file 
_mdt_cst.txt. Minimum and maximum range limits for possible values of maintenance down 
time are listed after the keyword ‘MDT’ in the first row. The second row of the data file starts 
with the key word ‘UNIT’ which identifies that the numerical value followed after is a total 
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number of time units (used for maintence time intervals) in the examined time period ( TU  as 
used in Formula 4.14). The third row with the key word ‘COMPONENTS’ indicates that the 
consequent rows of the data file contain basic events data. In each row a basic event code is 
followed by test time and time interval values between maintence activities. These are used to 
calculate maintenance down time for each component. 
 
 
Figure A.3  File _cost_cst.txt 
 
If maintenance intervals are not known and defined as design variables, the maintenance 
interval value for each basic event is set to 1 in the data file.  
Figure A.4 represents the data file content prepared for the same fault tree example as in the 
previous section (Section A.4). Maintence intervals are evaluated using days as time units. It 
means that the total number of time units in one year is equal to 365. Each component test 
time is measured in hours therefore the same time units, i.e. hours, are to be used for 
maintence down time assessment. Maintenance down time limits are set to 10 and 15 hours a 
year. 
COST 0 20 
UNITS 0 
COMPONENTS 
1  2  1  2  2  
2  3  1  1  2 
3  2  2  3  4 
4_1_1  4.5  0  0  0 
4_2_1  4.5  0  0  0 
4_3_1  4.5  0  0  0 
4_1_2  3  0  0  0 
4_2_2  3  0  0  0 
4_3_2  3  0  0  0 
5_1_1  2  0  0  0 
5_2_1  2  0  0  0 
6_1_1  3.5  0  0  0 
6_2_1  3.5  0  0  0 
7  5  0  0  0 
 
Keywords Minimum value Maximum Value 
Basic 
Event 
Code 
Testing 
Cost 
Corrective 
Cost 
Design 
Cost 
Preventive 
Cost 
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Figure A.4  File _mdt_cst.txt 
 
 
A.6. FILES _volume_cst.txt AND _weight_cst.txt 
The structures of data files _volume_cst.txt and _weight_cst.txt, which are used to store data 
for calculation of volume and weight constraints, are identical. The first row has minimum 
and maximum limit values of system volume/ weight identified with the key word 
‘VOLUME’/’WEIGHT’. In either file the second row has the key word ‘COMPONENTS’. 
The consequent rows start with a basic event code followed by the corresponding component 
volume/ weight. 
A.7. FILE _theta.txt 
If time intervals between maintence activities are considered as design variables an additional 
data file with the ending _theta.txt is required to be produced. The data in the file is divided 
into two parts. Different system components can undergo maintenance at different time 
intervals, therefore the range limits for time intervals between anticipated different maintence 
activities are provided first. It is implemented by storing each interval identification number 
and possible minimum and maximum limit values. 
MDT 10 15 
UNIT 365 
COMPONENTS 
1  3  30 
2  1  30 
3  2  30 
4_1_1  1  40 
4_2_1  1  40 
4_3_1  1  40 
4_1_2  1.5  55 
4_2_2  1.5  55 
4_3_2  1.5  55 
5_1_1  0.5  30 
5_2_1  0.5  30 
6_1_1  1.2  25 
6_2_1  1.2  25 
7  1  30 
Basic 
Event 
Code 
Test 
Time 
Test 
Interval 
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The second part of the file is separated from the first one by the key word “COMPONENTS”. 
It is used to store maintenance interval data of system components. Each row starts with a 
maintence interval identification number as introduced in the first part of the file. After the 
interval identification number a basic event code follows which represents a system 
component that has been assigned to undergo maintenance at these particular intervals. It is 
common, that a number of components undergo maintence at the same time, therefore a 
maintence interval identification number needs to be listed as many times as there are 
components maintained at these time intervals. In the same way, the remaining specified 
maintence intervals and associated basic events are listed. Note that this file does not provide 
numerical values of maintenance intervals, but it defines links between each basic event and 
its associated maintence interval. 
To illustrate the file content an example introduced in Section A.1 and analysed through out 
the appendix is analysed. Consider the system components 1, 2, 3 and 4 (as well as 
components 4_1_1, 4_1_2, etc.) undergo maintenance at the same time and it can be 
performed within the range of 3 to 5 months. The remaining components 5 (including 5_1_1 
and 5_2_1), 6 (including 6_1_1 and 6_2_1) and 7 can be maintained as often as 6 months but 
at least once a year. In consistence with the earlier given _mdt_cst.txt file example, range 
limits of maintence intervals should be provided in the same time units, i.e. days. For 
example, 3 month will be equivalent to 90 days and 5 month will be equal to 150 days. The 
data file is shown in Figure A.5. 
A.8. FILE _gav.txt 
GA parameters such as population size, crossover rate, mutation rate and number of 
generations have to be defined by the user in the data file _gav.txt. The example of the file 
content is shown in Figure A.6. The keywords in each file line are indispensable because they 
are used to identify a value of a certain parameter used by the GA.  
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Figure A.5  File _theta.txt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.6. File _gav.txt 
 
 
 
1 90 150 
2 180 360 
COMPONENTS 
1  1 
1  2 
1  3 
1  4_1_1 
1  4_2_1 
1  4_3_1 
1  4_1_2 
1  4_2_2 
1  4_3_2 
2  5_1_1 
2  5_2_1 
2  6_1_1 
2  6_2_1 
2  7 
Identification 
Number of 
Maintenance Test 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Basic Event 
Code 
population 10 
crossover 0.75 
mutation 0.002 
generations 100 
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APPENDIX 2 
A.2.1.  DATA FOR QUANTITATIVE FWDS FAILURE ANALYSIS 
 
Table A.2.1.   Distribution Network Failure Events 
Notation Event Description 
FSU Failure of pump selector unit to initiate start of the standby pump in sequence, on detection of failure of duty pump/pump to restore ringmain pressure. 
OE Designated duty pump/pump inadvertently left in a mode other than auto start at the 
end of the test. 
PBF Manual push button in the control room failing to initiate pump start when pressed. 
PT (type 1) Failure of ringmain low pressure sensor to indicate low ringmain pressure. 
 
Table A.2.2. Distribution Network Failure Basic Events 
Notation λ τ HT NS CS C1 Q 
FSU 8e-6 2.4e-5 1 1 200 2000  
PT 7e-6 4e-6 1 2 100 500  
OE  0.01 
PBF  0.01 
 
Table A.2.3. Firewater System Failure Basic Events 
Notation Event Description 
E_FB/D_FB The pump, which includes seawater filter, is blocked by debris (electrical and diesel driven). 
E_IVB/D_IVB The firewater pump line isolation valve being blocked (electrical and diesel driven). 
E_IVC/D_IVC The firewater pump line isolation valve closed (electrical and diesel driven). 
E_PRVO/D_PRVO Pressure relief valve on header from pump to ringmain fails open (electrical and diesel driven). 
E_SVO/D_SVO The flow control valve fails to open on demand. (It is used to dump 
excess flow from pumps to ringmain) (electrical and diesel driven). 
E_CVB/D_CVB Check valve on header between the pump and ringmain blocked (electrical and diesel driven). 
D_DVO/E_DVO Line discharge valve to sea fails open (electrical and diesel driven). 
EM/DM Maintenance is being carried out on an firewater pump (electrical and diesel driven). 
D_TIVB Diesel tank isolation valve blocked. 
D_TIVC Diesel tank isolation valve closed. 
D_LAF Diesel tank level switch fails to signal low level to control room. 
D_OAF Operator fails to notice firewater diesel tank low level alarm. 
D_EF Firewater diesel engine fails. 
DPF Failure of firewater diesel pump. 
E_ESF Failure of electric supply to the electric driven pumps. 
E_ESF Failure of electric supply to the electric driven pumps. 
E_MF Global motor failure. 
EPF Failure of firewater electric pump. 
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Table A.2.4. Firewater System Failure Basic Events 
Notation λ τ HT NS CS C1 β η Q 
E_FB/D_FB 2.8e-5 1.2e- 2 4 150 100    
E_IVB/D_IVB 1.8e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 300 400    
E_PRVO/D_PRVO 1.2e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 300 500    
E_SVO/D_SVO 1.8e-5 2.4e-5 2 3 300 800    
E_CVB/D_CVB 1.8e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 300 400    
E_IVC/D_IVC         0.01 
D_DVO/E_DVO         0.01 
EM/DM         0.04 
D_TIVC         0.01 
D_OAF         0.01 
D_EF         0.00128 
D_TIVB 3e-5 8e-6 2 2 300 400    
D_LAF 3e-5 6e-6 2 2 200 200    
DPF    2 1 1000 2900 2 14035  
EPF    2 1 1000 3000 2 16667  
E_ESF  5e-5 2e-6 2   1000    
E_MF         4.5e-05 
 
Table A.2.5. Basic Events of AFFF Supply System Failure 
Notation Event Description 
AE_FB/AD_FB The pump, which includes filter, is blocked by debris (electrical and diesel driven). 
AE_SIVB/AD_SIVB The AFFF pump line suction isolation valve being blocked (electrical and diesel driven). 
AE_SIVC/AD_SIVC The AFFF pump line suction isolation valve closed (electrical and diesel driven). 
AE_PRVO/AD_PRVO Pressure relief valve on header from pump to ringmain fails 
open (electrical and diesel driven). 
AE_SVO/AD_SVO 
The flow control valve fails open on demand. (It is used to 
dump excess flow from pumps to ringmain) (electrical and 
diesel driven). 
AE_CVB/AD_CVB Check valve on header between the pump and ringmain blocked (electrical and diesel driven). 
AE_DIVB/AD_DIVB The AFFF pump line discharge isolation valve being blocked (electrical and diesel driven). 
AE_DIVC/AD_DIVC The AFFF pump line discharge isolation valve closed (electrical and diesel driven). 
AE/DM Maintenance is being carried out on an AFFF pump (electrical and diesel driven). 
AD_ATIVB AFFF diesel tank isolation valve blocked. 
AD_ATIVC AFFF diesel tank isolation valve closed. 
AD_LAF Diesel tank level switch fails to signal low level to control 
room. 
AD_OAF Operator fails to notice AFFF diesel tank low level alarm. 
AD_EF Diesel global engine failure. 
ADPF Failure of AFFF diesel pump. 
AE_ESF Failure of electric supply to the electric driven AFFF pumps. 
ATIVB AFFF tank isolation valve blocked. 
ATIVC AFFF tank isolation valve closed. 
AEPF Failure of AFFF electric pump. 
Appendix 2 230 
Table A.2.6. Data of AFFF System Failure Basic Events 
Notation λ τ HT NS CS C1 β η Q 
AE_FB/AD_FB 2.8e-5 1.2e-5 2 4 150 100    
AE_SIVB/AD_SIVB 1.8e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 300 400    
AE_PRVO/AD_PRVO 1.2e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 300 500    
AE_SVO/AD_SVO 1.8e-5 2.4e-5 2 3 300 800    
AE_CVB/AD_CVB 2.5e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 300 500    
AE_DIVB/AD_DIVB 1.8e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 300 400    
AE_SIVC/AD_SIVC         0.01 
AE_DIVC/AD_DIVC         0.01 
AE/DM         0.04 
AD_ATIVC         0.01 
AD_OAF         0.01 
AD_EF         0.00128 
AD_ATIVB 3e-5 8e-6 2 2 300 400    
AD_LAF 3e-5 6e-6 2 2 200 200    
ADPF   2 1 800 1450 2 14035  
AEPF   2 1 800 1500 2 16667  
AE_ESF 5e-5 2e-6 2   1000    
ATIVB 3e-5 8e-6 2 2 300 400    
ATIVC         0.01 
 
Table A.2.7. Deluge System Failure Basic Events 
Notation Event Description 
SI/WSI Failure of MFGP to select and send a close signal to the solenoid valve 
correctly in AFFF and water Deluge Skid accordingly. 
MRM/WMRM Manual release mechanism fails to dump instrument air. 
SV1/SV2/WSV1/ 
WSV2 
Solenoid activated valve fails to dump instrument air on receipt of the 
signal from the MFGP in AFFF and water Deluge Skid accordingly 
(there are 2 solenoid valves in each deluge skid). 
WBS Strainer, located downstream of the water deluge valve, blocked. 
WNB Deluge nozzle on the waterspray system blocked. 
WIVB1/WIVB2 Locked open butterfly valve blocked (one upstream and one downstream 
of the water deluge valve). 
WHE1/WHE2 Operator leaves the normally locked open butterfly valve in the shut position (one upstream and one downstream of the water deluge valve). 
WV  Water deluge valve fails to open. 
WVRF (old type) Valmatic relief valve sticks closed on activation. 
AHE  AFFF isolation valve left closed. 
AIVB Normally locked open butterfly valve on the AFFF distribution line blocked (only one isolation valve on AFFF line). 
AINF The foam supply into the firewater distribution line is blocked by the inductor nozzle. 
ACVB The check valve in the AFFF injection line is blocked. 
AV (type 1) AFFF deluge valve fails to open on demand. 
 
Table A.2.8. Data of Basic Events for Deluge System Failure 
Notation λ τ HT NS CS C1 Q 
SI/WSI 2e-7 6e-6      
MRM/WMRM 1e-5 1.2e-5 2 1 300 600  
SV1/WSV1 3e-6 1.2e-5 2 2 300 400  
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Notation λ τ HT NS CS C1 Q 
SV2/ WSV2 2e-5 1.2e-5 2 2 300 250  
WBS 2.8e-5 1.2e-5 2 4 75 100  
WNB(old type) 3e-5 1.2e-5 2 3 300 1000  
WIVB1/WIVB2 1.8e-6 1.8e-6 2 2 300 400  
WHE1/WHE2       0.01 
WV (type 1) 4e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 200 400  
WVRF (old type) 5e-6 1.2e-5 2 1 300 600  
AHE       0.01 
AIVB 1.8e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 300 400  
AINF (old type) 3e-5 1.2e-5 2 3 300 1000  
ACVB 2.5e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 300 600  
AV (type 1) 4e-5 1.8e-5 2 2 150 300  
 
Table A.2.9. Data of New System Components 
Associated 
Design 
Variable 
Basic Event Notation λ τ β η HT NS CS C1 
tPT PT (type 2) 1.4e-5 4e-6   1 2 100 200 
tPT PT (type 3) 2.1e-5 4e-6   1 2 100 100 
t1FE, t2FE 
EPF (50% capacity) 
(type 1)   1.5 22857 2 2 900 1800 
t1FE, t2FE 
EPF (50% capacity) 
(type 2)   1.5 26667 2 2 900 2000 
t1FE, t2FE 
EPF (33 1/3% 
capacity) (type 1)   1.5 32000 2 2 800 1200 
t1FE, t2FE 
EPF (33 1/3% 
capacity) (type 2)   1.5 40000 2 2 800 1400 
t1FD, t2FD 
DPF (50% capacity) 
(type 1)   1.5 20000 2 2 900 1500 
t1FD, t2FD 
DPF (50% capacity) 
(type 2)   1.5 22857 2 2 900 1800 
t1FD, t2FD 
DPF (33 1/3% 
capacity) (type 1)   1.5 28571 2 2 800 1000 
t1FD, t2FD 
DPF (33 1/3% 
capacity) (type 2)   1.5 33333 2 2 800 1100 
tAE AEPF (50% capacity)   1.5 22857 2 2 600 900 
tAD APFD (50% capacity)   1.5 20000 2 2 600 750 
tWD WV (type 2) 3.5e-5 1.8e-5   2 2 200 500 
tWD WV (type 3) 2.8e-5 1.8e-5   2 2 200 600 
tAD AV (type 2) 3.5e-5 1.8e-5   2 2 150 400 
tAD AV (type 3) 2.8e-5 1.8e-5   2 2 150 500 
tDN WNB(new type) 5e-6 1.2e-5   2 3 300 3000 
tIN AINF (new type) 5e-6 1.2e-5   2 3 300 3000 
tVR WVRF (new type) 2e-6 1.2e-5   2 1 300 900 
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A.2.2. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED GSDOP PERFORMANCE 
SOLVING THE FWDS DESIGN OPTIMISATION PROBLEM 
 
Table A.2.10. Minimal Unavailability Values when Population Size is Equal to 10 
Population size = 10 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
0.001 0.1113 0.0977 0.0983 
0.005 0.1088 0.0960 0.0953 
Mutation Rate 
0.01 0.1048 0.0947 0.0942 
 
Table A.2.11. Minimal Unavailability Values when Population Size is Equal to 30 
Population size = 30 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
0.001 0.1076 0.0950 0.0948 
0.005 0.0937 0.0939 0.0936 
Mutation Rate 
0.01 0.0934 0.0934 0.0934 
 
Table A.2.12. Minimal Unavailability Values when Population Size is Equal to 50 
Population size = 50 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
0.001 0.0958 0.0956 0.0949 
0.005 0.0935 0.0938 0.0933 
Mutation Rate 
0.01 0.0933 0.0928 0.0926 
 
Table A.2.13. Minimal Unavailability Values when Mutation Rate is Equal to 0.001 
Mutation Rate = 0.001 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
10 0.1113 0.0977 0.0983 
30 0.1076 0.0950 0.0948 
Population Size 
50 0.0958 0.0956 0.0949 
 
Table A.2.14. Minimal Unavailability Values when Mutation Rate is Equal to 0.005 
Mutation Rate = 0.005 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
10 0.1088 0.0960 0.0953 
30 0.0937 0.0939 0.0936 
Population Size 
50 0.0935 0.0938 0.0933 
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Table A.2.15. Minimal Unavailability Values when Mutation Rate is Equal to 0.01 
Mutation Rate = 0.01 
Crossover Rate  
0.75 0.8 0.95 
10 0.1048 0.0947 0.0942 
30 0.0934 0.0934 0.0934 
Population Size 
50 0.0933 0.0928 0.0926 
 
Table A.2.16. Minimal Unavailability Values when Crossover Rate is Equal to 0.75 
Crossover Rate = 0.75 
Mutation Rate  
0.001 0.005 0.01 
10 0.1113 0.1088 0.1048 
30 0.1076 0.0937 0.0934 
Population Size 
50 0.0958 0.0935 0.0933 
 
Table A.2.17. Minimal Unavailability Values when Crossover Rate is Equal to 0.8 
Crossover Rate = 0.8 
Mutation Rate  
0.001 0.005 0.01 
10 0.0977 0.0960 0.0947 
30 0.0950 0.0939 0.0934 
Population Size 
50 0.0956 0.0938 0.0928 
 
Table A.2.18. Minimal Unavailability Values when Crossover Rate is Equal to 0.95 
Crossover Rate = 0.95 
Mutation Rate  
0.001 0.005 0.01 
10 0.0983 0.0953 0.0942 
30 0.0948 0.0936 0.0934 
Population Size 
50 0.0949 0.0933 0.0926 
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APPENDIX 3 
A.3.1. UAV DESIGN OPTIMISATION USING THE PHASED MISSION 
DESIGN OPTIMISATION ALGORITHM 
 
Table A.3.1. Basic Event Failure Probability Data 
Basic Event 
Name in 
Fault Trees 
Description Failure Probability 
LGret Landing gear can not be extended 0. 02 
LGex Landing gear can not be retracted 0. 025 
Avion Avionics system fails 0.01 
Valve_b_O Brake control valve fails opened 0.05 
Valve_b_C Brake control valve fails closed 0.05 
Valve_a_O Antiskid valve fails opened 0.04 
Valve_a_C Antiskid valve fails closed 0.05 
Brake Brakes fail 0.03 
Eng 1 Engine 1 fails 0.01 
Eng 2 Engine 2 fails 0.01 
Valve1c_O Cross feed valve 1 fails opened 0.037 
Valve1c_C Cross feed valve 1 fails closed 0.06 
Valve2c_O Cross feed valve 2 fails opened 0.037 
Valve2c_C Cross feed valve 2 fails closed 0.04 
Tank1 Tank 1 fails 0.01 
Tank2 Tank 2 fails 0.01 
Pump1 Pump 1 fails 0.03 
Pump2 Pump 2 fails 0.03 
Navig Navigation system fails 0.01 
Avoid Sense and avoidance system fails 0.01 
Flight Flight control surfaces fail 0.01 
Canc Phase is aborted 0.035 
Bird1 Bird strike on engine 1 0.06 
Bird2 Bird strike on engine 2 0.06 
Atc Air traffic control failure 0.01 
Aircraft Other aircraft 0.02 
Storm Storm 0.03 
Comm Communication mistake 0.01 
 
Table A.3.2. Additional Basic Events Data 
Description 
Basic Event 
Code in the 
Data Files 
Failure 
Probability 
Type 1 landing gear can not be extended 1_1_1 0. 02 
Type 2 landing gear can not be extended 1_1_2 0. 01 
Type 1 antiskid valve fails opened 6_1_1 0.04 
Type 2 antiskid valve fails opened 6_1_2 0.035 
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Description 
Basic Event 
Code in the 
Data Files 
Failure 
Probability 
Type 3 antiskid valve fails opened 6_1_3 0.045 
Type 1 brakes fail 8_1_1 0.03 
Type 2 brakes fail 8_1_2 0.02 
Type 1 navigation system fails 19_1_1 0.01 
Type 2 navigation system fails 19_1_2 0.015 
Type 1 sense and avoidance system fails 20_1_1 0.01 
Type 2 sense and avoidance system fails 20_1_2 0.0125 
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Figure A.3.1. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.75, Population Size 10 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.2. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.8, Population Size 10 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.3. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.95, Population Size 10 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.4. Standard Deviation of the Best Fitness Values from Five Runs, 
Population Size 10 Chromosomes 
 
Mutation  
Rate 
 
Crossover 
 rate 
0.001 0.005 0.01 
0.75 0.111193998 0.111143857 0.111124663 
0.8 0.111123294 0.11111812 0.11111812 
0.95 0.111127812 0.111117676 0.111117676 
Table A.3.3. Average Best Optimisation Results after 100 Generations for Five Runs, 
Population Size 10 Chromosomes 
 
Appendix 3 
 
237 
Crossover Rate 0.75
0.111
0.1112
0.1114
0.1116
0.1118
0.112
0.1122
0.1124
0.1126
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97
Generation No.
Fi
tn
e
s
s
 
Va
lu
e
Mutation Rate 0.001 Mutation Rate 0.005 Mutation Rate 0.01
 
Figure A.3.5. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.75, Population Size 30 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.6. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.8, Population Size 30 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.7. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.95, Population Size 30 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.8. Standard Deviation of the Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when 
Population Size is 30 Chromosomes 
 
Table A.3.4. Average Values for Best Optimisation Results after 100 Generations, 
Population Size 30 Chromosomes 
Mutation  
Rate 
 
Crossover 
 rate 
0.001 0.005 0.01 
0.75 0.111118565 0.111117676 0.111117676 
0.8 0.111117689 0.111117676 0.111117676 
0.95 0.111117676 0.111117676 0.111117676 
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Figure A.3.9. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.75, Population Size 50 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.10. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.8, Population Size 50 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.11. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.95, Population Size 50 Chromosomes 
 
Table A.3.5. Average Values for Best Optimisation Results after 100 Generations, 
Population Size 50 Chromosomes 
Mutation  
Rate 
 
Crossover 
 rate 
0.001 0.005 0.01 
0.75 0.111117676 0.111117676 0.111117676 
0.8 0.111117676 0.111117676 0.111117676 
0.95 0.111117676 0.111117676 0.111117676 
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A.3.2. MILITARY VESSEL DESIGN OPTIMISATION USING PMSDOP 
(CASE 1) 
 
Table A.3.6. Data of Power & Propulsion System Components 
Failure Events Failure Probabilities 
Nuclear steam raising plant fails 1.7278×10-4 
Condenser fails 2.5654×10-4 
Circulating water pump fails 8.7222×10-4 
Circulating water hull valve fails 1.9368×10-4 
Circulating water system fails 1.9368×10-4 
Air ejection gland fails 2.5654×10-4 
Lubricating oil system fails 2.3277×10-4 
Main lubricating oil filter fails 3.1033×10-4 
Main lubricating oil cooler and thermostat fails 2.3278×10-4 
Feed pump fails 3.1035×10-4 
Extraction pump 1, 2 fails 4.6399×10-4 
Main lubricating oil pump (alternating current) fails 3.8733×10-4 
Main lubricating oil pump (direct current) fails 5.8093×10-4 
Ahead valve fails 2.6165×10-3 
Astern throttle valve fails 2.6165×10-3 
Turbine fails 1.3093×10-3 
Main gear box fails 4.4457×10-3 
Clutches fail 4.4457×10-3 
Shaft fails 2.5654×10-4 
Shaft seal fails 2.5654×10-4 
Thrust block fails 2.5654×10-4 
Propulsor fails 1.7611×10-4 
 
Table A.3.7. Data of Electrical Supply System Components 
Failure Events Failure Probabilities 
Motor generator (MG) Fails  1.8141×10-3 
MG alternating current automatic voltage regulator fails  6.6208×10-4 
MG direct current voltage and frequency regulator fails 2.9791×10-3 
Direct current switchboard fails  3.3112×10-4 
Alternating current switch board 1, 2 fails 2.8407×10-4 
Turbine 1, 2 Fails 2.6193×10-4 
Turbo generator (TG) bearing 1, 2 fails 2.0075×10-4 
Generator bearing 1, 2 fails 2.0075×10-4 
TG air cooler 1, 2 fails 2.0075×10-4 
TG governor trips & control system 1, 2 fails 2.6196×10-4 
Duplex filter 1, 2 fails 2.6196×10-4 
Generator 1, 2 fails 2.3919×10-3 
TG automatic voltage regulator 1, 2 fails 9.952×10-5 
 
Table A.3.8. Data of Fresh Water Cooling System Components 
Failure Events Failure Probabilities 
Hull valve (inlet) 1, 2 fails 1.7611×10-4 
Flexible coupling unit 1, 2, 3, 4 fails 1.7611×10-4 
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Failure Events Failure Probabilities 
Sea water services system 1, 2 fails 1.7611×10-4 
Sea water service pump 1, 2 fails 5.2825×10-4 
Hull valve (outlet) 1, 2 fails 1.7611×10-4 
Heat exchanger 1, 2 fails 1.7611×10-4 
 
Table A.3.9. Data of Hydraulics System Components 
Failure Events Failure Probabilities 
External hydraulic plant fails 1.0861×10-3 
External hydraulic system fails 2.7164×10-4 
Aft system fails 2.7164×10-4 
Aft plant (steering) (alternating current) fails 2.7131×10-3 
Aft plant (steering) (direct current) fails 9.4637×10-3 
Main hydraulic plant fails 1.6287×10-3 
Main hydraulic system fails 2.7164×10-4 
 
Table A.3.10. Data of Hydroplanes Control System Components 
Explanation Failure Probabilities 
Aft hydroplane control surfaces fail 2.3277×10-4 
Hydraulic tilting cylinder fails  2.3277×10-4 
Aft hydroplane ram servo unit fails 6.9770×10-4 
Aft hydroplane order transmission box fails 2.3283×10-4 
Air tilting cylinder fails 2.3277×10-4 
Air in emergency control fails 6.9770×10-4 
For’d hydroplane control surfaces fail 2.3277×10-4 
Tilting cylinder fails 2.3277×10-4 
For’d hydroplane ram servo unit fails 6.9770×10-4 
For’d hydroplane order transmission box fails 2.3283×10-4 
 
Table A.3.11. Data of the Rudder Control System Components 
Failure Events Failure Probabilities 
Control surfaces fail 4.6549×10-4 
Rudder ram fails 2.3277×10-4 
Ram servo unit fails 1.3963×10-3 
Rate control fails 2.3283×10-4 
 
Table A.3.12. Data of New Vessel Components 
Components Failure Probabilities 
CW pump type 2 5.2825×10-4 
Feed pump type 2 1.2546×10-4 
Ahead valve type 2 3.6328×10-3 
MG VFR type 2 1.9654×10-3 
External hydraulic plant type 2 5.6120×10-4 
Main hydraulic plant type 2 2.7131×10-3 
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Table A.3.13. Data of Components Cost and Weight 
Component Cost Weight Component Cost Weight 
NRSP 10 20 TG Air Cooler 1, 2 7 200 
Condenser 6 700 TG Governor Trips & Control System 1, 2 6 60 
CW Pump Type 1 1 76 Duplex Filter 1, 2 3 10 
CW Pump Type 2 0.7 80 Generator 1, 2 4 120 
CW Hull Valve 1 10 TG AVR 1, 2 3 15 
Circ Water System 9 50 Hull Valve (Inlet) 1, 2 2 10 
Air Ejection Gland 6 10 Flexible Coupling Unit 1, 2, 3, 4 3 70 
Lub Oil System 7 30 Sea Water Services System 1, 2 6 30 
Main Lub Oil Filter 5 3 Sea Water Service Pump 1, 2 3 200 
Main Lub Oil Cooler and 
Thermostat 7 20 Hull Valve (Outlet) 1, 2 3 70 
Feed Pump Type 1 4 6 Heat Exchanger 1,   4 8 
Feed Pump Type 2 5 5 External Hydraulic Plant Type 1 7 1500 
Extraction Pump 1, 2 3 5 External Hydraulic Plant Type 2 7 1700 
Main Lub Oil Pump AC 4 4 External Hydraulic System 8 200 
Main Lub Oil Pump DC 2 4.5 Aft System 9 150 
Ahead Valve Type 1 2 6.5 Aft Plant (Steering) AC 4 100 
Ahead Valve Type 2 1.5 5 Aft Plant (Steering) DC 4 100 
Astern Throttle Valve 2 6.5 Main Hydraulic Plant Type 1 8 1000 
Turbine 9 2300 Main Hydraulic Plant Type 2 7 900 
Main Gear Box 7 2600 Main Hydraulic System 10 150 
Clutches 7 2600 Aft Hydroplane Control Surfaces 4 60 
Shaft 5 30 Hydraulic Tilting Cylinder 3.5 15 
Shaft Seal 6 10 Aft Hydroplane Ram Servo Unit 5 50 
Thrust Block 5 50 Aft Hydroplane Order Transmission Box 3 310 
Propulsor 10 5000 Air Tilting Cylinder 2.5 12 
MG 5 150 Air in Emergency Control  4 30 
MG AC AVR 3 5 For’d Hydroplane Control Surfaces 4 60 
MG DC VRF Type 1 1 4 Tilting Cylinder  3 15 
MG DC VRF Type 2 1.5 5 For’d Hydroplane Ram Servo Unit  5 50 
DC Switchboard 5.5 10 For’d Hydroplane Order Transmission Box  3 310 
AC Switch board 1, 2 6 15 Control Surfaces 5 60 
Turbine 1, 2 8 150 Rudder Ram  6 230 
TG bearing 1, 2 7 30 Ram Servo Unit  4.5 50 
Generator Bearing 1, 2 5 20 
 
Rate Control  6 30 
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Figure A.3.12. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.75,  Population Size 10 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.13. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.8, Population Size 10 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.14. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.95, Population Size 10 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.15. Standard Deviation of the Best Fitness Values from Five Runs, 
Population Size 10 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.16. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.75,  Population Size 30 Chromosomes 
 
Crossover Rate 0.8
0.094
0.095
0.096
0.097
0.098
0.099
0.1
0.101
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97
Generation No.
Fi
tn
e
s
s
 
Va
lu
e
Mutation Rate 0.001 Mutation Rate 0.005 Mutation Rate 0.01
 
Figure A.3.17. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.8,  Population Size 30 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.18. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.95,  Population Size 30 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.19. Standard Deviation of the Best Fitness Values from Five Runs, 
Population Size 30 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.20. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.75, Population Size 50 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.21. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.8, Population Size 50 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.22. Means of Best Fitness Values from Five Runs when Crossover Rate = 
0.95, Population Size 50 Chromosomes 
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Figure A.3.23. Standard Deviation of the Best Fitness Values from Five Runs, 
Population Size 50 Chromosomes 
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A.3.3. MILITARY VESSEL DESIGN OPTIMISATION PROBLEM 
WITH CONSTRAINTS ADDED AT EACH PHASE  
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Figure A.3.24. Average Fitness Values for Generations when Crossover Rate = 0.75 
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Figure A.3.25. Average Fitness Values for Generations when Crossover Rate = 0.8 
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Figure A.3.26. Best Fitness Values for Generations when Crossover Rate = 0.75 
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Figure A.3.27. Best Fitness Values for Generations when Crossover Rate = 0.8 
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APPENDIX 4 
UAV DESIGN OPTIMISATION USING THE MPMSDOA  
 
Table A.4.1. Basic Event Data 
Basic Event 
Name in 
Fault Trees 
Description Failure Probability 
LGret Landing gear can not be extended 0. 002 
LGex Landing gear can not be retracted 0. 0025 
Avion Avionics system fails 0.001 
Valve_b_O Brake control valve fails opened 0.005 
Valve_b_C Brake control valve fails closed 0.005 
Valve_a_O Antiskid valve fails opened 0.004 
Valve_a_C Antiskid valve fails closed 0.005 
LGret Landing gear can not be extended 0.002 
LGex Landing gear can not be retracted 0.0025 
Avion Avionics system fails 0.001 
Valve_b_O Brake control valve fails opened 0.005 
Valve_b_C Brake control valve fails closed 0.005 
Valve_a_O Antiskid valve fails opened 0.004 
Valve_a_C Antiskid valve fails closed 0.005 
Brake Brakes fail 0.003 
Eng 1 Engine 1 fails 0.004 
Eng 2 Engine 2 fails 0.006 
Valve1c_O Cross feed valve 1 fails opened 0.0037 
Valve1c_C Cross feed valve 1 fails closed 0.006 
Valve2c_O Cross feed valve 2 fails opened 0.0037 
Valve2c_C Cross feed valve 2 fails closed 0.004 
Tank1 Tank 1 fails 0.001 
Tank2 Tank 2 fails 0.001 
Pump1 Pump 1 fails 0.003 
Pump2 Pump 2 fails 0.003 
Navig Navigation system fails 0.001 
Avoid Sense and avoidance system fails 0.001 
Flight Flight control surfaces fail 0.001 
Canc Phase is aborted 0.0035 
Bird1 Bird strike on engine 1 0.006 
Bird2 Bird strike on engine 2 0.006 
Atc Air traffic control failure 0.001 
Aircraft Other aircraft 0.002 
Storm Storm 0.003 
Comm Communication mistake 0.001 
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Table A.4.2. Additional Basic Event Data 
Description 
Failure 
Probability 
during 
Mission 1 
Failure 
Probability 
during 
Mission 2 
Type 1 landing gear can not be extended 0.002 0.008 
Type 2 landing gear can not be extended 0.006 0.003 
Type 1 antiskid valve fails opened 0.004 0.004 
Type 2 antiskid valve fails opened 0.003 0.006 
Type 3 antiskid valve fails opened 0.008 0.002 
Type 1 brakes fail 0.003 0.001 
Type 2 brakes fail 0.001 0.004 
Type 1 engine 1 fails 0.004 0.005 
Type 2 engine 1 fails 0.006 0.003 
Type 3 engine 1 fails 0.009 0.009 
Type 1 engine 2 fails 0.006 0.002 
Type 2 engine 2 fails 0.0035 0.005 
Type 3 engine 2 fails 0.0015 0.008 
Type 1 navigation system fails 0.001 0.008 
Type 2 navigation system fails 0.005 0.0025 
Type 1 sense and avoidance system fails 0.001 0.007 
Type 2 sense and avoidance system fails 0.004 0.0025 
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Figure A.4.1. Generational Metric Values when Crossover Rate = 0.75 
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Figure A.4.2. Generational Metric Values for the Last 30 Generations when Crossover 
Rate = 0.75 
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Figure A.4.3. Function C Values when Crossover Rate = 0.75 
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Figure A.4.4. Spacing Metric Values when Crossover Rate = 0.75 
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Figure A.4.5. Generational Metric Values when Crossover Rate = 0.8 
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Figure A.4.6. Generational Metric Values for the Last 30 Generations when Crossover 
Rate = 0.8 
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Figure A.4.7. Function C Values when Crossover Rate = 0.8 
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Figure A.4.8. Spacing Metric Values when Crossover Rate = 0.8 
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Figure A.4.9. Generational Metric Values when Crossover Rate = 0.95 
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Figure A.4.10. Generational Metric Values for the Last 30 Generations when Crossover 
Rate = 0.8 
 
Appendix 4 254 
0.382 0.397
0.421
0.3270.34
0.388
0.595
0.3940.375
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Mutation Rate=0.001 Mutation Rate=0.005 Mutation Rate=0.01
Population Size=30 Population Size=50 Population Size=70
 
Figure A.4.11. Function C Values when Crossover Rate = 0.95 
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Figure A.4.12. Spacing Metric Values when Crossover Rate = 0.95 
